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I. Introduction
Trade disputes take many forms and can be resolved through a
variety of practical and legal means. Some disputes can be
resolved bilaterally, others plurilaterally or multilaterally. Some
involve the search for common understanding, others the pursuit
of solely national objectives. Some disputes can be initiated by
private parties, others require government action. Some disputes
are covered by international agreements, others are not.
The United States pursues its objectives through a wide variety
of fora: trade liberalization in Asia through the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) process; rules on investment
through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD); hemispheric trade liberalization through
the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA); dismantlement of
various barriers to trade through bilateral negotiations through the
World Trade Organization (WTO); harmonization of standards
(product, health and environmental) through various multilateral
bodies; and dispute settlement through the WTO and other bodies.
This paper analyzes dispute settlement under the WTO two
and a half years after ,its debut and discusses what private
practitioners should expect in the future. There are many vehicles
for resolving issues within the WTO. Some issues may be
resolved through committee work and others through negotiations.
This paper, however, focuses largely on issues that are resolved
through consultations and, in some cases, formal Panel
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proceedings. The responsibilities and functions of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) are also analyzed, giving
special attention to how the USTR serves to represent the interests
of the United States at the WTO.
A. The Need for More Effective Dispute Settlement
The World Trade Organization came into being on January 1,
1995 as a result of the long work program involved in the Uruguay
Round of negotiations.' A new entity such as the WTO was
deemed necessary because of the singular nature of the obligations
and rights assumed, and because the new agreements were broader
in scope than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) had been.' A core objective of the United States in the
Uruguay Round was a dispute resolution system that would be
more effective and more timely.' Many of the trading partners of
The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Romnd of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations was signed on April 15, 1995, at Marrakesh, Morocco. The main
component of the Final Act is the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and its four annexes. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 1 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994). Annex IA to the Marrakesh Agreement, Establishing the World
Trade Organization, contains multilateral agreements on trade in goods which make up
the "GATT 1994" as well as a number of side agreements. See Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 20
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. GATT 1994 has five
components, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 4
GATT B.I.S.D. at 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT 1947], as amended through the years,
instruments adopted under GATT 1947, and the Understandings contained in Annex IA
of the WTO Agreement. See General Agi'ement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra, Annex IA, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994), 33 1.L.M. 1226
[hereinafter GATT 1994]; PHILIP RAWORTH & LINDA C. REIF, THE LAW OF THE WTO 15-
16(1995).
As of November 20, 1996, there were 125 Members of the WTO. In addition, 31
nations have requested to join through the accession process. GATT coexisted with the
WTO for 12 months and came to an end, subject to certain ongoing dispute resolution
work, on December 31, 1995.
2 See Terence P. Stewart, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, in 2 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 2663, 2670 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
3 The U.S. Congress set out its negotiating objectives for dispute resolution in the
Uruguay Round as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. See 19
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the United States, on the other hand, wanted to curb unilateral
action by the United States in resolving disputes. The
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (DSU)4 within the WTO is the agreement aimed at
dealing with both needs.
While dispute settlement had been an integral part of GATT
since its inception and had worked satisfactorily in many
situations, practice revealed a number of flaws.' For example,
parties losing in the dispute settlement proceedings could block
adoption of the adverse ruling. While "peer pressure" eventually
resolved many cases, the disputes often dragged on for years.6
Even in cases where the losing party did not block adoption of
Panel reports, there was the opportunity for significant delay
because of the absence of time limits for completion of particular
phases. Virtually every aspect of a Panel proceeding could be
mired in delay if a participant did not want a speedy resolution 8
As a result of these problems, many countries felt that important
cases could simply not be decided within the GATT framework.
U.S.C. § 2901 (1994) [hereinafter Trade and Competitiveness Act]. The Act reads in
relevant part:
(b) Dispute Settlement-The principal negotiating objectives of the United
States with respect to dispute settlement are
(1) to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute settlement
mechanisms and procedures; and
(2) to ensure that such mechanisms within the GATT and GATT
agreements provide for more effective and expeditious resolution of
disputes and enable better enforcement of the United States' rights.
Id. § 2901(b).
' See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
5 See Stewart, supra note 2,,at 2669-70.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See Richard 0. Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section 301 and Dispute
Settlement in the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21' CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION 581, 583-84 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
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B. United States Attempts to Improve Dispute
Settlement Unilaterally
In response to these problems, the United States adopted
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.' Section 301 allowed
private parties to identify various market access problems to the
U.S. government and permitted consultations, negotiations,
dispute resolution and, if necessary, unilateral action.'°
Importantly, while the U.S. law permitted the pursuit of GATT
dispute settlement, it mandated resort to unilateral action if the
Panel process did not work quickly enough." Starting in the
Reagan years, the United States became much more aggressive in
pursuing problems through Section 301-threatening and, in a few
cases, taking unilateral action.'2 U.S. action was instrumental not
only in focusing attention on the need for an improved dispute
settlement process but also in expanding the agenda of the
Uruguay Round to include new areas like services and Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),'3 where
Section 301 was increasingly being used.
Many of the procedural delays in the GATT dispute settlement
system were addressed on a provisional basis at the Mid-term
review of the Uruguay Round negotiations in Montreal in
December 1988, where timelines for the various phases were
agreed upon.' 4 In addition, countries accepted the objective of
minimizing delay and blockage of reports."
II. Dispute Resolution Pursuant to the DSU
A more final solution came at the end of the Uruguay Round in
9 See Stewart, supra note 2, at 2704-05.
'o See id.
" See Cunningham & Smith, supra note 8, at 590.
12 See Trade Action Monitoring System Pending Investigation Report, Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Department of Commerce (1993).
1' See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex IC, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS; 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
'4 See Stewart, supra note 2, at 2755.
'" See id.
1998]
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1994 when the WTO was formed. The DSU was adopted as an
annex to the WTO Agreement and formed a critical part of the
overall package. 6 It established the rules and procedures for
consultations and dispute settlements.' 7 The DSU brings about a
number of fundamental changes in the way disputes are resolved.
It effectively ends the ability of losing parties to block adoption of
Panel reports by reversing the concept of consensus. Instead of
one party being able to block adoption, all countries must now
agree not to adopt (i.e., the winning party can prevent blockage). 18
Timelines reduce the potential for delay.' 9  Timelines for
implementation of changes, opportunity for review of whether
changes implemented correct the WTO violation, rights to
compensation or retaliation, and how to determine the amount of
compensation or retaliation are all addressed.0 Cross-retaliation
(e.g., against goods for a violation of a services or intellectual
property right) is authorized in limited circumstances.2' Forum
shopping, a common practice under the GATT system of
plurilateral Codes,22 is brought to an end. Special or additional
rules applicable to particular agreements are detailed. Countries
are required to resolve their disputes through the system rather
than by unilateral action." In addition, in response to deep
concerns within the United States about the transparency of GATT
16 As stated in Article 3.2 of the DSU:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.2.
7 See id. art. 1.1.
'8 See id. art. 2.4.
'9 See id. arts. 17.5, 17.14, 20.
20 See id. arts. 20-22.
21 See id. art. 22.
22 See id. art. 3.
23 See id. art. 23.
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proceedings,24 countries were given the right to release their
submissions and to request public versions or summaries of
25
submissions of other parties in disputes to which they are a party.
A. The Dispute Settlement Body
In order to administer its provisions, the DSU provides for the
creation of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 26  The DSB is
authorized to establish three-person Panels that in turn review
disputes." Parties unsatisfied with the Panel's recommendations
may appeal to a three-person Appellate Body, which is also
established by the DSB. 8
Panel members are chosen from a list of qualified individualsS 29
maintained by the WTO Secretariat. The DSU requires special
care in the selection of Panel members so as to ensure their
independence and diversity.3° Appellate Body members are to be
"persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in
law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered
agreements generally."3' They are appointed for a four year term
and each person may be reappointed once.32
Members of the Appellate Body are selected "on the basis of
rotation, while taking into account the principles of random
selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to
serve regardless of their national origin."33 During the first two
years, the Presiding Members were Justice Florentino Feliciano of
24 Some of the United States' concerns probably flowed from the adverse Panel
decision, never adopted, rendered in Mexico's challenge of the U.S. Marine Mammal
Protection Act. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 155 (1992); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat.
1027 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994)).
25 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 18.2.
26 See id. art. 2.1.
27 See id. arts. 6.1, 8.5, 11.
28 See id. art. 17.1.
29 See id. art. 8.4.
30 See id. art. 8.2.
"' Id. art. 17.3.
32 See id. art. 17.2.
33 WTO Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review (Feb. 15, 1996)
at 6.2 [hereinafter Working Procedures].
1998]
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the Philippines; Mr. Julio Lacarte Muro of Uruguay; Professor
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann of Germany; Dr. Said El-Naggar of
Egypt; Mr. Christopher Beeby of New Zealand; Professor Mitsuo
Matsushita of Japan; and Mr. James Bacchus of the United
States.34
1. Ethical Rules-Conflicts of Interest
Both Panel and Appellate Body members are governed by
rules of conduct established by WTO Members.35 These rules
include guidance on ethical matters such as conflicts of interest
and confidentiality. Panel members and Appellate Body members
are to take due care in the performance of their duties to fulfill
these expectations, including avoidance of any direct or indirect
conflicts of interest with respect of the subject matter of the
proceedings.36 The rules require self-disclosure by these "covered
persons" of any interest, relationship, or matter that the person
could reasonably be expected to know and that is "likely to affect
34 See Swearing-In Ceremony of Appellate Body Members, WTO Secretariat,
Press/37 (Dec. 13, 1995).
31 See Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DSB/RC/1 (Dec. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Rules
of Conduct]. The rules of conduct also apply to arbitrators and experts participating in the
dispute settlement mechanism. See id. at VII.5-10. The DSU only establishes Panel
procedures, not Appellate Body procedures. See id. art 12. The DSU allows the
Appellate Body to set its own procedures. See id. art. 17.9. The Appellate Body adopted
the Rules of Conduct on a provisional basis. See Working Procedures, supra note 33, at
8.1. The rules of conduct are subject to review within two years of their adoption and the
decision to continue, modify, or terminate these rules is in the hands of the DSB. See Rules
of Conduct, supra, at VIII.
36 See Rules of Conduct, supra note 35, at V. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA) implemented the WTO Agreement into U.S. law. See 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
As part of this Act, Congress expressed its desire for certain actions by the United States
Trade Representative. The Congress directed the USTR to seek the establishment of
conflicts rules:
(c) Rules governing conflicts of interest
The Trade Representative shall seek the establishment by the General
Council and the Dispute Settlement Body of rules governing the conflicts of
interest by persons serving on Panels and members of the Appellate Body
and shall describe, in the annual report submitted under section 3534 of this
title, any progress made in establishing such rules.
Id. § 3533(c).
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or give rise to justifiable doubts as to that person's independence
or impartiality."37 However, unlike Panelists, who are forbidden
from sitting on Panels where their governments are a party to the
proceeding,38  Appellate Body members are under no such
prohibition.39
While the conflict rules could mark an important step in the
process of building public confidence in the impartiality of
Panelists and Appellate Body members, many questions remain
unanswered. During negotiations over the rules, U.S. trade
representatives discovered that the concepts being articulated were
not well understood by other countries. Moreover, most Panelists
have been and continue to be from the Geneva missions of the
various countries.
While Panelists take the position in their individual capacities
and not as representatives of their governments, Panel members
are often from countries with stated positions on given issues.
This could lead to sensitive conflicts between countries. For
example, Cairnes group countries were generally highly
supportive of dramatic trade liberalization in agriculture. Should
the European Community (EC), which generally favored a go slow
approach on agricultural reform, be able to block use of delegates
from Cairnes group countries in any agricultural dispute to which
the EC is a party on the theory that the countries involved have
well defined positions? Should countries that are subject to import
quota regimes in textiles and apparel be viewed as conflicted in
determining Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)40
challenges?
Most observers would say no. If that is true, it is hard to
imagine how a governmental official would ever be disqualified.
One can imagine extreme situations where an official has publicly
3' Rules of Conduct, supra note 35, at V.2.
38 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 8.3. However, parties to the dispute may agree
otherwise. See id.
31 See Rules of Conduct, supra note 35.
40 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note
1, Annex IA, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TExTS (1994), available in 1994 WL 761483 [hereinafter
ATC].
1998]
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taken a position on the very issue before the Panel, but such
situations are likely to be rare. If conflicts of interest will seldom,
if ever, be found for government officials, perhaps the WTO has
simply engaged in a process of eyewash to assuage public
concerns without any real movement to address underlying
concerns. Answers to these concerns and questions presumably
will depend on experience and whether the viewer perceives that
there was a bona fide problem that needed to be addressed.
2. Ethical Obligations-Confidentiality
In addition to the conflict rules, there is a requirement of
confidentiality for persons covered by the rules. Maintaining
confidentiality of documents until the Panel process is completed
has already proven troublesome. Historically, it has been quite
common for Panel reports to be leaked to selected members of the
public including the press. Such practices were supposed to be
shut down by the new rules under the DSU.
41
Nonetheless, in one of the first Panel proceedings, breach of
confidentiality of the interim Panel report was raised to the Panel.
Specifically, in the Costa Rica underwear dispute with the United
States, the United States raised concerns with the Panel that Costa
Rica had violated its obligations of confidentiality by leaking
information on the interim Panel report as witnessed by a large
range of accounts in the Costa Rican press. 4' The United States
withdrew its claim when the underlying facts suggested that the
U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica was partially to blame through its
actions in response to press accounts allegedly flowing from Costa
Rican leaks.43
3. Standard of Review-Panels
The DSU also provides some guidance on the standard of
review for Panel and Appellate determinations. A major function
of Panels is to evaluate disputed agreements between Members.
However, the degree of deference to be accorded Members'
41 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 14.
42 See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre
Underwear, WT/DS24/R (Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Costa Rica Underwear Panel].
43 See id. at 8.
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interpretation of their obligations was not clarified by the DSU.
Therefore, Panels had to determine from their terms of reference,
the agreement or agreements in dispute, and from the submissions
of the parties, just what type of inquiry they would undertake."
Under the authority provided in Article 11 of the DSU, Panels
are to make an "objective assessment of the facts of the case. 45
Thus far, Panels have made decisions regarding Members'
obligations based on the agreements and facts of the particular
disputes. It will be interesting to see how Panels deal with
disputes arising under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, where a
specific standard of review is set out in Article 17.6.46 How Panels
44 1. Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the
dispute agree otherwise within 20 days from the establishment of the panel:
"To examine, in the light.of the relevant provisions in . . . the matter
referred to the DSB by (name of party) ... and to make such findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or giving the rulings
provided for in that/those agreement(s)."
2. Panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or
agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.
3. In establishing a Panel, the DSB may authorize its Chairman to draw up
the terms of reference of the Panel in consultation with the parties to the
dispute, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1. The terms of reference thus
drawn up shall be circulated to all Members. If other than standard terms of
reference are agreed upon, any Member may raise any point relating thereto in
the DSB.
DSU supra, note 4, art. 7.
41 Id. art. 11.
46 The standard of review for anti-dumping cases is established under GATT 1994.
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the Panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their
evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of
the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the Panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall
not be overturned;
(ii) the Panel shall interpret the relevant portions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Where the Panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of
more than one permissible interpretation, the Panel shall find the authorities'
measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 23
interpret this standard of review and to what degree they actually
accord deference to the Member nations remains to be seen.
4. Standard of Review-Appellate Body
The DSU sets out the rules for appellate review in Article 17 .
However, none of the provisions can be thought of as establishing
any cogent standard, such as a "clearly erroneous" or de novo, for
reviewing Panel decisions.48 The DSU only states that "[a]n
appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the Panel. ' 9  Therefore,
review is limited to legal, not factual, findings of the Panel. The
legal conclusions and findings of the Panel are deemed open to
review without any concrete guidance from the DSU on the
Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, art. 17.6 [hereinafter
Implementation of Article VI].
The WTO Panel process has yet to consider the special rules of review contained in the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, although several matters have been noticed through requests
for consultations. See Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60 (Oct. 24 1996) (complaint by Mexico); United
States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Solid Urea from the Former German
Democratic Republic, WT/DS63 (Dec. 9, 1996) (complaint by the European
Communities); United States-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Colour Television
Receivers from Korea, WT/DS89/1 (July 16, 1997) (complaint by Korea).
4" See DSU, supra note 4, art. 17. The article reads in relevant part:
17(4) Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a Panel report.
Third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may make written submissions to, and be
given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body.
17(5) As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date
a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the
Appellate Body circulates its report. In fixing its timetable the Appellate Body
shall take into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if relevant.
When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60
days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together
with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case
shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.
17(6) An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.
Id.
48 Cf. Implementation of Article VI, supra note 46 (providing the text of Article
17.6 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994).
49 DSU, supra note 4, art. 17.6.
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deference they deserve.
This type of review is similar to judicial review, in some
situations, in the Federal Courts of the United States. The U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeal do not give deference to the legal
interpretations or constructions of lower courts. ° Similarly, there
is no "reasonableness" standard applied by the Appellate Body to
issues of law.
In its first six appeals," the Appellate Body carefully
considered the issues appealed and the authority it enjoys in
deciding those issues. In the first appeal, Reformulated Gas, the
United States challenged certain legal conclusions of the Panel 2
The Appellate Body determined that the appeal was to be "sharply
limited" due to the limited number of issues appealed by the
United States. 3 The Appellate Body began by going through the
findings of the Panel and analyzing the way in which it had
reached its conclusions. There was no articulated standard by
which the Appellate Body proceeded to make its determination.
The Appellate Body reviewed the Panel's determinations and its
interpretations of the obligations required under the articles and
the agreement as a whole. It did not retrace the factual inquiry but
50 See NSK, Ltd. v. United States, 115 F.3d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Torrington
Co. v. United States, 82 F.3d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United
States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
51 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Panel], WT/DS2/AB/R
(Apr. 22, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body]; Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8, WT/DS 10, WT/DS 11 (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter Japan
Liquor Panel], WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSIO/AB/R, WT/DSII/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)
[hereinafter Japan Liquor Appellate Body]; Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated
Coconut, WT/DS22/R (Oct. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Desiccated Coconut Panel],
WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body]; Costa
Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Costa
Rica Underwear Appellate Body]; United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/R (Jan. 6, 1997) [hereinafter India Wool
Shirts and Blouses Panel], WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter India Wool
Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body]; Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Canada Split-Run Panel], WT/DS31/AB/R
(Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Canada Split-Run Appellate Body].
52 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 1.
3 See id. at 8.
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rather the conclusions the Panel came to based upon the Panel's
understanding of the obligations of the parties and the facts of the
dispute.
B. The Appeals Process
The appeals process is governed by the DSU as well as a set of
working procedures adopted by the Appellate Body. The
Appellate Body was given the task, under the DSU, of drawing up
its own working procedures. 4 The Appellate Body accordingly
adopted a set of working procedures that address practically all
important aspects of appellate decision making.5 The Working
Procedures set out timelines, requirements for submissions, and
guidance for the conduct of the parties during the dispute
resolution process.
The rules governing the process of appeals, as set out in part II
of the Working Procedures, are set up in the "interests of fairness
and orderly procedure in the conduct of an appeal. 56  The
procedures govern the commencement of appeals,57 the time
periods for appeals,58 communications with the Members,"
appellant's and appellee's submissions,6° rights of third parties,6'
and all other aspects of an appeal. The rules and procedures
correspond to the time limits set out in the DSU and attempt to
harmonize the Appellate Body's rules with those of the Panels.62
Due to the time periods set out in DSU Article 17.5, the Appellate
Body performs its functions in a relatively short period of time.
" See DSU, supra note 4, art. 17.9.
51 See Working Procedures, supra note 33.
56 Id. pt. II, 16.1.
17 See id. pt. II, 20.
58 See id. pt. II, 26.
59 See id. pt. I, 4.
0 See id. pt. II, 21-22.
61 See id. pt. II, 24.
62 Letter of Appellate Body Chairman to the Dispute Settlement Body Chairman,
WNTO Appellate Body, (Feb. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Letter of Appellate Body Chairman]
(copy of letter on file with author of article).
63 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 17.5. As a general rule, the proceedings are not to
exceed 60 days, and in no case shall go beyond 90 days from the date a party to the dispute
(Vol. 23
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In the view of the Appellate Body, these rules and procedures
"are reasonable within the constraints imposed by the DSU and
afford due process to all parties concerned while at the same time
providing the Appellate Body with the time it requires for careful
study, deliberation, decision-making, report-writing by the
division and subsequent translation of the Appellate Report.
64
1. Time Periods for Appellate Review
The DSU specifies that the Appellate Body has only sixty days
from the date the party to the dispute provides notice of itsS61
decision to appeal to the date the final report is circulated. With
a few minor exceptions the Appellate Body fulfilled its duties
within the sixty-day time period provided.66
2. Subject Matter of Appeal
The DSU sets out what may be the subject of an appeal.
Appeals are limited to issues of law and legal interpretations
formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report.
See id.
64 Letter of Appellate Body Chairman, supra note 62, at 3.
65 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 17.5.
66 In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body completed its review in
exactly 60 days. The United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal on February
21, 1996 and the Appellate Body signed its report on April 22, 1996. See Reformulated
Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 2, 29. In the Japan Liquor case, the Appellate
Body completed its review in 58 days. Japan notified the DSB of its decision to appeal on
August 8, 1996 and the Appellate Body signed its report on September 25, 1996. See Japan
Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 2, 33. In the Costa Rica Underwear case, the
Appellate Body completed its review in 86 days. Costa Rica notified the DSB of its
decision to appeal on November 11, 1996 and the Appellate Body signed its report on
February 5, 1997. See Costa Rica Underwear Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 2, 15. In
the Desiccated Coconut case, the Appellate Body completed its review in 60 days. The
Philippines notified the DSB of its decision to appeal on December 16, 1996 and the
Appellate Body signed its report on February 14, 1997. See Desiccated Coconut Appellate
Body, supra note 51, at 1, 16. In the India Wool Shirts and Blouses case, the Appellate
Body completed its review in 61 days. India notified the DSB of its decision to appeal on
February 24, 1997 and the Appellate Body signed its report on April 15, 1997. See India
Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 2, 21. In the Canada Split-Run
case, the Appellate Body completed its review in 55 days. Canada notified the DSB of its
decision to appeal on April 29, 1997 and the Appellate Body signed its report on June 23,
1997. See Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 2, 37.
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developed by the Panel.67 Although third parties have the right to
appear before a Panel and submit arguments, they do not have the
right to appeal the Panel's decision. 68  However, if an appeal is
taken by one of the parties, third parties do have the right to make
written submissions and be heard by the Appellate Body.69
Since the WTO and its dispute settlement system went into
effect on January 1, 1995, there have been six Appellate Body
decisions. In two of the cases the Appellate Body upheld all the
legal interpretations and findings of the Panel.' In the four other
cases, the Appellate Body overturned some of the Panel's legal
findings.
3. Issues Not Addressed in the Working Procedures
In the six appeals discussed above, the Appellate Body
resolved a number of critical issues. Although the DSU and the
Working Procedures were helpful in conducting business, they,
understandably, did not anticipate everything. For example, it was
not clear if earlier GATT 1947 Panel decisions were binding on
the Panel and Appellate Body under the WTO. Also, the
Appellate Body had to consider just how much factual analysis it
could permissibly undertake.
67 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 17.6. In the first case decided by the Appellate
Body, the Body made it clear that only those issues in fact appealed by a party would be
considered. See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 8. Stated
differently, a party who wishes to preserve the right to challenge an aspect of a Panel
decision must do so in its own appeal or in a timely cross-appeal. Under the Appellate
Body's Working Procedures, any party may file a separate appeal, See Working
Procedures, supra note 33, pt. 1I, 23.4., or join in an appeal filed by the original
appellant and raise its own alleged errors in the issues of law covered in the Panel report.
See id. pt. It, 23.1.
68 See DSU, supra note 4, arts. 10, 17.4.
69 See id. art. 17.4.
70 See supra note 51 for citations of all six cases.
7' See Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body, supra note 51; India Wool Shirts and
Blouses Appellate Body, supra note 51.
72 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51; Japan Liquor
Appellate Body, supra note 51; Costa Rica Underwear Appellate Body, supra note 51;
Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra note 51.
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a. Status of GATT 1947 Decisions
In applying the customary rules of international law in
interpreting the WTO and "covered agreements,"73 the Appellate
Body had to decide the status of adopted Panel decisions under
GATT 1947. The issue arose in the Japan Liquor Panel decision
when one of the parties argued that a 1987 Panel decision should1 4
be considered controlling authority in the dispute. In essence,
Canada argued that "subsequent practice" should be considered in
interpreting the terms of GATT 1994. 75
The Appellate Body found the Panel's finding of "subsequent
practice" to be in error under recognized principles of customary
international and general international law. In particular, the
Appellate Body observed:
Generally, in international law, the essence of subsequent
practice in interpreting a treaty has been recognized as a
"concordant, common and consistent" sequence of acts or
pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernible
pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation. An isolated act is generally not sufficient to
establish subsequent practice, it is a sequence of acts
establishing the agreement of the parties that is relevant."
The Appellate Body concluded that adopted GATT 1947 Panel
decisions only bound the parties to the dispute in that particular
case.77  That determination was supported by the fact that
subsequent GATT 1947 Panels did not feel legally bound by the
"details and reasoning of a previous Panel report."7' The Appellate
Body reasoned:
73 In its first decision, the Appellate Body found that it was required to interpret
WTO agreements according to principles of customary international law. See
Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 16; see also DSU, supra note
4, art. 3.2 (stating that agreements should be interpreted "in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law").
7' See Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at 12-13.
71 See id. at 13.
76 Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 12-13 (citations in original
quote omitted).
77 See id. at 14.
78 Id. at 13.
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We do not believe that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in
deciding to adopt a Panel report, intended that their decision
would constitute a definitive interpretation of the relevant
provisions of GATT 1947. Nor do we believe that this is
contemplated under GATT 1994 .... Adopted Panel reports
are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often
considered by subsequent Panels. They create legitimate
expectations among WTO Members, and therefore, should be
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.
However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving
the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute. In
short, their character and their legal status have not been
changed by the coming into force of the WTO Agreement.79
4. Appellate Body Factual Analysis
An important question under the DSU is the degree to which
the Appellate Body may engage in factual analysis. The DSU in
Articles 17.6 and 17.13 limits appeal to "issues of law covered in
the Panel Report and the legal interpretations developed by the
Panel."8° In the Canada Split-Run decision, the Appellate Body
reversed the findings of the Panel on the issue of "like product"
because it could not agree that the Panel had "sufficient grounds"
to find the two products at issue were like products.8' Because the
Appellate Body could not uphold the Panel's findings on this
issue, the entire determination regarding GATT 1994 Article 111:2,
first sentence, which sets out certain national treatment
requirements, was invalidated.
8 2
By reversing the Panel's findings on the issue of "like
product," the Appellate Body had to undertake an analysis of the
"consistency of the measure with the second sentence of Article
111:2 of the GATT 1994" in order to determine if there was a
violation. This caused a problem because none of the parties
79 Id. at 13-14.
80 Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 22.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 Id.
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appealed the findings of the Panel on this provision.84 The
question was whether it was within the power of the Appellate
Body to conduct such an analysis. The Appellate Body
determined that it had the authority to do so, reasoning:
As the legal obligations in the first and second sentences are
two closely-linked steps in determining the consistency of an
internal tax measure with the national treatment obligations of
Article 111:2, the Appellate Body would be remiss in not
completing the analysis of Article 111:2. In the case at hand, the
Panel made legal findings and conclusions concerning the first
sentence of Article 111:2 and because we reverse one of those
findings, we need to develop our analysis based on the Panel
Report in order to issue legal conclusions with respect to Article
111:2, second sentence of the GATT 1994.85
Thus, the Appellate Body will not hesitate to engage in legal
and factual analysis when it determines that such analysis is
necessary to complete its job in a timely manner. The Appellate
Body's report was adopted by the DSB, and, apart from Canada's
objections, there seems to be no real reaction from WTO Members
to the Appellate Body's decision and interpretation of its authority.
If Members are unhappy with a lack of "remand" authority, they
will have a chance to consider modifications during the 1998
review of the DSU.86
84 See id. at 23.
85 Id. at 24.
86 See Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement, supra note 1,
Decisions and Declarations 33 I.L.M. 1259 (1994). The Decision provides:
Recalling the Decision of 22 February 1994 that existing rules and procedures
of GATT 1947 in the field of dispute settlement shall remain in effect until the
date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization,
Invite the relevant Councils and Committees to decide that they shall remain in
operation for the purpose of dealing with any dispute for which the request for
consultation was made before that date;
Invite the Ministerial Conference to complete a full review of dispute settlement
rules and procedures under the World Trade Organization within four years
after the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and to take a decision on the occasion of its first meeting after the
completion of the review, whether to continue, modify or terminate such
dispute settlement rules and procedures.
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III. Improved Transparency
The WTO dispute resolution system also benefits from a
movement towards improved transparency of the resolution
process. More information is made available under the current
system than was available under GATT 1947.
A. Transparency Under GATT 1947
Being a forum for governments, GATT was characterized by
substantial confidentiality of proceedings and deliberations. To
many, the GATT limitations on access to documents have been
excessive and have created unnecessary uncertainty as to the
concerns of and conflicts between the trading nations. Restrictions
on access have been so overbroad that even public laws and
regulations and administrative determinations forwarded to GATT
were routinely marked as restricted and not made available to the
public for extended periods of time. While selected GATT
documents were published periodically, the vast majority of
documents were available only to governments. Access to even
public GATT documents (other than those published in the BISD
series) has been difficult for most members of the public to obtain.
Not surprisingly, the public in the United States has viewed
with suspicion the need for such confidentiality within GATT.
This suspicion was heightened with the prospect of binding
dispute resolution and the controversy over loss of sovereignty.87
Id.
87 On January 4, 1995, then-U.S. Senator Bob Dole introduced Senate Bill, S. 16.
The purpose of the bill was to create a commission that would review the dispute
settlement reports of the World Trade Organization. See WTO Dispute Settlement
Review Commission Act, S. 16, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Review Commission].
The "Dole Commission," as it became known, would review the decisions of the Panels
and Appellate Body to determine if the Panel or Appellate Body had exceeded its
authority under the terms of reference. See supra note 44 for the text of DSU article 7 on
terms of reference. After review of the adverse decisions, the commission would make a
report to Congress on the Panel or Appellate Body decisions, and Congress could decide
by Joint Resolution to instruct the President to undertake negotiations to amend or
modify the rules and procedures of the DSU. See Review Commission, supra.
Ultimately, if the Congress was sufficiently persuaded that continued membership in the
WTO was not in the interest of the United States, it could withdraw its approval of the
WTO Agreement. See id.
This legislation has not been adopted. No nation needs a special commission to
withdraw from an international agreement. Agreements typically contain explicit
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Moreover, private parties whose interests are directly affected
by GATT Panels have had relatively limited access to the process
in the United States. While petitioners in underlying trade
disputes were often consulted by the USTR for views in GATT
Panels, the public had little, if any, input. Submissions by the
United States or its trading partners were not part of the public
record, making a study of the Panel process quite difficult and
essentially incomplete.
Concerns were also raised about unequal access to the GATT.
Counsel for foreign interests were occasionally deputized and
made part of delegations for dispute settlement proceedings in
Geneva (although apparently only where other parties did not
object). By contrast, the United States has had a long-standing
policy of not allowing non-government personnel into Panel
proceedings. Because government interests may not correspond to
the interests of the private parties, some have advocated giving a
formal role to private litigants in the Panel process.
B. Transparency Under the WTO-Derestriction
of Documents
A host of transparency and public access issues were addressed
in the Uruguay Round Agreements and in the first two and a half
years of the WTO's operation. The United States viewed
transparency as one of the critical elements to a successful worldtrade " 88
trade regime. Transparency of foreign trade regimes is critical to
an understanding of trade barriers and inconsistencies that may
exist. The Uruguay Round Agreements have been quite successful
in requiring countries to provide notifications of existing laws,
regulations, and practices.
The USTR has worked for greater transparency at the WTO
procedures and timelines for withdrawal. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. XV:I
(withdrawal "should take effect upon the expiration of six months from the date on
which written notice of withdrawal is received").
88 "The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding transparency is
to obtain broader application of the principle of transparency and clarification of the costs
and benefits of trade policy actions through the observance of open and equitable
procedures in trade matters by Contracting Parties to the GATT." Trade and
Competitiveness Act, supra note 3, § 2901(b)(3).
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and within the U.S. system. 9 Since the launch of the WTO, the
USTR has pursued substantial revisions in the treatment of
documents submitted to and generated by the WTO. An early
success for the United States was the initial decision that laws and
regulations were not entitled to be restricted. 90 Resolution of the
larger issue of derestriction of documents was held up for some
time, in part due to the sensitivity of how dispute settlement
proceedings would be handled.
Nonetheless, in July 1996, the WTO General Council decided
to adopt procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO
documents.9' The General Council decision was a significant
success for those seeking greater transparency. While there was a
long delay from the General Council in 1997 in deciding actual
public access, there is now substantial access to derestricted
documents. 9' Thousands of documents are currently available on-
line: more are added daily, and many are no longer restricted.
However, the WTO is having problems in making previously
restricted documents available to the public.93
The decision mandates that documents be circulated after the
89 The URAA puts a premium on transparency.
The Trade Representative shall seek the adoption by the Ministerial Conference
and General Council of procedures that will ensure broader application of the
principle of transparency and clarification of the costs and benefits of trade
policy actions, through the observance of open and equitable procedures in
trade matters by the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, and by the
dispute settlement Panelists and the Appellate Body under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding.
19 U.S.C. § 3536 (1994).
90 See WTO General Council, Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of
WTO Documents, WT/L/160 (July 18, 1996) [hereinafter Derestriction Procedures]
(noting "information that is publicly available or ... is required to be published under
any agreement in Annex 1, 2 or 3 of the WTO Agreement shall be circulated on an
unrestricted basis").
9' See id.
92 The WTO can be reached via its Internet address at http://www.wto.org.
93 The Washington, D.C. law firm of Stewart and Stewart performed an internal
review of derestricted documents listed by the WTO. Its search indicated that as of July
30, 1997, several hundred documents had been listed as derestricted by WTO notices.
Only two documents, however, were actually found in the WTO Internet database:
WT/DER/I, WT/DER/2, WT/DER/3, WT/DER/4 (covering the period 25 March 1997
through 24 July 1997).
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effective date of the WTO unless listed in the Appendix.
Documents in the Appendix (i.e., restricted documents) are subject
to potential derestriction. Importantly, the decision confirms that
"any document that contains only information that is publicly
available or information that is required to be published under any
agreement in Annex 1, 2 or 3 of the WTO Agreement shall be
circulated on an unrestricted basis. 94
The Appendix lists eight categories that are to be treated as
restricted and provides the normal timing of derestriction. 9' If
documents are actually derestricted, there will be, over time, a
substantial interest in transparency of the workings of the WTO.
94 Derestriction Procedures, supra note 91, para. 1. Paragraph 2 permits parties to
submit other documents as unrestricted and permits restricted documents to be reviewed by
various entities or at the request of a member. See id. para. 2. Paragraph 3 sets forth the
procedures for seeking derestriction. See id. para. 3. Paragraph 4 outlines the obligations of
the Secretariat to put out a list of documents for possible derestriction. See id. para. 4.
Paragraph 5 indicates that opposition to derestriction takes the document out of
consideration for between one and two years (depending on date of objection). See id. para.
5. Paragraph 6 outlines the timetable for circulation of newly derestricted documents and
documents that remain restricted. See id. para. 6. Paragraph 7 gives the General Council
the opportunity to review and, "if necessary," modify the procedures two years after their
adoption - i.e., in July 1998. See id. para. 7.
95 The eight categories are (a) Working documents in all series (i.e., draft
documents such as agendas, decisions and proposals, as well as other working papers);
(b) Documents in the secret series (i.e., those documents relating to modification or
withdrawal of concessions pursuant to Article XXVII of GATT 1994); (c) Minutes of
meetings of all WTO bodies (other than minutes of the Trade Policy Review Body,
which shall be circulated as unrestricted), including Summary Records of Sessions of the
Ministerial Conference; (d) Reports by the Secretariat and by the government concerned
relating to the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, including the annual report by the
Director-General on the overview of developments in the international trading
environment; (e) Documents relating to working parties on accession; (f) Documents
(other than working documents covered by (a) above) relating to balance-of-payments
consultations; (g) Documents submitted to the Secretariat by a Member for circulation,
if, at the time the Member submits the document, the Member indicates to the Secretariat
that the document should be issued as restricted; (h) Reports of Panels which are
circulated in accordance with the provisions of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (such reports shall be circulated to all
Members as restricted documents and derestricted no later than the.tenth day thereafter
unless prior to the date of circulation a party to the dispute that forms the basis of a
report submits to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body a written request for
delayed derestriction; a report circulated as a restricted document shall indicate the date
upon which it will be derestricted). See Derestriction Procedures, supra note 91, app.
(a)-(h).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
However, there are already indications that Members are
restricting categories of documents for which there would appear
to be no compelling interest but that significantly restricts public
understanding. "Informal" papers circulated in working parties
would be one example.
C. Increased Transparency in the United States
Congress in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)
provided specific guidance to the Administration on opening up
the dispute settlement process to greater public observation and
rights to comment. Specifically, Congress mandated that the
USTR consult with various parties including Congress, "relevant
private sector advisory committees," and interested parties.96
Furthermore, the USTR is required to publish a notice in the
Federal Register of any WTO disputes involving the United
States 97
In addition to these requirements, Congress made clear that the
public shall have access to certain documents including U.S.
submissions, nonconfidential submissions of the other WTO
Member or Members to the dispute, and reports of the Panels and
Appellate Body. 98 The statute also requires that the USTR request
nonconfidential summaries of their written submissions from each
party to a dispute.99
The USTR's performance in adhering to the statutory
guidelines has been generally good, although the USTR has
adopted constructions of its obligations which limit information
that is made available to the public. The USTR does regularly
publish notices requesting public comment on each dispute to
which the United States is a party.
Information in the USTR public reading room includes a list of
public comments received, a copy of U.S. submissions, and the
Panel report, when appropriate for public release. However, the
files are inconsistent in the inclusion of submissions from foreign
96 19 U.S.C. § 3537(a) (1994).
97 See id. § 3537(b).
98 See id. § 3537(c).
99 See id. § 3537(d).
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governments. At times the files are updated regularly with
submissions from the parties, and other times the information is
not included for months after the submission date. The
discrepancy may have to do with the schedules of the limited
USTR staff or with inconsistent practices within the USTR in
asking for summaries or public versions of foreign government
submissions. Under the DSU, public versions or summaries must
be provided if requested by a party. However, the DSU does not
provide a deadline for public versions, and lawyers within the
USTR have indicated that some foreign governments have simply
failed to supply public summaries.
While the United States has been a party to most disputes
under the WTO, the USTR does not keep files on disputes to
which it is not a party. While not required by statute to do so, lack
of access to arguments and reasoning of parties in the other
disputes reduces transparency of the system. The USTR may wish
to consider ways to improve transparency in such disputes as well.
With regard to written views of the public, the USTR has
apparently adopted the view (although not in all cases) that
responses to the Federal Register notice will not be included in the
public record as positions taken may be used by the USTR in
preparation of its papers in the case. While such a construction
may be reasonable prior to the briefs being filed, there would
appear to be little justification in not including such documents in
the public file once all briefs have been filed or once the Panel
report is issued. The USTR's actions in not releasing such
documents at some point are inconsistent with the underlying
spirit of the URAA provisions. They limit the public's
understanding of the comment process and the type of issues used
or not by the USTR, and they prevent academic and other research
on the effectiveness of the system.
IV. Concerns: Implementation of WTO Obligations
Although the DSU, DSB, and increased transparency are
strides in the right direction, Member countries still have a number
of fundamental concerns with the WTO in general. A primary
concern has been whether other nations have in fact implemented
the new obligations undertaken as part of the WTO agreement.
Implementation of rights was a central issue in the reports of the
1998]
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Committees to the first WTO Ministerial in Singapore.1°° While
most of the major trading nations are Members of the WTO and
have provided notifications as required, the overall level of
compliance remains quite low (generally around fifty percent)
since several of the developing and least developed country
Members have not provided notifications on a wide range of
101
areas.
Moreover, the main arena for compliance concerns has been
the myriad Committees set up by the WTO. This has led to a
massive increase in paperwork for the Committees, as each of
them is already involved in reviewing notifications and examining
the responses through a system of questions and answers.I°2 The
technical work program within the Committees of reviewing laws
and regulations and raising questions about possible WTO-
inconsistency is, of course, critical to the WTO's operation. In
light of the huge additional administrative burden on countries,
there have been efforts to provide technical assistance to certain
developing countries to improve implementation efforts.
In an effort to ensure compliance, the WTO also carries
forward the work program started at the Montreal Mid-term of
reviewing trade policies of individual countries, with larger
countries being reviewed more frequently, under the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM).' °3 The TPRM provides countries a
single source overview of a country's trade policies and highlights
areas where the Secretariat or individual Members have concerns.
The intention is to highlight developments and, through public
disclosure, encourage movement to greater conformity with WTO
"o See Report of the General Council to the 1996 Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN
(96)/2 (Nov. 26, 1996); Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (96)/DEC, paras. 1,
10 (Dec. 18, 1996).
10' See WTO Singapore Ministerial Meeting: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., 105th Cong. TR-1 (1997) (statement of
Terence P. Stewart, Managing Partner, Stewart and Stewart), available in 1997 WL
82264.
102 See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.7.
103 See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 1, Annex 3, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994), available in 1194 WL 761480 [hereinafter
TPRM].
[Vol. 23
WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
obligations. Whether the TPRM has been successful is open to
question at this point in time. Nonetheless, the TPRM has been a
valuable tool in identifying trade policies of concern to WTO
Members.
The WTO has made other efforts to allow countries time to
acclimate to the new obligations. Some agreements covering
subjects that have been the object of numerous disputes (e.g., anti-
dumping and subsidies) and some agreements where substantial
new obligations are undertaken have transition rules providing
time to implement the new obligations.' °4 Hence, the number of
disputes or requests for consultations in these areas have been
limited, although this is changing.'°5
Even with the efforts to facilitate compliance, the DSB has
received ninety-nine consultation notifications during its first two
years of existence. Eight Panel decisions have been issued, and
the Appellate Body,' °6 established to handle appeals from Panel
decisions, has ruled on six cases. Moreover, a significant number
of disputes have been resolved by informal means.
Dispute resolution under the WTO has taken some interesting
statistical turns as well. Under the GATT 1947 dispute settlement
procedures, the overwhelming majority of cases were brought by
industrialized or developed countries. 10 7 Under the WTO system
there have been sixty-four requests for consultations by developed
Members, twenty-four requests by developing Members, °8 and ten
requests by both developed and developing Members. °9 Also,
"o See The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, A Collection of the Legal Texts,
World Trade Organization, August 1995, 78-91.
115 See, e.g., United States-Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabyte or Above from Korea,
WT/DS99/1 (Aug. 14, 1997).
106 See WTO SECRETARIAT, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, OVERVIEW OF THE
STATE-OF-PLAY OF WTO DsIuTEs, (Aug. 15, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm> [hereinafter WTO Dispute Overview].
107 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATIT LEGAL SYSTEM 3, 29 (1993); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 99 (1989) (listing GAT disputes from 1947 to 1986).
108 See Dispute Overview, supra note 106.
o See id. at 11-12. The Dispute Overview provides the number of matters and the
breakdown of requests for consultation by developed and developing Members. See id.
1998]
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even with the transition rules, a large number of requests for
consultations have involved new or "clarified" areas, including
intellectual property (TRIPs), agriculture, textiles and apparel
(ATC), trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), and services
(GATS)." °
V. Role of the USTR in Dispute Resolution:
Enforcement and Monitoring
As the President's principal adviser and chief spokesperson on
trade,"' the USTR not only negotiates trade agreements but is also
responsible for enforcement of the rights of the United States
under these agreements.
The section of the USTR's office responsible for coordinating
and supervising all dispute resolution activities at the WTO is the
office of Monitoring and Enforcement.' This office was created
in January 1996, by then-USTR Mickey Kantor."3 Ambassador
Kantor outlined the unit's responsibilities: develop, in cooperation
with the Department of Commerce, a comprehensive database and
tracking system for monitoring compliance of trade agreements;
prepare the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers; identify foreign government practices for U.S.
enforcement action and proper coordination of the Super 301
process and Special 301; use trade policy leverage to bring
countries into compliance with their obligations; and, in
cooperation and consultation with U.S. businesses, worker
representatives, and nongovernmental organizations,
systematically examine implementation of regional and
multilateral agreements. 114
10 This includes ten TRIPS cases, twelve Agriculture cases, seven ATC cases, ten
TRIMS cases, and three GATS cases. See Dispute Overview, supra note 106.
1 " See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c) (1994).
112 See USTR 1996 TRADE POL'Y AGENDA AND 1995 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM [hereinafter
USTR 1995 ANN. REP.], Monitoring and Enforcement Activities.
113 See USTR Establishes a Permanent Monitoring and Enforcement Unit, USTR
Press Release No. 96-1, Jan. 5, 1996.
114 See id. at 2-3.
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The office of Monitoring and Enforcement has only been in
operation since January 1996 and has been under enormous
pressure because of a limited staff and a heavy workload these first
two years. In spite of these pressures, having an office to
coordinate overall strategy and decision-making for disputes
makes sense and should ensure greater consistency in U.S.
arguments before the WTO.
The USTR is required to submit an annual report on the WTO
to Congress"5 that includes a summary of the progress achieved in
WTO dispute settlement." 16 In addition to this report, the USTR is
required to submit a report that reviews trade expansion priorities
and identifies foreign country practices that, if eliminated, are
likely to increase U.S. exports." 7 The USTR, in its 1996 report,
gave an overview of WTO dispute settlement and outlined current
and possible future cases. The USTR brought fourteen cases in
1996; three of the new cases were as a result of the 1996 Super
301 annual review." 8 The cases the USTR lists as successes are
Japan liquor; Japan sound recordings, where Japan agreed to
change its law during consultations; EC grain imports, where
settlement was reached in conjunction with the U.S.-EC settlement
on EC enlargement; Turkey film tax, where Turkey agreed in
consultations to remove the tax discrimination; and Portugal patent
protection, where Portugal changed its system to implement its
''9
obligations under the WTO TRIPS agreement.'
From January 1, 1995 to August 1997, the USTR requested
formation of a Panel in eleven cases and consultations in thirty-
' " See 19 U.S.C. § 3534 (1994). The 1995 and 1996 reports by the USTR included
trade expansion priorities, new section 301 and WTO enforcement actions, results of
implementation by other countries of the WTO agreements, Bilateral and Multilateral
priorities, WTO dispute settlement proceedings, WTO successes and the ongoing disputes.
See USTR 1995 ANN. REP, supra note 112; USTR 1997 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1996
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM [hereinafter USTR 1996 ANN. REP.].
116 See 19 U.S.C. § 3534(8) (1994).
"7 See REPORT ON TRADE EXPANSION PRIORITIES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER
12901 ("Super 301"), 61 Fed. Reg. 52,827-52,835 (1996) [hereinafter USTR TRADE
EXPANSION REP.].
1I8 See id. at 52,831.
"19 See id.
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three cases. As discussed above, the United States was
successful in a number of cases. The United States was able to,
settle some of the more politically difficult cases in consultations,
including ones brought against the United States (e.g.,
automobiles). Of the sixteen cases brought against the United
States, three resulted in Panel and Appellate Body decisions that
found the U.S. action to be inconsistent with its obligations under
particular WTO Agreements. The three "losses" of the United
States at the WTO involved environmental' 2' and textiles
122
measures.
As of August 1997, the United States is a party to an appeal at
the Appellate Body,'23 a case proceeding forward in the Panel
process, 24 and a case suspended by request of the Complainants.
2 1
VI. Panel and Appellate Body Decisions
Although the WTO has had a short history, its Panels and
Appellate Body can draw upon Panel decisions of GATT (though
such decisions are not binding) and the normal rules of
120 See Dispute Overview, supra note 106.
121 The first case brought against the United States, concerning Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, gave the United States its first loss in the WTO at the Panel level
and then at the Appellate Body. See Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51;
Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51.
122 The Panel in the Costa Rica Underwear case ruled that the United States violated
its obligations under Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. See
Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 104; ATC, supra note 40. In India's
complaint concerning measures affecting imports of woven wool shirts and blouses, the
Panel and Appellate Body found that the United States violated its obligations under the
ATC when it imposed a transitional safeguard against imports of the shirts and blouses. See
India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra note 51, at 78; India Wool Shirts and Blouses
Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 16.
23 See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas Panel, WT/DS27/US, WT/DS27/MEX, WT/DS27/ECU, WT/DS27/GUA/HON
(May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC Bananas Panel]. The Appellate Body ruled against the
EC. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R at 105-08 (Sept. 9, 1997).
24 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58 (Sep. 22, 1997) (Complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand)
[hereinafter United States-Shrimp]. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
25 See United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38
(Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter United States-Cuban Act-Suspension].
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international treaty interpretation (e.g., the Vienna Convention).' 26
This section will review the body of Panel reports and Appellate
Body decisions through July 30, 1997.
Before proceeding through the reports and decisions, it is
important to remember that the primary purpose of dispute
settlement under the WTO, as under GATT, is finding a mutually
acceptable solution between the governments concerned. The
Panel process and Appellate Body review are pursued only where
consultations have been unsuccessful. The formal process can be
terminated whenever resolution between the parties is achieved.
Indeed, the structure of the consultation process provides for a
period of at least sixty days following the formal request for
consultations for parties to reach a resolution before a party can
ask the DSB to establish a Panel.'27 The parties may continue, and
often have continued, consultations far beyond the sixty days
provided for in the DSU.'28
As of August 15, 1997, ninety-nine requests for consultations
had been submitted to the DSB.'29 Many of the requests for
consultations resulted in noticed resolutions. Indeed, while the
requests for consultations involve sixty-eight distinct matters,
roughly three times as many cases have been resolved bilaterally
(seventeen) as have resulted in Panel decisions (six).
This is not to say that the approach in Geneva has not become
more "legal." Discussion with WTO officials indicates that the
records before the Panels are increasing in length and factual
content. The pending Panel challenge of certain Japanese actions
and practices in photographic film and paper reportedly has a
126 See generally Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, U.N.Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
127 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 4.7.
128 See, e.g., Japan-Measures Affecting Distribution Services, WT/DS45 (June 13,
1996) (request for consultations by United States; further consultations were requested
by the United States on Sept. 20, 1996); Korea-Laws, Regulations and Practices in the
Telecommunications Sector, WT/DS40 (May 9, 1996) (request for consultations by the
EC); Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids, WT/DS21 (Nov. 17,
1995) (request for consultations by United States). In none of these cases has there been
a request for the establishment of a Panel.
129 See Dispute Overview, supra note 106.
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record of approximately 20,000 pages.'3° Because of the time
limits on appeals and the continued high percentage of challenges
that result in findings of violations, the WTO Secretariat reports
that countries often move briskly through the consultation phase
and request a Panel. This does not reduce the importance of the
consultation process. It does, however, indicate a shift in basic
approach to disputes within the WTO. There is a divergence of
opinion as to whether the approach is temporary or a harbinger of
the future direction.
A. Bilateral Resolution Option
Bilateral resolution remains an important option for a country
whether it is raising a concern or defending its national laws and
practices. This is true whether the countries involved are
developed, developing, or both. Indeed, the first request for
consultations involved a dispute between two developing
countries.' The case was ultimately resolved bilaterally.
Pressures for finding a bilateral solution, as opposed to running the
issue through a dispute settlement, may be greatest where the
volume of trade affected is significant or the politics of the case
difficult. Consider two high profile cases involving the United
States where agreements were reached that either ended the
dispute or postponed action by the Panel: the automobile dispute
with Japan' and the ongoing dispute with the EC over
110 See Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Film and Paper, WT/DS44/4 (June 11,
1997) (requesting an extension of time to file Panel's report "in light of a number of
factors including . . . (iii) the unprecedented volume of the evidence submitted in
English and Japanese which is approaching 20,000 pages").
131 The two countries were Malaysia and Singapore and the dispute involved the
importation of polyethylene and polypropylene. See Dispute Overview, supra note 106.
132 See Dispute Overview, supra note 106. In July 1995, the parties notified
settlement of the dispute. See also Tracy M. Abels, The World Trade Organization's
First Test: The United States-Japan Auto Dispute, 44 UCLA L. REv. 467 (1996) (noting
that "the United States violated both the language and the spirit of the WTO Agreement
by acting unilaterally to change another country's anti-competitive practices"); William
E. Scanlan, A Test Case For The New World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement
Understanding: The Japan-United States Auto Parts Dispute, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 591
(1997) (concluding that "the preferred option in cases in which a dispute arises [is to
have the parties] work out the dispute on a bilateral basis ... as was done in the auto-
parts dispute").
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implementation of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act.
133
1. Automobile Dispute
In the automobile case, the United States had sought to resolve
the long-standing trade imbalance in automobiles and automobile
parts with Japan. 34 In May 1995, the United States declared two
years of talks with Japan unsuccessful and announced "delivery of
a pre-filing notification to the WTO indicating the U.S. intent to
invoke the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO to
challenge the continuing discrimination against U.S. exports of
automobiles and parts to Japan.' 35  The United States also
announced, pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, a retaliation list of
Japanese cars on which tariffs could be raised to 100%.136 The
vehicles were certain luxury automobiles with an estimated trade
value of $5.9 billion. 137
Japan, like other countries, had pursued restraints on perceived
"unilateral" action by the United States during the Uruguay Round
negotiations,3 and had filed a request for consultations with the
United States in May 1995.39 Consultations with the United
States were held on June 12-13 and June 22-23. 40  A bilateral
agreement was reached between the United States and Japan
"I The Panel suspended its work on the Cuban Liberty case. See United States-
Cuban Act-Suspension, supra note 125. The case relates to the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.S. § 6021 (Supp. 1997)
(popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act).
13 In the mid-1990s, the United States had less than 1% of the automobile market
and only 1.1 .% of the automobile parts market in Japan. See USITC THE YEAR IN TRADE
1995, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM DURING 1995, 4 7 th Report,
USITC Pub. 2971 at 53 (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter USTIC YEAR IN TRADE 1995] (citing
Letter from Michael Kantor, USTR, to Renato Ruggiero, WTO Director-General (May 9,
1995)).
136 Id. at 53.
"I See id.
131 See id
138 See DSU, supra note 4, art. 23.
19 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
140 See id.
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before the retaliatory tariffs were implemented. 141
2. Cuban Embargo
A politically sensitive case, which has a relatively minor trade
component but that would have tested the United States and its
commitment to the WTO, was the EC's challenge to portions of
the U.S.'s Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also
known as the Helms-Burton Act. 14 2 This law was passed following
the downing of two civilian aircraft from the United States by the
Cuban military. 143  The EC requested consultations on the act
passed by the U.S. Congress in early 1996. The United States
took exception to the European action in filing the case with the
WTO, claiming that the case involved national security issues and
was not properly before the WTO.'" The EC's challenge did not
implicate provisions of the Helms-Burton Act but instead
141 See USITC YEAR IN TRADE 1995, supra note 134, at 53.
142 The principal U.S. measures to which the EC objected are as follows:
(a) the extraterritorial application of the US embargo of trade with Cuba in
so far as it restricts trade between the EC and Cuba or between the EC
and the US. This embargo is applied by virtue of the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations (CACR) of 1962, which are now codified in part
515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations. It is confirmed, codified
and reinforced by Sections 102 and 110 Libertad Act;
(b) denial of access to the U.S. tariff rate quota for sugar by virtue of Section
902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985, repeated in Section 110(c) of
the Libertad Act which prohibits the allocation of any of the sugar quota
to a country that is a net importer of sugar unless that country certifies
that it does not import Cuban sugar that could indirectly find its way to
the U.S. Several Member States of the EC are net importers of sugar and
have been unable to export sugar to the U.S. under the quota because of
this provision;
(c) denial of transit by EC goods and vessels of Members States of EC
through ports in the U.S. pursuant to Article 6005(b) of Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA)....
United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/2, at 1-2
(Oct. 4, 1996) (EC requesting establishment of a Panel).
43 See 143 CONG. REC. H645-01 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1997) (statement of Rep. Diaz-
Balart) avaliable in 1997 WL 79578.
144 See Briefing Given in Washington on Clinton Administration Position on EU's
WTO Challenge to the Libertad Act, Feb. 20, 1997 (visited Apr. 4, 1998)
<http://www.usis.usemb.se/topical/econ/libertadlibtwo.htm>.
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concerned U.S. laws that had been on the books for years-some
since the Cuban missile crisis in the early 1960s.
Nonetheless, this case pits the ability of the United States to
take action to enforce its economic embargo on Cuba against the
EC's unhappiness with perceived U.S. unilateralism. Not
surprisingly, there is a strong interest by some within Congress in
ensuring that the Helms-Burton Act is enforced as written.' 5 To
date, the Administration has been postponing implementing
actions to prevent the challenge from going forward while the
United States and the EC search for a mutually satisfactory
solution.
3. Current Disputes
The ongoing dispute over the EC's banana regime presents
issues of political and economic sensitivity to the European Union
and to many of the developing and least developed countries that
are dependent upon the banana preferences provided by the EC.
Political and economic sensitivities of a number of countries in the
Caribbean have resulted in, according to some accounts, the
United States looking for a way to settle the matter with the EC
prior to the appellate process.1
4 6
Of course, not all potentially sensitive cases have been settled
prior to the issuance of an adverse Panel decision. Canada, for
example, has long viewed its desire to maintain its cultural
diversity as a justification for many restrictive actions or
limitations on GATT and now WTO activity. Consequently,
Canada decided to forego settlement and fully litigate the issue of
split-run magazines.4 Both the Panel and Appellate Body decided
against Canada.' 48  Canada must now struggle with how it will
achieve its objectives in a manner that is not inconsistent with
WTO obligations.
141 See Letter from Jesse Helms, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations to William J. Clinton, President of the United States
(July 16, 1997) <http://www.insidetrade.com> (addressing enforcement of the Helms-
Burton Act).
146 Victory may not prove sweet to US, J. OF COMM., August 20, 1997.
147 See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51.
148 See id. at 74; Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 35-36.
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Similarly, the Panel is presently considering a challenge to a
U.S. law protecting sea turtles. 49 The dispute concerns a U.S. law
governing the taking of certain sea turtles by shrimp vessels that
use nets.'50 The Complaining parties are protesting the U.S. ban on
the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from their
countries.'5' This dispute is widely viewed as potentially having
significant political ramifications in the United States, should the
U.S. law be found to violate its WTO obligations.
With health problems flowing from a number of highly
publicized but unrelated matters, the adverse Panel decision on the
EC's ban on beef hormones'52 may similarly test the ability of
Member countries within the EC to conform to an external
determination on the conformity of national law or practices to
WTO obligations.
The United States, EC, and Japan are also pursuing challenges
to the Indonesian government's action in the automobile sector. '
There is some indication that one or more countries may accept a
bilateral solution since this is a politically sensitive issue in
Indonesia. 
54
As these cases may suggest, some nations are concerned about
issues of sovereignty under the WTO dispute resolution system.
While countries have the option of rejecting adverse findings
"I See United States-Shrimp, supra note 124.
110 See Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a) (Supp. 1997).
'5' See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58, at I (May 20, 1997) [hereinafter United States-Shrimp-India's Complaint]
(first written submission by India),
52 European Communities-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS48/R/USA at 268 (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Meat Panel]. On
appeal, the Appellate Body also decided against the EC. See European Communities-
Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R at 71 (Jan.
16, 1998) [hereinafter EC Meat Appellate Body].
'I See Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 'W/DS59
(Oct. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Indonesia-Auto] (United States requesting consultations);
WT/DS64 (Oct. 14, 1996) (EU requesting consultations); WT/DS54 (Oct. 10, 1996)
(Japan requesting consultations).
'14 Subsequent to the writing of this article, the DSB chairman announced the
creation of a Panel. See Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS55/8 (Aug. 5, 1997).
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rather than providing "compensation" or suffering "retaliation,"
the issue of whether Member countries can maintain a practice
inconsistent with WTO obligations over the long term may itself
become the subject of Panel review.
To date, however, the dispute settlement process is receiving
generally high marks by most participants. Members also seem to
be willing to live with adverse determinations.
Not surprisingly, in the decisions that have been released
publicly by the Panels and the Appellate Body through August 15,
1997, a host of important issues (procedural and substantive) have
been raised and resolved. This article now turns to a review of the
disputes and the seven published reports and decisions.
B. WTO Decisions
1. Reformulated Gasoline
a. Panel Report
The Reformulated Gas decision was the first dispute to make
its way through the Panel and Appellate Body process and be
adopted by the DSB. The dispute concerned a challenge by
Venezuela and Brazil to the consistency of regulations adopted by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement
the Clean Air Act of 1963' with certain WTO obligations."'
As stated in the Federal Register notice announcing the final
regulation, the EPA's intention was to reduce air pollution,'57 and
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1994). The Clean Air Act was originally enacted in
1963 and was subsequently amended in 1990. See Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra
note 51, at 2.1. Pursuant to the 1990 amendments, the EPA issued new regulations
which gave rise to the dispute before the WTO. See id.
156 See generally Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51.
157 See Regulations of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7716-17 (1974) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 80). The purpose of the regulation was stated as:
Summary: Through the amended Clean Air Act of 1990, Congress mandated
that EPA promulgate new regulations requiring that gasoline sold in certain
areas be reformulated to reduce vehicle emissions of toxic and ozone-forming
compounds. This document finalizes the rules for the certification and
enforcement of reformulated gasoline and provisions for unreformulated
conventional gasoline.
1998]
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it did so by focusing on establishing baseline emission standards
on gasolines and mandating certain reductions over time. The
regulation stated:
Section 211 (k)(1) directs* EPA to issue regulations that,
beginning in 1995, "require the greatest reduction in emissions
of ozone-forming and toxic air pollutants ("toxics") achievable
through the reformulation of conventional gasoline, taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such emissions reductions,
any non air quality environmental impacts and energy
requirements." The Act mandates certain requirements for the
reformulated gasoline program. Section 21 l(k)(3) specifies that
the minimum requirement for reductions of volatile organic
compounds (VOC) and toxics for 1995 through 1999, or Phase I
of the reformulated gasoline program, must require the more
stringent of either a formula fuel or an emission reduction
performance standard, measured on a mass basis, equal to 15
percent of baseline emissions. Baseline emissions are the
emissions of 1990 model year vehicles operated on a specified
baseline gasoline. CAA compositional specifications for
reformulated gasoline include a 2.0 weight percent oxygen
minimum and 1.0 volume percent benzene maximum.
For the year 2000 and beyond, the Act specifies that the VOC
and toxics performance standards must be no less than that of
the formula fuel or a 25 percent reduction from the baseline
emissions, whichever is more stringent. EPA can adjust this
standard upward or downward taking into account such factors
as feasibility and cost, but in no case can it be less than 20
percent. These are known as the Phase II reformulated gasoline
1. Background
The purpose of the reformulated gasoline regulations is to improve air quality
by requiring that gasoline be reformulated to reduce motor emissions of toxic
and tropospheric ozone-forming compounds, as prescribed by section 211 (k)(1)
of the Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act), as amended. This section of the Act
mandates that reformulated gasoline be sold in the nine most severe
summertime ozone levels and that other ozone nonattainment areas that opt into
the program. It also prohibits conventional gasoline sold in the rest of the
country from becoming any more polluting than it was in 1990. This
requirement ensures that refiners do not "dump" fuel components that are
restricted in reformulated gasoline and that cause environmentally harmful
emissions into conventional gasoline.
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performance standards. Taken together, sections 211(k)(1) and
211(k)(3) call for the Agency to set standards that achieve the
most stringent level of control, taking into account the specified
factors, but no less stringent than those described by section
211(k)(3).,58
The regulations were aimed at improving air quality by
controlling the composition and emissions effects of gasoline. The
regulations promulgated by the EPA established certain
compositional and performance specifications for reformulated
gasoline.'59  The EPA's regulations control the reformulated
gasoline blends and resulting emissions by establishing "baseline"
levels for companies.
The EPA set up three methods for determining a domestic or
foreign refiner's individual historic baseline, with different
standards for each. The EPA regulations stated that:
Under Method 1, the refiner must use the quality data and
volume records of its 1990 gasoline .... If Method 1 type data
are not available, a domestic refiner must use its 1990 gasoline
blendstock quality data and 1990 blendstock production records
(Method 2). In the event that neither of these two methods [are]
available, a domestic refiner must turn to Method 3 type data
which consists of its post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/or
gasoline quality data modeled in light of refinery changes to
show 1990 gasoline consumption. Domestic refiners are not
permitted to choose the statutory baseline.
2.7 An importer which is also a foreign refiner must
determine its individual baseline using Methods 1, 2
and 3 if it imported at least 75 percent, by volume, of
the gasoline produced at its foreign refinery in 1990
into the United States in 1990 (the so-called "75%"
rule).
2.8 Certain entities are, however, automatically assigned to
the statutory baseline. Firstly, refineries which began
operation after 1990 or were in operation for less than 6
months in 1990 are required to use the statutory
baseline. Secondly, importers and blenders are
assigned the statutory baseline unless they can establish
158 Id.
"' See id. at 7716.
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their individual baseline following Method I ....
Similarly, EPA considers that importers cannot use
Methods 2 and 3, because these methods inherently
apply only to refineries and because of the extreme
difficulty in establishing the consistency of their
gasoline quality over time.
The EPA's regulations were designed with two principles in
mind: "establishing accurate and verifiable refinery baselines,
while avoiding options that might provide incentives for the
regulated community to 'game' the baseline-setting process. ' ',6i In
other words, the regulation's objective was to ensure that the EPA
could realistically meet the statutory objectives. There is nothing
in the notice or discussion to suggest that the EPA had any desire
or interest in affecting trade flows or advantaging domestic
producers. For example, the EPA explored at some length
whether it could provide identical standards for foreign and
domestic products and determined that such an approach was
unworkable if the underlying statutory objective was to be
achieved.' The EPA also considered how records were typically
maintained by domestic and foreign companies and determined
that ordinary record keeping made certain options, which were
available to domestic producers, unrealistic in situations where the
vast majority of the foreign refinery product was not exported to
the United States. 163 It also determined that foreign entities might
not be subject to the full range of enforcement powers of the
EPA. 64
i. Article 111:4 Analysis
Under the WTO, countries are not prohibited from takingactins o potec th " 165
actions to protect the environment. However, if actions taken for
'6 Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51, at 3.
161 Regulations of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7785 (1974) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
80).
162 See id. at 7785-7788.
163 See id. at 7786.
164 See id.
165 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XX.
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health or safety reasons are done in a manner perceived to
discriminate between domestic and foreign products, concerns can
arise as to whether so-called "national treatment" obligations of
the WTO are being met or whether an exception exists to permit
such discriminatory action. 166 Because the EPA established
different standards for establishing baselines for domestic and
certain foreign gasoline, Venezuela and Brazil perceived that their
gasoline exports were being discriminated against within the
United States.
Brazil and Venezuela claimed that the Gasoline Rule violated
the obligations of the United States under Article II1:4 of GATT
1994. 16  When claiming a violation of Article 111:4, the
Complaining party has the burden of showing the existence of
both:
(1) a law, regulation or requirement affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
an imported product; and (2) treatment accorded in respect of
the law, regulation or requirement that is less favorable to the
imported product than to the like product of national origin.1
61
The Gasoline Rule violated Article 111:4 in the opinion of
Brazil and Venezuela for the following reasons:
* . . because it accorded less favourable treatment to imported
gasoline, both reformulated and conventional, than to U.S.
gasoline. The Gasoline Rule required imported gasoline to
conform with the more stringent statutory baseline when U.S.
gasoline had to comply only with a U.S. refiner's individual
baseline. Practically, this meant that imported gasoline with
certain parameter levels above the statutory baseline could not
166 See generally GATT 1994, supra note 1, arts. III (National Treatment), XX
(General Exceptions).
167 Article 111:4 requires that each Member State's imports should be treated equally
with domestic products:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATr 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:4.
168 Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51, at 30.
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be directly sold on the U.S. market whereas gasoline with these
same qualities produced in a U.S. refinery could be freely sold
in the U.S. market provided that it conformed with that refiner's
individual baseline. In order to accommodate this situation,
foreign refiners had two options: (i) make expensive
investments and changes to their refineries in order to produce
gasoline conforming to the more stringent statutory baseline, or
(ii) supply a lower price gasoline to an importer that could
average that gasoline with other gasolines (if such other
gasolines exist in sufficient amount) in order to meet, over an
annual period, the requirements of the statutory baseline. Both
options adversely affected the conditions of competition for
imported gasoline and afforded protection to domestic
production in a manner contrary to Article III. Furthermore,
these adverse competitive effects were precisely what EPA
intended to avoid for U.S. refiners by granting them individual
baselines. Brazil added that it was up to the United States to
demonstrate that its discriminatory system did not treat imports
less favourably. 161
The Panel first had to determine if imported gasoline and
domestic gasoline were like products; and second, whether the
treatment accorded under the U.S. regulation to imported gasoline
was less favorable than that accorded to like gasoline of national
origin.
The Panel examined the criteria used to determine "like
products" for purposes of Article 111:4. The Panel decided to
examine the like product issue "in conformity with Article 3.2" of
the DSU and Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.' 70 The Panel
looked to the 1970 Working Party Report on Border Tax
Adjustments 7 ' and the 1987 Japan Liquor case7 2 for guidance. In
its report on border tax adjustments, the Working Party stated,
with respect to the like product question:
169 Id. at 6.
7T0 Id. at 30. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that "a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Id. (quoting the
Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 31).
"' Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments L/3464, Dec. 2, 1970, GATT
B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 102 (1970) [hereinafter Border Tax Adjustments].
172 See Japan Liquor 1987, infra note 234.
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[T]he term should be examined on a case-by-case basis. This
would allow a fair assessment in each case of the different
elements that constitute a "similar" product. Some criteria were
suggested for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a
product is "similar": the product's end-uses in a given market;
consumers' tastes and habits, which change from country to
country; the product's properties, nature and quality.'73
From its examination of the Working Party's analysis and the
Japan Liquor case, the Panel determined that the "like product"
determination should be made on a case-by-case basis. The
products should be evaluated on the basis of: (1) their similar
properties, (2) end-uses, and (3) usually uniform classification in
tariff nomenclatures.7 4 The Panel determined that imported and
domestic gasoline are chemically identical and "have exactly the
same physical characteristics, end-uses, [and] tariff classification";
and thus, were perfectly substitutable. 5 In addition, the United
States had not argued that imported and domestic gasoline were
not "like products" per se.176 Therefore, the Panel concluded that
imported and domestic gasoline were "like products" satisfying
the first prong of Article 111:4.177
Next, the Panel considered whether the treatment accorded to
the imported "like product" was less favorable than that accorded
to the "like product" of domestic origin. Venezuela argued that
imported gasoline should have the same "distribution
opportunities" available to U.S. produced gasoline in order to
satisfy the no less favorable treatment standard in Article III:4.17s
The Panel compared the competitive ability of domestic gasoline
to imported gasoline and found that:
... domestic gasoline benefited in general from the fact that the
seller who is a refiner used an individual baseline, while
imported gasoline did not. This resulted in less favourable
treatment to the imported product, as illustrated by the case of a
"I Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 171, at 102.
174 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51, at 31.
175 Id.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 10.
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batch of imported gasoline which was chemically-identical to a
batch of domestic gasoline that met its refiner's individual
baseline, but not the statutory baseline levels. In this case, sale
of the imported batch of gasoline on the first day of an annual
period would require the importer over the rest of the period to
sell on the whole cleaner gasoline in order to remain in
conformity with the Gasoline Rule. On the other hand, sale of
the chemically-identical batch of domestic gasoline on the first
day of an annual period would not require a domestic refiner to
sell on the whole cleaner gasoline over the period in order to
remain in conformity with the Gasoline Rule. The Panel also
noted that this less favourable treatment of imported gasoline
induced the gasoline importer, in the case of a batch of imported
gasoline not meeting the statutory baseline, to import that batch
at a lower price. This reflected the fact that the importer would
have to make cost and price allowances because of its need to
import other gasoline with which the batch could be averaged
so as to meet the statutory baseline. Moreover, the Panel
recalled an earlier Panel report which stated that "the words
'treatment no less favourable' in paragraph 4 call for effective
equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
products." The Panel found therefore that since, under the
baseline establishment methods, imported gasoline was
effectively prevented from benefiting from as favourable sales
conditions as were afforded domestic gasoline by an individual
baseline tied to the producer of a product, imported gasoline
was treated less favourably than domestic gasoline.'79
The United States claimed that the difference in treatment
between imported and domestic gasoline was justified because
importers "could not reliably establish their 1990 gasoline quality,
lacked consistent sources and quality of gasoline, or had the
flexibility to meet a statutory baseline since they were not
constrained by refinery equipment and crude supplies."'8  The
Panel disagreed and found the difference in treatment was
unjustified because:
"I Id. at 31 (quoting United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7,
1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 386 (1989)).
180 Id. at 32.
[Vol. 23
WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Article 111:4 of the General Agreement deals with the treatment
to be accorded to like products; its wording does not allow less
favourable treatment dependent on the characteristics of the
producer and the nature of the data held by it. The Panel noted
that in the Malt Beverages case, a tax regulation according less
favourable treatment to beer on the basis of the size of the
producer was rejected. Although this finding was made under
Article 111:2 concerning fiscal measures, the Panel considered
that the same principle applied to regulations under Article
111:4. Accordingly, the Panel rejected the US argument that the
requirements of Article 111:4 are met because imported gasoline
is treated similarly to gasoline from similarly situated domestic
parties.
Apart from being contrary to the ordinary meaning of the terms
of Article 111:4, any interpretation of Article 111:4 in this manner
would mean that the treatment of imported and domestic goods
concerned could no longer be assured on the objective basis of
their likeness as products. Rather, imported goods would be
exposed to a highly subjective and variable treatment according
to extraneous factors. This would thereby create instability and
uncertainty in the conditions of competition as between
domestic and imported goods in a manner fundamentally
inconsistent with the object and purpose of Article III."'
The United States also argued that "the treatment accorded to
gasoline imported under a statutory baseline was on the whole no
less favorable than that accorded to domestic gasoline."'82
According to the U.S. argument, the Gasoline Rule did not
discriminate against imported gasoline because the statutory
baseline and "the sum of the individual baselines both
corresponded to the average gasoline quality in 1990."'83
Therefore, according to the argument, domestic and imported
gasoline were treated equally overall.'8 " The Panel found this
argument unconvincing and noted that in these circumstances it
"amounted to arguing that less favourable treatment in one
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
s"4 See id.
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instance could be offset provided that there was correspondingly
more favourable treatment in another."'85  Accordingly, "[t]his
amounted to claiming that less favourable treatment of particular
imported products in some instances would be balanced by more
favourable treatment of particular products in others."'86
In addition, the Panel found that the statistics submitted proved
that there was a difference in treatment between imported and
domestic gasoline.'87 The Panel concluded that imported gasoline
was "effectively prevented from benefiting from as favourable
sales conditions as were afforded domestic gasoline by an
individual baseline tied to the producer of a product, [and thus]
imported gasoline was treated less favourably than domestic
gasoline."'88
ii. Article XX Analysis
After finding that the Gasoline Rule was inconsistent with U.S.
185 id.
186 Id. The Panel noted in reaching this decision that a previous Panel found that:
the "no less favourable" treatment requirement of Article 111:4 has to be
understood as applicable to each individual case of imported products. The
Panel rejected any notion of balancing more favourable treatment of some
imported products against less favourable treatment of other imported products.
If this notion were accepted, it would entitle a contracting party to derogate
from the no less favourable treatment obligations in one case, or indeed in
respect of one contracting party, on the ground that it accords more favourable
treatment in some other case, or to another contracting party. Such an
interpretation would lead to great uncertainty about the conditions of
competition between imported and domestic products and thus defeat the
purposes of Article III.
Id. at 32-33 (quoting United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, supra note
179).
187 See id. at 33. The Panel noted:
According to the United States, as of August 1995, approximately 100 US
refiners, representing 98.5 percent of gasoline produced in 1990, had received
EPA approval of their individual baselines. Only three of the refiners met the
statutory baseline for all parameters. Thus, while 97 percent of US refiners did
not and were not required to meet the statutory baseline, the statutory baseline
was required of importers of gasoline, except in the rare case (according to the
parties) that they could establish a baseline using Method 1.
Id.
188 Id.
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obligations under Article 111:4, the Panel considered whether such
inconsistency could be covered by an exception in its text. Article
XX provides for general exceptions to Members' obligations,
provided the measure at issue both fits within a category provided
and is in conformity with the introductory paragraph, or chapeau.
The United States claimed that the Gasoline Rule could be
justified under either Article XX(b), as "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health";'8 9 XX(d), as "necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement";' 9° or XX(g)
because it was "relating to the conservation . . . of exhaustible
natural resources."'' All of these exceptions are "[s]ubject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."' 92
The Panel began its inquiry by stating what must be
demonstrated in order to invoke an exception under Article XX.
The party invoking an exception bears the burden of proof in
demonstrating that the inconsistent measure falls within the scope
of the exception.19
iii. Article XX(b), (d), and (g) Exceptions
The Panel proceeded to examine the U.S. argument that the
Gasoline Rule was consistent with the terms of Article XX(b), (d),
and (g) respectively. A party must establish three elements with
respect to each of the individual exceptions it claims applies to the
measure at issue. The elements that must be established are that:
(1) "the measures for which the provision was invoked fell within
the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant
life or health"; (2) "the inconsistent measures for which the
.exception was being invoked were necessary to fulfill the policy
objective"; and (3) "the measures were applied in conformity with
119 Id. at 14 (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XX(b)).
190 Id. at 18-19 (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XX(d)).
'9' Id. at 19 (quoting GAT T 1994, supra note 1, art. XX(g)).
192 Id. at 21 (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, pmbl., art. XX).
'9' See id. at 34.
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the introductory clause of Article XX. ' 1 4
With respect to Article XX(b) the Panel found that the United
States was not able to establish that the Gasoline Rule was
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."' 95
Although the Panel agreed that it would be necessary under such a
system to know the origin of gasoline, the Panel concluded that the
United States had not shown that this could not have been
achieved "by other measures reasonably available to it and
consistent or less inconsistent with the General Agreement."'96
The Panel went on to find that the United States' concern
about possible "gaming" or other circumvention of the regulations
by importing dirtier gasoline was not "an adequate justification for
maintaining the inconsistency with Article 111:4."' 9' In addition,
the Panel found that with respect to the third element, the United
States had not established that "there was no other measure
consistent, or less inconsistent, with Article 111:4 reasonably
available to enforce compliance with [the] ... baselines."' 98
With respect to the claim by the United States under Article
XX(d), the Panel found that the maintenance of discrimination
between imported and domestic gasoline, found to be inconsistent
with Article 111:4, did not secure compliance with the baseline
system. The Panel found that the rules were a means of
determining individual baselines but were not enforcement
mechanisms such that they would come within Article XX(d). 9
The Panel then turned to an analysis of Article XX(g). First,
the Panel recognized "that a policy to reduce the depletion of clean
194 Id.
195 Id. at 36. The Panel was "not convinced that the United States had satisfied its
burden of proving that those reasons precluded the effective use of individual baselines
in a manner which would allow imported products to obtain treatment that was
consistent, or less inconsistent, with obligations under Article 111:4." Id.
196 Id. The Panel considered the fact that "there was no reason to believe that, given
the usual measures available in international trade for determination of origin and
tracking of goods (including documentary evidence and third-party verification) there
was any particular difficulty sufficient to warrant the demands of the baseline
establishment methods applied by the United States." Id. at 36-37.
197 Id. at 37.
198 Id.
'99 See id. at 38.
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air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the meaning
of XX(g)."200 This conclusion was based on the fact that air was a
natural resource and could be depleted.01 Therefore, the fact that
the resource was renewable could not be an objection to its
classification as an exhaustible natural resource.202
Second, the Panel examined whether the baseline
establishment rules were "related to" the conservation of clean
air.203 Venezuela argued that "related to" should be interpreted, as
past Panels had done, to mean "primarily aimed at" the
conservation of a natural resource.2 4 The Panel noted that the
GATT 1947 Panel had interpreted the term "related to" as meaning
"primarily aimed" at conservation, and it agreed with that
• . . .. 205
interpretation.
The Panel then proceeded to determine if the baseline
establishment rules were "primarily aimed" at conservation. 2 06 The
Panel "saw no direct connection between less favourable treatment
of imported gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic
gasoline, and the US objective of improving air quality in the
United States. 2 7 Indeed, the Panel stated that "being consistent
with the obligation to provide no less favourable treatment would
not prevent the attainment of the desired level of conservation of
natural resources under the Gasoline Rule., 20 ' Accordingly, it
could not find that the baseline establishment methods "were
primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources. 2 °9 In the
Panel's view, the lack of a connection was apparent because
affording treatment of imported gasoline consistent with its Article
200 Id. at 40.
201 See id. at 39.
202 See id. (citing Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1988)), and United States-
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (circulated on June 16, 1994, but not adopted).
203 Id. at41.
204 id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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111:4 obligations "would not in any way hinder the United States in
its pursuit of its conservation policies under the Gasoline Rule."2 °
The Panel concluded that the baseline establishment methods at
issue in this case were not primarily aimed at the conservation of
natural resources and, therefore, the baseline establishment rules
did not fit within the exception provided for in Article XX(g)."
Finally, because the Panel found that the baseline
establishment measures did not fit within the specific exceptions
provided for in sections (b), (d), or (g) of Article XX, it did not
proceed to determine whether the measure met the conditions in
the chapeau of Article XX.212
The Panel concluded its analysis by stating that its task was
not to examine the desirability or necessity of the environmental
objectives of the CAA or Gasoline Rule because its examination
was "confined to those aspects of the Gasoline Rule that had been
raised by the complainants under specific provisions of the
General Agreement."2"3 Despite the fact that WTO Members were
free to set their own environmental objectives GATT, they were
still "bound to implement these objectives through measures
consistent with its provisions, notably those on the relative
treatment of domestic and imported products. 24
b. Report of the Appellate Body
The only issues the United States appealed were the Panel's
finding that the EPA regulations could not be justified under
Article XX(g) and the Panel's interpretation of Article XX as a
whole, including the requirements of the chapeau to Article XX.
215
The Appellate Body found the Panel erred in both its conclusion
that the "baseline establishment rules" did not fall within the terms
of Article XX(g) and for failing to decide whether the "baseline
establishment rules" fell within the ambit of the chapeau of Article
210 Id. at 42.
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See id.
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XX of GATT. 16
The Appellate Body considered what the language in Article
XX(g) required for a particular measure to fall within its terms and
stated that:
Taken together, the second clause of Article XX(g) appears to
us to refer to governmental measures like the baseline
establishment rules being promulgated or brought into effect
together with restrictions on domestic product or consumption
of natural resources. Put in a slightly different manner, we
believe that the clause "if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption" is appropriately read as a requirement that the
measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of
imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline.
The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the
imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the
production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.
There is, of course, no textual basis for requiring identical
treatment of domestic and imported products. Indeed, where
there is identity of treatment-constituting real, not merely
formal, equality of treatment-it is difficult to see how
inconsistency with Article 111:4 would have arisen in the first
place ....
In the present appeal, the baseline establishment rules affect
both domestic gasoline and imported gasoline, providing for-
generally speaking-individual baselines for domestic refiners
and blenders and statutory baselines for importers. Thus,
restrictions on the consumption or depletion of clean air by
regulating the domestic production of "dirty" gasoline are
established jointly with corresponding restrictions with respect
216 See id. at 29. For the text of Article XX(g), see supra note 191 and accompanying
text. The Appellate Body set out the findings of the Panel:
[T]he Panel concluded that the baseline establishment methods contained in
Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations are not consistent with
Article 111:4 of the General Agreement, and cannot be justified under
paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of Article XX of the General Agreement. The Panel
recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States to
bring this part of the Gasoline Rule into conformity with its obligations under
the General Agreement.
Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 6.
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to imported gasoline. That imported gasoline has been
determined to have been accorded "less favourable treatment"
than the domestic gasoline in terms of Article 111:4, is not
material for purposes of analysis under Article XX(g). It might
also be noted that the second clause of Article XX(g) speaks
• ,,217
disjunctively of "domestic production or consumption.
Hence, the Appellate Body concluded that the baseline
establishment fell within the terms of Article XX(g).
The Appellate Body then had to determine if the measure
satisfied the chapeau of Article XX. It decided that the chapeau
prohibited application of a measure at issue, otherwise falling
within the scope of Article XX(g), that would constitute either:
"(a) 'arbitrary discrimination' between countries where the same
conditions prevail[ed]; (b) 'unjustifiable discrimination' (with the
same qualifier); or (c) a 'disguised restriction' on international
trade." '218 The Appellate Body noted that "the text of the chapeau
is also ambiguous with respect to the field of application of the
standards it[] contains."219 However, it concluded that:
It is clear to us that "disguised restriction" includes disguised
discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear that
concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in
international trade does not exhaust the meaning of "disguised
restriction." We consider that "disguised restriction", whatever
else it covers, may properly be read as embracing restrictions
amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in
international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally
within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX .... The
fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of
avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to
substantive rules available in Article XX.1
2°
The Appellate Body next addressed whether the particular
measure, the baseline establishment rules, fit within the
requirements and purpose of Article XX. It determined that there
217 Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 20-21.
218 Id. at 22.
219 Id. The Appellate Body specifically identified the "the arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination standards and the disguised restriction on international trade standard" as
being particularly ambiguous. Id.
220 Id. at 22-23.
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had been "two omissions on the part of the United States: [1] to
explore adequately means, including in particular cooperation with
the governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the
administrative problems relied on as justification by the United
States for rejecting individual baselines for foreign refiners, and
[2] to count the costs for foreign refiners that would result from
the imposition of statutory baselines. 22'
In the view of the Appellate Body, "these two omissions go
well beyond what was necessary for the Panel to determine that a
violation of Article 111:4 had occurred in the first place." '22 This
was because "[t]he resulting discrimination must have been
foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable.
22 3
Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded:
In the light of the foregoing, our conclusion is that the baseline
establishment rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their application,
constitute "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised
restriction on international trade." We hold, in sum that the
baseline establishment rules, although within the terms of
Article XX(g), are not entitled to the justifying protection
224
afforded by Article XX as a whole.
Although the Appellate Body decided that the measure failed
to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX, the
construction of Article XX(g) was important to the United States
in terms of justifying its (and any Member State's) right to take
actions for environmental reasons, even if they are allegedly
discriminatory. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body's decision
imposes a heavy burden under Article XX on administrations who
take discriminatory action to demonstrate not only potential
difficulties in achieving the underlying objectives but that every
option potentially available that could reduce the discrimination
has been pursued. With increased interest in the intersection of
trade and environmental policies, the decision is important for all
WTO Members. The Appellate Body's interpretation of how
Article 111:4 and Article XX are to be interpreted should prove
221 Id. at 26.
222 Id.
223 ld.
224 Id. at 26.
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helpful for countries considering options for implementing
environmental objectives.225
i. Implementation of the Appellate Body
Recommendations
On June 12, 1997, the United States filed its status report on
the implementation of the DSB's recommendations. 26 The United
States reported that the EPA had issued a proposed revision to its
gasoline rule. The proposed rule was published in the Federal
Register and provided notice of an opportunity for parties to
comment and for a public hearing to be held on the issue. 2 ' The
EPA issued its final rule on August 19, 1997, and it was published
in the Federal Register on August 28, 1997.228
The EPA decided to allow foreign refiners to establish their
own individual baselines. 29 The report stated:
225 The Appellate Body also made an important jurisdictional decision based on the
working procedures. Venezuela and Brazil, parties to the original dispute, did not appeal
certain issues to the Appellate Body. However, during the appeal, Brazil and Venezuela
pursued certain issues which were not part of the U.S. appeal. The United States argued
that such issues were not properly before the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body agreed
with the U.S. view. In essence, Members will not be allowed to make, in the words of the
Appellate Body, "conditional appeals." Therefore, if an issue is in dispute, it must be
appealed by the dissatisfied party or the Appellate Body will not consider it. See id. at 10-
11.
226 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Status Report by the United States, Addendum, WT/DS2/10/Add.5 (June 12, 1997)
(source on file with author of article).
227 See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements for
Gasoline Produced by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,776 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (proposed May 6, 1997).
228 Id. at 45,533.
229 See id. at 45,537. The response stated:
Today's final action allows foreign refiners the option to establish and use IBs
[individual baselines] under the conventional gasoline program. Specific
regulatory provisions will be implemented to ensure that the optional use of an
IB will not lead to adverse environmental impacts. This involves monitoring
the average quality of imported gasoline, and if a specified benchmark is
exceeded, remedial action will be taken. The remedial action involves making
the requirements for imported gasoline not subject to an IB more stringent.
This will ensure the environmental neutrality of this approach.
Under this final rule, the procedures and methods for setting an IB, as well as
the tracking, segregation and other compliance related provisions described
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The volume of gasoline that can be imported under the IB for a
foreign refinery is limited in the same manner as for domestic
refiners, relative to a refinery's 1990 baseline volume. Since
the foreign refiner seeks an IB in order to specifically produce
gasoline for the U.S. market, the tracking and segregation
requirements noted above should not have a significant impact
on the ready availability of gasoline for import. The current
requirements for imported gasoline will continue to apply for all
of the other gasoline imported into the U.S.
There was some concern about the possible environmental
impact of providing this option to foreign refiners. A foreign
refiner may only have an economic incentive to seek an IB if it
will be less stringent than the SB. Gasoline produced by this
foreign refiner would then be measured against this less
stringent lB. Other imported gasoline would be measured
against the SB through the importer. As compared to the
situation in 1990, there would be the potential for the quality of
imported gasoline to degrade from an emissions perspective.
The size and amount of this impact, however, is difficult to
quantify. It would depend on the number of foreign refiners
that receive an IB, the specific emissions levels of the IBs
assigned, and the volume of gasoline included in the IB .... It
is also hard to quantify to what extent, if any, foreign refiners
who produced gasoline in 1990 that was cleaner than the SB
would ship gasoline that is dirtier than what they shipped in
1990. These circumstances, as well as the existence of a
volume cap on the use Of IB's, and the large variation in the
total levels of CG and RFG imports each year make it difficult
to assess in advance the risk of an adverse environmental
impact.
EPA is addressing these potential environmental concerns in the
final rule by: (1) Establishing a benchmark for the quality of
imported gasoline that will reasonably identify when the factors
identified above have led to an adverse environmental impact;
(2) monitoring imported gasoline to determine whether the
benchmark has been exceeded; and (3) if the benchmark is
exceeded, imposing a remedy that compensates for the adverse
below will all apply. However, they will only apply where a foreign refiner
chooses to apply for an lB.
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environmental impact.230
The EPA will accept baseline petitions from foreign refiners at
any time prior to January 1, 2002.3 Whether the changes in the
EPA regulations will bring the United States into compliance with
the WTO recommendations remains to be determined. Offering
foreign refiners individual baselines remedies the problems of
different treatment. However, volume caps under the lBs and
other aspects of the EPA regulation involving corrections for
adverse environmental impacts may raise future questions.
2. The Japan Liquor Case
232
a. Panel Report
This dispute arose from a Japanese tax law that imposed a
higher tax on imported liquor like vodka, rum, and gin ("white
spirits"), and whisky and brandy ("brown spirits"), than the tax on
the Japanese domestic liquor shochu.233 The controversy over
Japan's taxation on liquors was not new; a GATT Panel in 198724
decided that Japan's tax on imported wines and alcohol violated
GATT Article 111:2.235 Despite the 1987 Panel report and
230 Id.
231 See id. at 45,548.
232 See Japan 'Liquor Panel, supra note 51 (translations were submitted to the Panel
by Japan).
233 See id. at 2-3; Shuzeiho [Japanese Liquor Tax Law], Law No.6 of 1953, as
amended [hereinafter Liquor Tax Law]. Shochu is defined under the Japanese law as
liquor produced by the distillation of alcohol containing substances. The liquor must
have an alcoholic strength of 45% or less, included in the Tax Law definition are
shochu, whiskey/brandy, spirits and liquors. See Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at
3.
234 See Panel Report on Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on
Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at
83 (1987) [hereinafter Japan Liquor 1987]. Although the Panel report was adopted, Japan
never fully complied with the Panel ruling in the view of its trading partners. On February
2, 1989, the Government of Japan informed the Contracting Parties that the ad valorem tax
and grading system had been abolished, resulting in a single rate for all grades of
whisky/brandies, and that the existing differences in taxation of whisky/brandies and
shochu had been considerably reduced by decreasing the specific tax rate for
whisky/brandies and raising that on shochu. See Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at 2-
3.
235 See Panel Report on Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on
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subsequent actions taken by Japan, its trading partners remained
dissatisfied with market opportunities in Japan for their liquors
because of the liquor tax law. Accordingly, the United States,
Canada, and the EC individually requested consultations with
Japan in June and July 1995.236 The Complaining parties claimed
that the Japanese tax system applicable to distilled spirits had been
devised to afford protection to domestic production of shochu over
foreign liquors in violation of Article 111:2's first and second
sentences .237
The Panel looked at the relationship between Article 111:1 and
Article 111:2's first sentence, which states: "The products of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly,
to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. 238
It determined that the language used in Article 111:1 provided
general principles, but that Article 111:2 provided legally binding
obligations.
The Panel concluded that the wording of Article 111:2's first
sentence required it to address three issues in order to determine if
there was a violation: (1) whether the products concerned were
Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATI B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at
83 (1987).
236 See Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 5 1, at 1.
237 Article 111:2 of GATT 1994 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party
shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph
I.
GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:2.
238 Id. Article III:1 of GATT 1994 provides:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other charges, and
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in
specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. III:1.
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"like"; (2) whether the contested measure was an "internal tax" or
"other internal charge"; and (3) if so, "whether the tax imposed on
foreign products is in excess of the tax imposed on like domestic
products. 239  If all three questions were answered in the
affirmative, then the tax would be in violation of the obligation
contained in Article 111:2's first sentence. The second issue,
whether the Liquor Tax was an internal tax or other internal
240
charge, was not a contested issue in this dispute.
i. Like Product Analysis Under Article 111:2
The Panel had to determine whether shochu, vodka, and other
distilled liquors were "like products" under Article 111:2.24' The
Panel decided that "like products" should be interpreted on a case-
by-case basis.242 In the Panel's opinion, "like products" did not
have to be identical in all respects but rather the term "should be
construed narrowly in the case of Article 111:2's first sentence. 243
The Panel gave two reasons for its conclusion. First, "Article
111:2 distinguishes between like and directly competitive or
substitutable products, the latter obviously being [a] much larger
category of products than the former., 244 Second, if "two products
are subject to the same tariff binding and therefore to the same
maximum border tax, there is no justification, outside of those
mentioned in GATT rules, to tax them in a differentiated way
through internal taxation."2 45 However, in respect to this second
reason, the Panel stated that this did not mean that "the
determination of whether products were 'like' should be based
exclusively on the definition of products for tariff bindings, ...
[e]specially where it is sufficiently detailed, a product's
description for this purpose is in this case an important criterion
239 Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at 107.
240 See id.
241 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:2.
242 See Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at 108. See, e.g., Border Tax
Adjustments, supra note 171.
243 Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at 108.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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for confirming likeness for the purposes of Article 111:2. " 46
The Panel looked at the traditional factors used to determine
like product: (1) physical characteristics; (2) end-uses; (3)
consumer preferences; and (4) tariff classifications or bindings.
The Panel compared vodka and shochu and found that they were
"like products" because the two shared almost identical physical
characteristics. 27 It also determined that the alcoholic strength of
the two products did not preclude a finding of likeness because
alcoholic beverages are often drunk in diluted form and that vodka
and shochu are classified under the same tariff heading in Japan's
tariff system.
2 48
ii. Imported Like Products Taxed in Excess Of
Domestic Like Products Analysis
Once the Panel decided that shochu and vodka were like
products, it had to decide if the liquor tax violated Japan's
obligations, under Article 111:2, by taxing an imported product in
excess of the domestic product. The Panel determined that, in
fact, imported spirits were taxed in excess of the like domestic
spirits.! It rejected Japan's argument that the tax discrepancy was
designed to maintain consistent tax/price ratios.250 With respect to
the tax/price ratio, the Panel noted:
[T]he statistics submitted by Japan show that significant
differences exist between shochu and the other directly
competitive or substitutable products and also noted that there
are significantly different tax/price ratios within the same
product categories. Moreover, there were significant problems
with the methodology for calculating tax/price ratios submitted
246 Id.
247 See id. at 110.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 11l. The following breakdown of the tax rates applied to domestic and
imported "like products" provide a helpful illustration of why the Panel came to this
determination. Liquor tax per kilolitre: Shochu A (alcoholic strength of 25 degrees)
155,700 yen, Shochu B (alcoholic strength of 25 degrees) 102,100 yen, Whisky
(alcoholic strength of 40 degrees) 982,300 yen, Brandy (alcoholic strength of 40
degrees) 982,300 yen, Spirits (gin, rum, vodka) (alcoholic strength of 38 degrees)
377,203 yen, Liqueurs (alcoholic strength of 40 degrees) 328,760 yen. See id.
250 See id.
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by Japan, such that arguments based on that methodology could
only be viewed as inconclusive . . . . Since the prices of the
domestic spirits and whisky/brandy are much lower than the
prices of the imported ones, this exclusion has the impact of
reducing considerably the tax/prices ratios cited by Japan for
those products. In this connection, the Panel noted that one
consequence of the Japanese tax system was to make it more
difficult for cheaper imported brands of spirits and
whisky/brandy to enter the market.25'
Having rejected Japan's tax/price ratio argument as
justification, the Panel found that by taxing vodka in excess of
shochu, Japan had violated its obligation under Article 111:2's first
sentence 2
iii. Article 111:2 's Second Sentence Analysis
The Panel next examined Article III:2's second sentence to
determine if the Liquor Tax Law also violated that provision. In
determining if Article III:2's second sentence was violated, two
questions were answered: (1) "whether the products concerned
(whisky, brandy, gin, genever, rum and liqueurs) are directly
competitive or substitutable"; and, if so, (2) "whether the treatment
afforded to foreign products is contrary to the principles set forth
in paragraph 1 of Article III.
' 253
First, the Panel found that the evidence presented by the
Complaining parties supported the conclusion that the imported
and domestic products were "directly competitive or
substitutable. 25 4 The Panel found that the study put forward by
the Complainants, the ASI study, proved that there was a high
degree of price-elasticity between shochu, the five brown spirits,
and the three white spirits.2 6 This price-elasticity between the
251 Id. at 117.
252 See id. at 118.
253 Id. at 112.
254 Id. at 114.
255 See id. at 92. The study was commissioned by the Liquor Committee of the
European Business Community in Tokyo and carried out in February, 1996 by ASI
Market Research. See id.
256 See id. at 114.
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products, combined with the findings of the 1987 GATT Panel
decision, led the Panel to conclude that these products were
directly competitive or substitutable.257
The Panel next had to determine if the tax was applied in a
manner so as to afford protection to the domestic product.258 The
Panel concluded that "if directly competitive or substitutable
products are not 'similarly taxed"' and, if the tax favors domestic
products, then unfair protection would be afforded to such
products, and Article 111:2, second sentence, is violated.2 ' The fact
that the products were taxed dissimilarly and, because of this,
shochu was given a competitive advantage was sufficient evidence
for the Panel to find Japan in violation of its obligations.2 60
In the Panel's view, the Japanese internal taxes and high
import duties managed to "isolate domestically produced shochu
from foreign competition. 26' Therefore, Japan had violated its
obligations under Article 111:2's second sentence by maintaining
such a system.
iv. Legal Status of Adopted GAT Panel
Decisions
The Japan Liquor case also raised an important issue regarding
257 See id. at 116.
258 See id. In making this inquiry, the Panel looked to the Interpretive Note of
Article 111:2 that stated:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would
be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only
in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed
product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product
which was not similarly taxed.
Id. (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:2).
259 Id. at 116.
260 See id. In this connection, the Panel noted that for it to conclude that dissimilar
taxation afforded protection, it would be sufficient for it to find that the dissimilarity in
taxation was not de minimis. See id. at 116 n.118. "In the Panel's view, it is appropriate
to conclude, as have other GATT Panels including the 1987 Panel, that it is not
necessary to show an adverse effect on the level of imports, as Article III generally is
aimed at providing imports with 'effective equality of opportunities' in 'conditions of
competition."' Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
261 Id. at 118.
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the status of prior GATT Panel decisions.262 In its submission to
the Panel, the Canadian Government made the argument that the
1987 Panel decision 263 regarding Japan's taxes on alcoholic
beverages was particularly authoritative and should be followed by
the Panel established under the DSU.264 Thus, the legal status of
the 1987 Panel decision became an issue for the Panel.
Canada argued that Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement
"provides clear guidance to a Panel and the DSB respecting the
legal value of reports adopted by CONTRACTING. PARTIES
under GATT 1947. "265 Canada based this argument on the words
in Article XVI: 1 that said future Panels "shall be guided by the
decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies
established in the framework of GATT 1947. "266 Canada argued
that the decision made by the parties to adopt the prior decisions
made them an integral part of GATT 1994, and, therefore, binding
on the parties in their interpretation of Article 111:2 of GATT
1994.267 The United States argued that Canada's argument ran
counter to GATT 1947 Panel practice because "in the GATT 1947
system, Panel reports were an input for the interpretative process,
but not an independent source of binding norms. 268
The Panel agreed with Canada and decided that "[P]anel
reports adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body constitute subsequent practice in a
specific case by virtue of the decision to adopt them.,
269
b. Appellate Body Decision
Japan and the United States appealed the Panel decision.27 °
262 See id. at 116.
263 Japan Liquor 1987, supra note 234.
264 See Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at 13.
265 Id. at 12.
266 WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. XVI: 1.
267 See Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51, at 13.
268 Id. at 14.
269 Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 31 (citation omitted).
270 See generally Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51.
[Vol. 23
WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Japan's basic contentions were that the Panel had failed to
determine the effect Article 111:1 had on the interpretation of
Article 111:2 and that it erred in its interpretation of the "so as to
afford protection" language and its like product analysis.
The United States supported the Panel's overall conclusions
but, nevertheless, appealed certain issues. The U.S. claim
questioned the Panel's interpretation of Article 111:2, the way it
determined "like product," and that it did not consider the full
scope of products subject to the dispute. 7' In particular, the
United States claimed that the Panel's understanding of the
relationship between Article 111:2 and Article 111:1 was erroneous
because it disregarded Article III:1. According to the United
States, this was an error because Article III: 1 was an integral part
of the context that must be considered in interpreting Article
111:2.272 In addition, the United States appealed the Panel's
characterization of adopted GATT 1947 Panel reports as
subsequent practice under the Vienna Convention.273
The Appellate Body agreed with the United States' argument
with respect to the interpretation of Article III. It concluded that
Article III: 1 informs Article 111:2 by "establishing that if imported
products are taxed in excess of like domestic products, then that
tax measure is inconsistent with Article 111.,,274 In addition, the
Appellate Body found that the first sentence of Article 111:2 is in
effect an application of the general principle stated in Article III.
We believe the meaning is simply that the presence of a
protective application need not be established separately from
the specific requirements that are included in the first sentence
in order to show that a tax measure is inconsistent with this
general principle set out in the first sentence. However, this
does not mean that the general principle of Article III: 1 does not
apply to this sentence. To the contrary, we believe the first
sentence of Article 111:2 is, in effect, an application of the
general principle. The ordinary meaning of the words of Article
271 See id. at 4-5.
272 See id. at 4.
273 See id. at 5. The parties listed more issues, but these were the issues actually
decided by the Appellate Body. See generally id.
274 Id. at 18.
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111:2, first sentence leads inevitably to this conclusion. Read in
their context and in the light of the overall object and purpose of
the WTO Agreement, the words of the first sentence require an
examination of the conformity of an internal tax measure with
Article III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported and
domestic products are "like" and, second, whether the taxes
applied to the imported products are "in excess of" those
applied to the like domestic products. If the imported and
domestic products are "like products", and if the taxes applied
to the imported products are "in excess of' those applied to the
like domestic products, then the measure is inconsistent with
Article 111:2, first sentence.275
The Appellate Body held that three separate issues must be
addressed to determine whether an internal tax measure is
inconsistent with Article 111:2's second sentence. 276 These issues
are whether: (1) the imported products and the domestic products
are "directly competitive or substitutable products" that are in
competition with each other; (2) the directly competitive or
substitutable imported and domestic products are "not similarly
taxed"; and (3) the dissimilar taxation of the directly competitive
or substitutable imported domestic products is "applied . . . so as
to afford protection to domestic production. 277  The Appellate
Body agreed with the Panel's legal reasoning and concurred that
Japan's liquor tax was discriminatory and in violation of its
obligations under Article III:2's first sentence.
2 78
The Appellate Body took up the issue of the legal status of
adopted GATT Panel reports and then, after careful analysis of the
requirements of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention,
rejected the Panel's conclusion. 279 Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention states that "any subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation" is to be "taken into account together
275 Id. at 18-19.
276 See id. at 24.
277 Id.
278 See id. at 32.
279 See id. at 14. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 126.
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with the context" in interpreting the terms of the treaty." The
Appellate Body observed that "[g]enerally, in international law,
the essence of subsequent practice in interpreting a treaty has been
recognized as a 'concordant, common and consistent' sequence of
acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a
discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation."28 ' A single Panel report was not enough to
establish a sequence of acts. The DSU makes clear that
"[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
,,12agreements. Moreover, Members could seek a binding
interpretation through other means at the WTO.283
The Appellate Body concluded that a decision to adopt a Panel
decision by the Contracting Parties did not constitute subsequent
practice and, therefore, those decisions are not binding upon future
Panels, even those deciding a similar dispute between the same
• 284
parties.
3. The Desiccated Coconut Case
a. Panel Report
The Desiccated Coconut case 28 5 concerned the interplay
between the Tokyo Round Subsidies Agreement, Article VI of
GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM).2 6 The Philippines initiated the dispute in
response to Brazil's imposition of countervailing duties on imports
210 Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 12 (quoting the Vienna
Convention, supra note 126, art. 31(3)(b)).
281 Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
282 DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.
283 See id. art. 3.9.
284 See Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 14.
285 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 5 1.
286 See id. at 4; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 4, Annex IA, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994), available in 1994
WL 761483 [hereinafter SCM].
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of desiccated coconuts. 2" The underlying question was whether
Article VI of GATT 1994, the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, or
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement) applied to the dispute.288
The Philippines claimed that Brazil had violated its obligations
under Articles I and II, and that Brazil's actions were not justified
under Article VI:3 and VI:6 of GATT 1994.289 The Philippines did
not claim that either the Tokyo Round Code or the SCM
Agreement applied.290
In 1994, after the signing ceremony in Marrakesh, and before
the WTO's formal launch on January 1, 1995, countries
considered how to proceed with disputes that were underway or
might yet arise before the WTO's launch. The issue was of
particular importance in the anti-dumping and subsidy/
countervailing duty areas, where the new agreements by their
terms were applicable only with regard to investigations or
reviews initiated after January 1, 1995. GATT Contracting Parties
agreed to keep the dispute settlement procedures alive for causes
of action arising under the GATT 1947 system for two years after
the launch of the WTO, through December 31, 1996, a full year
after GATT otherwise ceased to exist. 291
287 See Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 2. The CVD investigation by
Brazil was actually initiated in 1994, prior to the effective date of the WTO, and the duties
were imposed beginning in 1995, after the WTO went into effect. See id.
288 See id. at 4. Article 32.3 of the SCM indicates that the SCM applies to
investigations initiated after the WTO came into effect. SCM Article 32.3 of GATT
1994 contains the following language: "Subject to paragraph 4, the provisions of this
Agreement shall apply to investigations, and reviews of existing measures, initiated
pursuant to applications which have been made on or after the date of entry into force
for a Member of the WTO Agreement." SCM, supra note 286, art. 32.3.
289 See Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 3.
290 See id. at 4. As noted above, Article 32.3 of the SCM renders the SCM
inapplicable to investigations initiated prior to January 1, 1995. See SCM, supra note 286,
art. 32.3.
291 See Transitional Co-Existence of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement,
adopted Dec. 8, 1994, GATT Doc. PC/12-L/7583 (final); Decision on Transitional Co-
Existence of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, adopted Dec. 8, 1994, GATT Doc. PC/13-L/7584 (final); and Transitional
Co-Existence of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Marrakesh Agreement
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The Philippines was faced with the following situation: either
file a challenge under GATT 1947, where dispute settlement
ultimately was non-binding without the consent of the losing
party; or request consultations and pursue a dispute within the
WTO on the hope or expectation that consistency with underlying
GATT articles can be challenged independent of an agreement that
is part of the WTO and that specifically expands and clarifies
rights and obligations under the GATT Article. Such bifurcated
approaches to challenging governments' actions had been possible
under GATT.2 9'
The Philippines argued that when a party has alternative legal
grounds upon which to base a claim, the party has a right to
choose the legal basis for its claim.2 93 In support of its position, the
Philippines cited prior cases brought under provisions of GATT
1947 that could have been brought under the Tokyo Round SCM
Agreement.2
94
The Panel considered whether a Member can bring a case
under the WTO dispute settlement provisions using a GATT 1994
Article as the basis for its claim. Stated differently, where the
applicable Agreement not only was not invoked but also could not
be invoked, could a Member, by alleging a violation of Article VI
of GATT 1994, invoke the dispute settlement system? Brazil took
the position that the SCM Agreement controlled and that a dispute
Panel could not review the decision being challenged. Brazil's
argument was that:
under customary principles of international law and the terms of
the WTO Agreement itself, neither GATT 1994 nor the
Agreement on Agriculture apply to this dispute, as the
Establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted Dec. 8, 1994, GATT Doc. PC/16-
L/7587 (final).
292 See Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 14 (citing United States-
Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, July 11, 1991,
GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.) at 30 (1991) [hereinafter Pork]; EEC-Payments and
Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed
Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 116 (1990) [hereinafter
Oilseeds]). In these cases the parties chose to proceed with their claim under provisions
of GATT 1947 and not the Tokyo Round SCM Code to which they were parties.
293 See.id. at 14.
294 See id. The GATT 1947 dispute settlement Panels neither objected to nor
questioned a party's right to bring such actions.
1998]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
investigation leading to the imposition of the measure was
initiated pursuant to an application received prior to the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement.9
The Panel, therefore, had to decide whether Article VI created
rules that are separate and distinct from those in the SCM
Agreement or whether they "represent an inseparable package of
rights and disciplines that must be considered in conjunction" with
each other.296
The Panel decided that Article VI of GATT 1994 is not
independently applicable to a dispute to which the SCM
Agreement is not applicable. 97  Two reasons for the Panel's
decision were stated: (1) the temporal application of the SCM
agreement and (2) the interrelationship of Article VI of GATT
1994 and the SCM Agreement.29 ' The plain language of SCM's
Article 32.3 provided that it was inapplicable to investigations or
reviews commenced prior to the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement.299 This, read in conjunction with the customary rules
of interpretation of international agreements, and, specifically,
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that treaties
are not to be applied retroactively, led to the conclusion that the
SCM was not applicable to the current dispute.3°
Next, the Panel considered the separability of Article VI from
the SCM Agreement. As previously discussed under GATT 1947
dispute settlement practice, a claim could be brought under either a
particular agreement or under a GATT 1947 article. 30 ' The issue
for the Panel was whether the provisions of GATT 1994 relating to
countervailing duties "are susceptible of application and
interpretation independently of the SCM Agreement."3 2  In
addressing this issue the Panel examined: (1) the textual
provisions; (2) the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of
295 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 57.
296 Id. at 58.
297 See id. at 74.
298 See id.
299 See SCM, supra note 286, art. 32:3.
1o See Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 74.
301 See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
302 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 60.
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the SCM and Article VI of GATT 1994; (3) precedents under
GATT 1947; and (4) the consequences of a conclusion that Article
VI of GATT 1994 cannot apply independent of the SCM
Agreement. °3
i. Textual Provisions
The Panel examined the language of the SCM Agreement to
determine whether anything in the language of the agreement
would lead to the conclusion that Article VI could be invoked as
an independent basis for a claim. Finding the language of the
agreement to be less than decisive on the issue, the Panel
continued its analysis stating:
It is significant, however, that Article 32.1V04 refers to the SCM
Agreement as interpreting Article VI of GATT 1994. Article
VI of GATT 1994 sets forth a series of core concepts central to
the WTO regulation of countervailing measures (e.g., subsidy,
material injury, domestic industry). These concepts are,
however, expressed in only the most general terms, and are thus
susceptible of a wide range of interpretations. In our view, the
Tokyo Round SCM Code and its successor the SCM Agreement
were developed in part to lend greater precision and
predictability to the rights and obligations under Article VI.
Article 32.1 makes clear that where the SCM Agreement
applies the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 cannot be
established without reference to the provisions of the SCM
Agreement. The drafters clearly foresaw the possibility of
conflict between GATT 1994 and the MTN Agreements, as
evidenced by the general interpretive note to Annex 1A. If
there could be conflicts between GATT 1994 and the MTN
agreements, there could also be conflicts between GATT 1994
taken in isolation and GATT 1994 interpreted in conjunction
with an MTN Agreement.
The clear non-applicability of the SCM to this dispute means
303 See id. at 60-75.
30 Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement states: "No specific action against a subsidy
of another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT
1994, as interpreted by this Agreement." SCM, supra note 286, art. 32.1.
305 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 62 (emphasis in original).
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that if we were to conclude that Article VI of GATT 1994 may
apply on its own, we would be obliged to interpret it as if the
SCM Agreement did not exist.... It would be legally improper
to seek to reconcile any emergent differences between Article
VI applied on its own and Article VI as it would be understood
in conjunction with the SCM Agreement by reverting to the
SCM Agreement, not as applicable law but as an interpretive
aid--even though the latter Agreement by its own terms does
not apply to this dispute. Such an approach would be contrary
to the ordinary meaning of Article 32.3 of the SCM Agreement.
It would not be appropriate for this Panel to incorporate the
requirements of the SCM Agreement indirectly where the SCM
Agreement does not apply directly. If then, we interpret the
relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement as permitting the
application of Article VI of the GATT 1994 on its own, there
would be a real and altogether serious possibility that Article VI
of GATT 1994 would be imbued with one meaning where
applied independently, and with a different, and potentially
conflicting, meaning where applied in conjunction with the
SCM Agreement as required by Article 32.1 .06
After its textual analysis, the Panel looked to the object and
purpose of the WTO Agreement as a whole.
ii. Object and Purpose of the WTO
In reviewing the WTO Agreement and the Preamble, the Panel
determined that one of the central objects and purposes of the
agreement was to develop a more integrated and durable
multilateral trading system. The Panel stated:
In our view, one of the central objects and purposes of the WTO
Agreement, as reflected in the Preamble to that Agreement, is to
"develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, the results of past liberalization efforts, and all of the
results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations .... " This is one of the reasons that the WTO
Agreement is a single undertaking, accepted by all Members.
Unlike the pre-WTO regime, where contracting parties to
GATT 1947 could elect whether or not to adhere to the Tokyo
306 Id. (footnotes in text omitted).
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Round SCM Code, such option has been removed in the present
regime. The integrated nature of the WTO system is reflected
in Article 11.2, which states that "[t]he agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3...
are integral parts of this Agreement binding on all Members"
.... To revert to a situation where Article VI of GATT 1994
could have different meanings depending on whether or not it
was applied in conjunction with the SCM Agreement would
perpetuate in part the legal fragmentation that the integrated
WTO system was intended to avoid. °7
In light of its interpretation of the object and purpose of the
WTO Agreement, the Panel then looked at the rights and
obligations of Members under Article VI, the SCM Agreement
and its predecessor, the Tokyo Round SCM Code.308 In particular,
the Panel reviewed the package of rights and obligations and how
its interpretation of the applicability of Article VI could alter those
rights and obligations. The Panel concluded that:
Article VI and the respective SCM Agreements impose
obligations on a potential user of countervailing duties, in the
form of conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to impose a
duty, but they also confer the right to impose a countervailing
duty when those conditions are satisfied. The SCM Agreements
do not merely impose additional substantive and procedural
obligations on a potential user of countervailing measures.
Rather, the SCM Agreements and Article VI together define,
clarify and in some cases modify the whole package of rights
and obligations of a potential user of countervailing measures.
Member's actions could potentially be found to be inconsistent
with Article VI of GATT 1994 even though those actions were
consistent with Article VI of GATT 1947 in conjunction with
the Tokyo Round SCM Code and/or would have been consistent
with Article VI of GATT 1994 in conjunction with the SCM
Agreement, had the latter agreement applied.' °9
The possible inconsistency in what rights and obligations
Members would have if Article VI were applied independent of
the SCM Agreement led the Panel to discuss how this might place
307 Id. at 62-63.
308 See id. at 63.
30 Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added).
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more onerous obligations on Members than they had originally
undertaken. The Panel stated that if it were to determine that
Article VI of GATT 1994 was independently applicable to
disputes initiated under the Tokyo Round SCM Code, it "would
not only be opening a risk of conflicting interpretations of Article
VI of GATT 1994 but would [also] be holding WTO Members to
a package of rights and obligations that were potentially more
onerous [than] those to which they were subject under Article VI
in conjunction with the Tokyo Round SCM Code when they
initiated the investigation. "310 With these concerns in mind, the
Panel concluded that the proper interpretation of the SCM
Agreement prohibited it from finding that Article VI could apply
independently in situations where the SCM Agreement did not
apply.
31 1
iii. GAiT Precedents
The Philippines also raised the issue of past GATT dispute
settlement cases where parties were allowed to bring a dispute1" 312
under either the article or agreement that applied . In determining
the relative value to be placed on these past decisions, the Panel
looked to Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement. Article XVI: 1
provides that: "Except as otherwise provided under this
Agreement of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall
be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices
followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and
the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947." 3' 3 The
Panel held that although Panel reports do not constitute formal
precedent, they are nevertheless useful and persuasive guidance.
3 14
However, in this dispute, the Panel found the prior Panel decisions
to be of "very limited relevance."3 5
310 Id. at 66.
"' See id. at 67.
312 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
3 13 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 67 (quoting WTO Agreement,
supra note 1, art. XVI:L).
314 See id. at 67.
315 Id. The Panel based this evaluation on that fact that:
the central contentious issue before us was neither argued before the Pork Panel
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iv. Consequences of Non-Separability
of Article VI
The last issue raised by the Philippines, with respect to the
applicability of Article VI in isolation from the SCM Agreement,
was what the consequences to Members would be if Article VI
was found to be non-separable. The Philippines claimed that it
would effectively be left without access to WTO dispute
settlement if Article VI was found not to constitute the applicable
law.316
In the Philippines' view, such a consequence would clearly be
inequitable because it would "deny access to WTO dispute
settlement with respect to a duty imposed as a result of a
determination made after the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement if that determination was the result of an investigation
initiated pursuant to an application made before the entry into
force of the WTO Agreement."3 '7 The Philippines also argued that
"some WTO Members could be left without a forum to pursue
their rights under either the GATT or WTO systems with respect
to countervailing measures imposed as a result of investigations
initiated pursuant to applications made before the date of entry
into force of the WTO Agreement.
' 318
The Panel disagreed with the arguments put forward by the
Philippines. It did not believe that the option to resort to dispute
settlement was denied to the Philippines. The Panel stated:
In the first place it rests on a simple misconception of the true
effect of a finding that Article VI of GATT 1994, standing
alone, does not constitute applicable law to a dispute of the type
nor formed part of its deliberations and findings. Little weight can be given to
the Panel's failure to consider the dispute sua sponte. In any event, it is
doubtful whether, given the fragmented nature of dispute settlement in the
GATT system, a Panel established under Article XXIII of GATT 1947 would
have had the authority under its terms of reference to determine, in the light of
provisions of the Tokyo Round SCM Code, that GATT Article XXIII was not
the proper basis on which to pursue an application.
Id. at 68. Therefore, the Panel concluded that the Pork Panel decision was not
persuasive especially in light of its interpretation of the relevant textual provisions of the
WTO Agreement. See id.
316 See id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
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before us. The WTO substantive provisions and dispute
resolution procedure are not in fact fully denied in either
situation. They are, instead, phased in by the transnational
provisions in the WTO.319
In addition, because the Philippines and Brazil were both
members of the Tokyo Round SCM Code and the fact that the
Philippines could have invoked the dispute settlement provisions
of that agreement, the Philippines was not left without recourse to
dispute settlement under GATT 1947.30 The Panel determined
that at some point it could pursue the claim under the WTO
dispute settlement system because of the way the SCM Agreement
was to be phased in32" ' and the procedural rules contained therein.322
The Panel concluded that measures to which the WTO
Agreement is not immediately applicable will in time fall under its
provisions.323 The Panel also found that it was best to balance the
319 Id. at 69-70 (footnote omitted).
320 See id. at 71. The Panel reasoned:
Pursuant to the Decision on the Transitional Co-existence of the GATT 1947
and the WTO Agreement, L/7538 (adopted 8 December 1994), the GATT 1947
continued in force for one year after the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement .... As a result, Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 which desired
to pursue dispute settlement with respect to a countervailing measure to which
neither the Tokyo Round SCM Code nor Article VI of GATT 1994 in
conjunction with the SCM Agreement applied had an additional year in which
to invoke GATT 1947 dispute settlement.
Id.
32 Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement states:
The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty,
where warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of
time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive countervailing duty,
upon request by any interested party which submits positive information
substantiating the need for a review. Interested parties shall have the right to
request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty
is necessary to offset subsidization, whether injury would be likely to continue
or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a result of the review
under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the countervailing duty is
no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
SCM, supra note 286, art. 21.2.
322 See id. at 72 (citing SCM, supra note 286, art. 21.2). The Panel noted that
"reviews of existing measures initiated pursuant to requests made after the date of entry
into force of the WTO Agreement are subject to the SCM Agreement." Id.
323 See id. at 73.
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interests of the Philippines in having their dispute settled
immediately under the WTO regime with the potential problems
such a conclusion would cause. 3 4  The claims raised by the
Philippines under Articles I and II were also found to be
inapplicable to this dispute.325
Having concluded that Article VI of GATT 1994 was not
applicable law for the dispute, the Panel turned to the Philippines'
1 326
claim under the Agreement on Agriculture. In particular, the
Philippines claimed that Brazil had violated the provisions of
Article 13(b)(i) of the Agreement on Agriculture, which provides
an exemption "from the imposition of countervailing duties unless
a determination of injury or threat thereof is made in accordance
with Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V of the Subsidies
Agreement. 327  The Agreement on Agriculture also states that
"due restraint shall be shown in initiating any countervailing duty
investigations."328
The Panel concluded that countervailing duties are subject to
the provisions of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture only
if they are covered by both Article VI of GATT 1994 and the SCMm 329
Agreement. Because the Panel already concluded that Article VI
of GATT 1994 did not apply, and that the SCM Agreement by its
324 See id. at 69.
325 See id. at 75. The Panel recognized that "Articles I, II and VI of GATT 1994
are interrelated and that Article VI allows measures which might otherwise be
inconsistent with Articles I and II of GATT 1994." Id. at 74. However, having
interpreted the WTO Agreement and its provisions "in their context an in light of their
object and purpose .... [the Panel concluded] that Article VI of GATT 1994 does not
constitute applicable law for the purposes of this dispute." Id. at 75. Therefore, "the
Philippines' claims under Articles I and II, which derive from their claims of
inconsistency with Article VI of GATT 1994, cannot succeed." Id.
326 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1,
Annex IA, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994) [hereinafter Agriculture Agreement].
327 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 75 (quoting Agriculture
Agreement, supra note 326, art. 12). Note 4 to Article -13 provides that
"[clountervailing duties where referred to in this Article are those covered by Article VI
of GATT 1994 and Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures." Agriculture Agreement, supra note 326, art. 12 n.4.
328 Id.
329 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 76.
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terms did not apply to this dispute, it decided that the claim under
Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture must fail.330
The last issue the Panel considered was the Philippines' claim
that Brazil had failed to consult it under the provisions of the
DSU.' In the Panel's view, the duty to consult under the DSU
was "absolute, and not susceptible to the prior imposition of any
terms and conditions by a Member. 33 2 However, the Panel found
the issue not to be within its terms of reference because it was not
in the Philippines' request for establishment of a Panel.333
Therefore, the Panel did not reach the issue of what type of
obligations Members have to consult upon request by another
Member.
b. Report of the Appellate Body
Both the Philippines and Brazil appealed certain aspects of the
Panel's ruling. In particular, the Philippines appealed the issue of
whether Article VI of GATT 1994 applies, independently of the
SCM Agreement, to a countervailing duty measure imposed as a
result of an investigation initiated pursuant to an application made
before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.3 4  The
Philippines asserted that the Panel's analysis was erroneous
because it did not correctly address the relationship between
Articles I, II and VI of GATT 1994 and Article 32.3 of the SCM
Agreement.33 5 In addition, the Philippines submitted that the Panel
erred in concluding that Article VI of GATT 1994 cannot be
independently applied in transitional situations where the SCM
Agreement is not applicable pursuant to Article 32.3 of the SCM
Agreement.336 In the Philippines' view, Article 32.3 of the SCM
Agreement:
at most, precludes the application of the SCM Agreement to
WTO-era measures applied for before the entry into force of the
330 See id.
331 See DSU, supra note 4, arts. 4.1-4.3.
332 Desiccated Coconut Panel, supra note 51, at 76.
133 See id.
334 See Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 3.
331 See id.
336 See id. at 3-4.
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WTO Agreement due to differences between the SCM
Agreement and the Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Tokyo Round SCM Code),
but such a transitional rule does not affect the applicability of
Articles I, II and VI of the GATT 1994, whose texts are exactly
identical to their counterpart provisions in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 ....
Brazil agreed with the Panel's decision except in regard to the
applicability of Articles I and II of GATT 1994, believing that the
issue of the applicability of those articles was properly before the
Panel.338
The Appellate Body upheld the legal findings and conclusions
of the Panel.339 Its analysis of the Panel's decision essentially
follows the sequence in the Panel decision.
i. Applicability of Article VI of GATT 1994
The Appellate Body first looked at the differences between the
WTO and GATT 1947 and concluded that the WTO is one
integrated agreement, while the GATT 1947 system was
comprised of several agreements, understandings, and legal
instruments.140 The Appellate Body outlined the difference
between the GATT 1947 and WTO systems:
Each of these major agreements was a treaty with different
membership, an independent governing body and a separate
dispute settlement mechanism. The GATT 1947 was
administered by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, whereas the
Tokyo Round SCM Code was administered by the Tokyo
Round Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty
Measures comprised of the signatories to that Code. With
respect to disputes brought under Article XXIII of the GATT
1947, the CONTRACTING PARTIES were responsible for
dispute settlement, including establishment of panels, adoption
of panel reports, surveillance of implementation of rulings and
recommendations, and authorization of suspension of
3 Id. at 4.
338 See id. at 6.
339 See id. at 22.
340 See id. at 9-10.
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concessions or other obligations. The Tokyo Round Committee
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was responsible for
administering and monitoring dispute settlement under Articles
12, 13, 17 and 18 of the Tokyo Round SCM Code.34 '
GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round SCM Agreement were of
separate legal identities, meaning that a party wishing to bring a
dispute regarding countervailing measures had to either bring the
dispute under Article VI of GATT 1947 or under the Tokyo Round
SCM Code. 42 The WTO system is a single undertaking; those
nations wishing to join have to accept all the agreements other
than certain plurilateral agreements not relevant to the dispute.343
In particular, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, found in
Annex IA, governs the settlement of disputes under the WTO
system.3" Therefore, WTO Members must settle their disputes
under the rules and procedures set forth in the DSU.
ii. GATT 1994 within the WTO Agreement
The Appellate Body examined the WTO Agreement and
focused on the language contained in certain articles to aid in its
understanding of how the WTO system fits together. The
Multilateral Trade Agreements found in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 are
"integral parts" of the WTO Agreement, as stated in Article 11:2 of
the WTO Agreement.3 4' There are also thirteen multilateral
agreements contained in Annex 1A. 346  The general interpretive
note included in Annex IA states that in the event of a conflict
between a provision of GATT 1994 and a provision of another
agreement in Annex IA, the latter shall prevail to the extent of the
conflict.
3 47
341 Id. at 9 (citations omitted). The Appellate Body stated that "[b]y the end of
1994, the GATT 1947 had 128 contracting parties, whereas the Tokyo Round SCM
Code had 24 signatories." Id. at 9 n.14.
342 See id. at 10. Under the GATT 1947 system there was, in essence, a choice of
forum for settling disputes. See id.
343 See id.
144 See id.; see also supra notes 16-86 (discussing the DSU).
341 See Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 10.
346 See id.
147 See id. at 11.
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iii. Principle of Non-Retroactivity of Treaties
The Appellate Body decided that according to Article 28 of the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, treaties are non-
retroactive, absent a contrary intention.3 48 Therefore, the text of the
SCM Agreement, on its face, was effective after the entry into
force of the WTO.3 49  The . relationship between Article VI of
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement, as set out in Article 10 and
32.1 of the SCM Agreement,35 ° made it clear that "countervailing
duties may only be imposed in accordance with Article VI of the
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement."35' The Appellate Body
determined that the Panel was correct in its determination that
Article VI of GATT 1994 was not applicable law for this dispute
because the SCM Agreement did not apply to the dispute and
Article VI of GATT 1994 could not be applied independently of
the SCM Agreement to countervailing duties.352
iv. Object and Purpose of the WTO Agreement
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the WTO
Agreement was intended by its authors to put an end to the
fragmentation that had plagued the GATT 1947 system. In
particular, the Appellate Body determined that, because of the
"integrated nature" of the WTO system, it was necessary to draw
certain distinctions and "lines" between the application of the
GATT 1947 system and the WTO regime.353 The Appellate Body
348 See id. at 12.
34' See id.
350 See id. Article 10 of the SCM provides:
Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a
countervailing duty on any product of the territory of any Member imported
into the territory of another Member is in accordance with the provisions of
Article VI of GATT 1994 and the terms of this Agreement. Countervailing
duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Agreement on
Agriculture.
SCM, supra note 286, art. 10. For the language of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement,
see supra note 304.
31 Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 13.
352 See id. at 13-14.
313 See id. at 14. The decision's report stated:
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declared:
Because a countervailing duty is imposed only as a result of a
sequence of acts, a line had to be drawn, and drawn sharply, to
avoid uncertainty, unpredictability and unfairness concerning
the rights of states and private parties under the domestic laws
in force when the WTO Agreement came into effect.354
Because of the transitional decision allowing for extended
dispute settlement under the Tokyo Round SCM Code for two
years, and because the measures at issue would eventually fall
within the scope of the WTO provisions, the Appellate Body
found, as did the Panel, that the Philippines was not without a right
of action."'
The Appellate Body then reviewed the issue of the
applicability of Articles I and II to the dispute and agreed with the
Panel that Article VI of GATT 1994 was not applicable to this
dispute.356 Because Article VI of GATT 1994 was found to be
inapplicable, the Appellate Body also agreed with the Panel that
the applicability of Articles I and II was also foreclosed.357
The Appellate Body sees Article 32.3 of the SCM Agreement as a clear
statement that for countervailing duty investigations or reviews, the dividing
line between the application of the GATT 1947 system of agreements and the
WTO Agreement is to be determined by the date on which the application was
made for the countervailing duty investigation or review.
Id.
314 Id. at 15.
155 See id. at 16. The Appellate Body explained:
[T]he complaining party in this dispute, the Philippines, had legal options
available to it, and, therefore, was not left without a right of action as a result of
the operation of Article 32.3 of the SCM Agreement .... Until 31 December
1996, as a result of the Decision on Consequences of Withdrawal from or
Termination of the Tokyo Round SCM Code approved by the signatories to the
Tokyo Round SCM Code, dispute settlement was available under the provisions
of the Tokyo Round SCM Code. Within a reasonable period of time after the
definitive countervailing duty was imposed, the Philippines had the right to
request a review pursuant to Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement-a right
which remains available to the Philippines today.
Id.
356 See id. at 16-17.
"I See id. at 17. The Appellate Body explained:
In the same manner as the Panel found that "the measures are neither consistent
nor 'inconsistent' with Article VI of GATT 1994; rather, they are simply not
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v. Terms of Reference of Panels
In response to a claim by Brazil regarding what properly was
within the Panel's terms of reference, the Appellate Body
reviewed the importance of a Panel's terms of reference and
stated:
A Panel's terms of reference are important for two reasons.
First, terms of reference fulfill an important due process
objective-they give the parties and third parties sufficient
information concerning the claims at issue in the dispute in
order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the
complainant's case. Second, they establish the jurisdiction of
the Panel by defining the precise claims at issue in the
dispute.358
The Appellate Body determined that the "matter" referred to a
Panel consists of the specific claims stated by the parties to the
dispute in the documents in the terms of reference."' Therefore, it
is important for the Panel to have an issue properly within its
terms of reference in order for it to decide the issue.
4. Costa Rica Underwear Case
a. Background of the Dispute
The Panel decision in the Costa Rica dispute concerned the
U.S. restrictions on imports of cotton underwear under the
transitional safeguards provisions of the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing (ATC). 360 In early 1995, the U.S. Committee for the
Implementation of Textiles Agreements (CITA) reviewed data on
subject to that Article", we believe that the measures here are neither
"consistent" nor "inconsistent" with Articles I and 11 of the GATT 1994,
because those Articles are also not applicable law for purposes of this dispute.
Id.
358 Id.
351 See id. at 21 (citing United States-Denial of Most Favoured-Nation Treatment as
to Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at
128 (1992)); EC-Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yam from
Brazil, ADP/137, 456 (Oct. 30 1995); United States-Imposition of Countervailing
Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, SCM1153, 212
(Apr. 28, 1994); United States-Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh
and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, 336 (Apr. 26-27, 1994).
36 See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42; ATC, supra note 40.
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total imports of cotton and man-made fiber underwear and
determined that serious damage could occur to the U.S. underwear
industry.36' The potential damage to the U.S. industry was
identified as coming from imports from seven countries:
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Honduras, Thailand, and Turkey.362
The United States requested consultations with Costa Rica,
along with some of the other parties, on March 27, 1995.363 The
consultations were entered to "initiat[e] the transitional safeguard
procedure for establishing a quantitative restriction on
[underwear] in accordance with Article 6 of the ATC and [to]
provide[] a statement of serious damage setting out the factual
information in the matter."3
The consultations between Costa Rica and the United States
did not lead to an agreement.36 ' The United States proceeded to
impose quotas on the product in question and notified the Textiles
Monitoring Body (TMB), as required by Article 6.10 of the
ATC.366  During the TMB's review, the United States supplied
updated data and other relevant information including the July
1995 Market Statement.3 67 The TMB found that serious damage
had not been demonstrated by the United States but could not
reach a consensus on the "existence of actual threat of serious
damage. '3 68 At the end of the thirty days after the sixty-day period
361 See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 3.
362 See id.
363 See id.; see also Request for Public Comments on Bilateral Textile
Consultations on Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Underwear, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,891 (1995)
(listing the restraint period which may be established if no solution is reached in
consultations at a level of 14,423,178 dozen).
364 Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 3. During the consultations, the
United States proposed a "two-part measure comprising a specific limit (SL) of 1.25
million dozen and a guaranteed access level (GAL) of 20 million dozen." Id.
365 See id. at 4.
366 See id.
367 See id. at 4. There were two Market Statements: March and July 1995. The
reports covered certain variables: output, utilization of capacity, employment, domestic
prices, profits, and investment. However, they failed to include information on
productivity, inventories, exports, and wages. See id.
368 Id. at 4.
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for consultations between the United States and Costa Rica, as
provided for in Article 6.7 of the ATC, the United States imposed
the restraint measure on imports from Costa Rica."' The measure
included all imports received after March 27, 1995, in the amount
allowed under the transitional safeguard measure, meaning, in
effect, that all imports received after that date would be counted
against the limit imposed by the transitional safeguard measure."O
In other words, the date of the measure was backdated to the date
of the request for consultations.
Costa Rica requested consultations with the United States on
December 22, 1995, in order to reach a mutually acceptable
solution to the dispute under the DSU.37' The consultations did not
result in a solution and on March 5, 1996, Costa Rica requested
the DSB to establish a Panel.3
b. Panel Report
The Panel for the dispute addressed the following issues: (i)
the standard of review the Panel should employ when reviewing
the actions of the domestic authority; (ii) the type of inquiry a
Member must undertake and what the Member is required to show
before imposing a transitional safeguard measure; (iii) the specific
evidence before the Panel; and (iv) the effective date of any
restraint measure.
i. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof
The United States submitted that the appropriate standard of
review for the importing country's determination to impose
safeguards was a standard of reasonableness. 7  In particular, the
369 See id. The request for consultations and the restraint level was published in the
Federal Register on April 21, 1995, and was to become effective on June 23, 1995. See
Establishment of an Import Limit for Certain Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Textile
Products Produced or Manufactured in Costa Rica, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,653 (1995) ("[T]he
United States Government has decided to control imports in Categories 352/652 for the
period beginning on March 27, 1995 and extending through March 26, 1996 at a level of
14,423,178 dozen.").
370 See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 4.
371 See id. at 5.
372 See id.
371 See id. at 16.
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United States argued that "[t]he standard for Panel evaluation of
such determinations should follow established GATT practice,
which was based on the GATT 1947 case concerning the
withdrawal by the United States under Article XIX of a tariff
concession on women's fur felt hats and hat bodies. 374  In an
earlier case, the Working Party reviewing the U.S. action in the
Fur Felt Hat case375 found that the U.S. determination was
reasonable and that the standard was not conclusive proof of
serious injury caused or threatened. 76 The Panel decided that "a
policy of total deference to the findings of national authorities
could not ensure objective assessment as foreseen by Article 11 of
the DSU. 377  The Panel went on to state that "[w]e do not,
however, see our review as a substitute for the proceedings
conducted by national investigating authorities or by the TMB.
Rather, in our view, the Panel's function should be to assess
objectively the review conducted by the national investigating
authority, in this case the CITA.'3 78  The Panel noted that many
decisions made it clear that it was not the role for Panelists to
374 Id.
375 Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession under
Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Concerning Women's Fur
Felt Hats and Hat Bodies, CP/106 (Mar. 27, 1951), available in 1951 WL 7547
G.A.T.T. [hereinafter Fur Felt Hat Case].
376 See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 16 (citing Fur Felt Hat Case,
supra note 375, para. 30). The report in the Fur Felt Hat Case stated that "the United
States is not called upon to prove conclusively that the degree of injury caused or
threatened in this case must be regarded as serious; since the question under consideration
is whether or not they are in breach of Article XIX, they are entitled to the benefit of any
reasonable doubt." Id. (citing Fur Felt Hat Case, supra note 375, para. 30).
177 Id. at 73. Article 11 of the DSU states:
The function of Panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities
under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a Panel
should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings
as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with
the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a
mutually satisfactory solution.
DSU, supra note 4, art. 11.
378 Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 73.
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"engage in de novo review. 379
The Panel then examined the issue of which party bore the
burden of proof under the ATC. The United States argued that it
had established that the restriction was consistent with the rules of
the ATC in its March Market statement and that it was under no
obligation to re-establish that consistency 380 Costa Rica argued
that the United States had the burden of proof and was required to
establish to the "Panel's satisfaction" that the restriction was
consistent with the terms of the ATC.8
ii. Type of Inquiry Required
To determine what type of inquiry was needed in order to have
sufficient information to put a transitional safeguard measure in
place, the Panel examined the provisions of Article 6 of the ATC.
Article 6.2 of the ATC382 specifically conditions the "applicability
of a transitional safeguard on a finding that a product is being
imported in such increased quantities so as to cause serious
damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry
producing like and/or directly competitive products." '383
Furthermore, Article 6.3 of the ATC contains a list of economic
indicators and variables "that can be taken into account in order to
379 Id.
380 See id. at 74.
381 See id. The Panel explained:
Consequently, in our view, it is up to the United States to demonstrate that it
had fulfilled the requirements contained in Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the ATC in the
March Statement which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the
scope of the matter properly before the Panel.
Id. at75.
382 Article 6.2 of the ATC reads as follows:
Safeguard action may be taken under this Article when, on the basis of a
determination by a Member, it is demonstrated that a particular product is being
imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious
damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing like and/or
directly competitive products. Serious damage or actual threat thereof must be
demonstrably caused by such increased quantities in total imports of that
product and not by such other facts as technological changes or changes in
consumer preference.
ATC, supra note 40, art. 6.2.
383 Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 76.
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assess the serious damage or actual threat thereof.""3 4 The Panel
concluded:
After having satisfied the conditions of Article 6.2 of the ATC,
Members must attribute the serious damage or actual threat
thereof to a particular Member or Members, since, in
accordance with Article 6.4 of the ATC, transitional safeguards
"shall be applied on a Member-by-Member basis.""3 5
For the foregoing reasons, the Panel decided that a
determination under Article 6.2 of the ATC is "a necessary but not
sufficient condition to have recourse to bilateral consultations
under Article 6.7 of the ATC. 386 The Panel concluded that only in
situations where "serious damage or actual threat thereof has been
demonstrated under Article 6.2 and has been attributed to a
particular Member or Members under Article 6.4 of the ATC[] can
recourse to Article 6.7 of the ATC be made in a way consistent
with the provisions of the ATC. 387
The Panel then examined Costa Rica's basic contention that
the United States had failed to demonstrate, as required under
Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the ATC, that the domestic industry had
suffered serious damage from imports from Costa Rica.388 In order
384 Id.
385 Id. Article 6.4 of the ATC reads as follows:
Any measure invoked pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall be applied
on a Member-by-Member basis. The Member or Members to whom serious
damage, or actual threat thereof, referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, is attributed,
shall be determined on the basis of sharp and substantial increase in imports,
actual or imminent, from such a Member or Members individually, and on the
basis of the level of imports as compared with imports from other sources,
market share, and import and domestic prices at a comparable stage of
commercial transaction; none of these factors, either alone or combined with
other factors, can necessarily give decisive guidance. Such safeguard measure
shall not be applied to the exports of any Member whose exports of the
particular product are already under restraint under this Agreement.
ATC, supra note 40, art. 6.4. Footnote 6 accompanying the text of Article 6.4 (imminent
increase) states: "Such an imminent increase shall be a measurable one and shall not be
determined to exist on the basis of allegation, conjecture or mere possibility arising, for
example, from the existence of production capacity in the exporting Members." Id. art.
6.4 n.6.
386 Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 77.
387 Id.
388 See id.
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to decide the issue, the Panel set out to make an objective
assessment of the U.S. action in accordance with the standard of
review.1389 The Panel decided to examine the U.S. determination in
respect to: (1) whether the U.S. industry suffered serious damage;
(2) the cause of the serious damage (i.e., imports or other factors);
and (3) the attribution of serious damage to Costa Rican imports as
opposed to imports from other Members.390
The Panel first decided to limit the scope of their inquiry to the
March Statement provided by the United States. 9 In the Panel's
opinion, the statements subsequent to the March Statement
"should not be viewed as a legally independent basis for
establishing serious damage or actual threat thereof.' 392  In
reviewing the March Statement, the Panel determined that it only
needed to address the issue of serious damage and not actual
threat, stating:
Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the ATC make reference to "serious
damage, or actual threat thereof." The word "or" distinguishes
between "serious damage" and "actual threat thereof." . . .In
our view, "serious damage" refers to a situation that has already
occurred, whereas "actual threat of serious damage" refers to a
situation existing at present which might lead to serious damage
in the future. Consequently, in our view, a finding on "serious
damage" requires the party that takes action to demonstrate that
damage has already occurred, whereas a finding on "actual
threat of serious damage" requires the same party to
demonstrate that, unless action is taken, damage will most
likely occur in the near future. The March Statement contains
no elements of such a prospective analysis.... [T]he fact that
the March Statement made no reference to actual threat and
contained no elements of such a prospective analysis was
dispositive per se. Consequently, we do not agree with the US
argument that the March Statement supports a finding on actual
389 See id.
390 See id.
391 See id.
392 Id. The March Statement was the legal basis by which the United States took
the transitional safeguard action and if the United States was acting in accordance with
Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the ATC, then the March Statement would provide the necessary
evidence. See id.
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threat of serious damage.9
iii. Evidence Before the Panel
The March Statement provided the Panel with the information
the United States used to make a determination of serious damage.
The information provided in the March Statement was divided into
the following categories: (1) output (U.S. production); (2) market
share (market share loss/import penetration); (3) employment; (4)
man-hours; (5) sales; (6) profits; (7) investment; (8) utilization of
capacity; (9) prices; (10) causality; and (11) attribution of serious
damage to Costa Rica.
39 4
In analyzing the March Statement, the Panel found serious
problems that led it to question the accuracy of the data provided.
For example, the March Statement referred to 395 establishments
that manufactured cotton and man-made fiber underwear;
however, the July Statement identified only 302.'9' In the Panel's
view, this raised serious questions about the "accuracy of the
information contained in the March Statement and the conclusion
that serious damage exists. 396
(a) Reimports
The Panel next went through all the categories previously
mentioned to determine if the United States had sufficient
information to conclude that serious damage had occurred. With
regard to output, the Panel found that the data only weakly
supported a determination of serious damage.397 The Panel found
393 Id. at 84-85.
114 See id. at 79-83.
395 See id. at 78.
396 Id. The March Statement provided that:
[e]mployment in the U.S. cotton and man-made fibre underwear industry
dropped from 46,377 production workers in 1992 to 44,056 workers in 1994, a
five percent decline and a loss of 2,321 employees. In the July Statement, the
number of production workers in the industry was 35,191 in 1992. The number
of production workers declined to 33,309 in 1994, a five percent decline and a
loss of 1,882 employees.
See id.
197 See id. at 79. The Panel noted that "if those firms with declining underwear
production shifted their capacity to other products . . . then it is quite possible that
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that in making its determination as to market share, the United
States included re-imports3 9 and that as long as the rest of the
conditions of Article 6 were met those re-imports could properly
be considered.3 99
(b) Factors Not Sufficiently Addressed
The Panel determined that the data presented with respect to
man-hours, sales, and profits, was not sufficient to draw a
conclusion of serious damage. 4° In addition, the United States did
not address the question of investment and the statement was
401vague as to utilization of capacity and prices.
The United States was also required under Article 6.2 of the
ATC to demonstrate that such serious damage was caused by
imports.42 The Panel examined whether the United States had met
its burden and determined that:
[b]ecause of the nature of the trade, it is not possible in these
circumstances to conclude from the simple fact that there has
been a fall in production that there has also been serious
damage. The Market Statement undertakes no such discussion.
Moreover, the March Statement suggests other possible causes
of serious damage, such as rising cotton prices ... but does not
consider their role as a cause of such damage. Thus, it cannot
be said that the March Statement "demonstrably" shows that
serious damage was caused by increased levels of imports. We
find, therefore, that an objective assessment of the March
neither the firms nor their workers would be seriously damaged." Id.
398 Where manufacturers utilize the outward processing regime, assembly of the
products are contracted out to overseas manufacturers and then the finished products are
re-imported by the U.S. manufactures for sale in the U.S. market.
39 See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 79.
41 See id. at 82. The Panel explained:
The weaknesses in the March Statement that are discussed above raise
considerable doubts as to whether serious damage has been demonstrated.
However, we refrain from making a finding on this point of law. The factors
listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC do not provide sufficient and exclusive
guidance in this case. We are, therefore, not in a position to conclude that the
United States has failed to demonstrate serious damage or actual threat thereof.
Id.
401 See id. at 81-82.
402 See id. at 82.
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Statement leads to the conclusion that the United States failed to
comply with its obligations under Article 6.2 of the ATC by
imposing a restriction on imports of Costa Rican underwear
without adequately demonstrating that increased imports caused
serious damage.403
Of note is the analysis by the Panel and its treatment of
information that was submitted to the TMB, but that was not
before CITA when it reached its decision. The Panel discounted
the probity of information that was not before CITA, but that was
submitted to the TMB, to support the U.S. action; and the Panel
indicated it would not consider CITA as a decision maker for the
purpose of its analysis '4 Because the later data was different
(though trends identified were identical), the Panel viewed the
initial data as possessing limited value.4 5 Based on its analysis of
the data before CITA at the time of its decision, the Panel then
determined that the United States had not complied with its
obligations under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the ATC.4°
iv. Backdating of Restraint Measure
The Panel also concluded that the United States acted
inconsistently with Article 6.10 of the ATC when it made the
effective date of the transitional safeguard measure the date of the
request for consultations.40 ' The Panel found nothing in the ATC
that provided guidance as to the appropriate date of application of
a transitional safeguard measure. °8 Therefore, the Panel turned to
Article X:2 of GATT 1994, which provides that measures of
general application shall not be enforced prior to being
published.4 0 Because the transitional safeguard measure was made
403 id.
404 See id. at 83.
405 See id.
406 See id. at 89.
407 See id. at 89-90.
408 See id. at 87.
4 See id. Article X:2 of GATT 1994 provides:
No measure of general application taken by any [Member] effecting an advance
in a rate duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform
practice, or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or
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effective on June 23, 1995, but the restriction on imports related
back to the original request for consultations on March 27, 1995,
the measure was "enforced" prior to its publication. The Panel
found that if a Member sets the initial date of the restraint period
as the date of the request for consultations, the Member is acting in
violation of Article X:2 of GATT 1994.40 However, in the Panel's
view, it would not have been inconsistent with the ATC or GATT
1994 to have April 21, 1995, be the effective date for the
transitional safeguard measure as this was the date of publication
of the request for consultations.4
c. Report of the Appellate Body
Costa Rica appealed only the issue of the effective date of
application of the U.S. transitional safeguard measure from the
Panel ruling to the Appellate Body.42 The Panel concluded that
the United States' restraint measure could have legal effect
between the date of publication of the notice of consultations in
the Federal Register on April 21, 1995, and the date of the
application of the measure, June 23, 1995.413 Costa Rica argued
that Article XIII:3(b) of GATT generally prohibits the backdating
of import quotas.1 4 Furthermore, Costa Rica contended that a
backdated transitional safeguard measure restricting imports could
be allowed only if it was expressly authorized by Article 6 of the
ATC; therefore, because Article 6 did not authorize such
backdating, the United States could not impose a backdated
quota.415
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel in its conclusion
prohibition of imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be
enforced before such measure has been officially published.
GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. X:2.
411 See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42, at 88.
411 See id.
412 See Costa Rica Underwear Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 4.
413 See id. at 9. "The restriction was introduced on 23 June 1995 for a period of 12
months starting on 27 March 1995." Id. March 27, 1995, was the original date when
consultations were requested, but April 21, 1995, was the date the request for
consultations was actually published in the Federal Register. See id.
414 See id. at 4.
415 See id.
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that Article 6.10 of the ATC did not substantively address the
issue of backdating, stating:
To the contrary, we believe it does and that the answer to this
question is to be found within Article 6.10 itself-its text and
context-considered in the light of the objective and purpose of
Article 6 and the ATC.
Under the express terms of Article 6.10, the importing Member
which "propose[s] to take safeguard action," may, "after the
expiry of the period of 60 days" from the date of receipt of the
request for consultations without agreement having been
reached, "apply the restraint (measure) within 30 days following
the 60-day period for consultations . . . ." As we understand it,
apply when used as here in respect of a governmental
measure-whether a statute or an administrative regulation-
means, in an ordinary acceptation, putting such measure into
operation ....
Accordingly, we believe that, in the absence of an express
authorization in Article 6.10, ATC, to backdate the effectivity
[sic] of a safeguard restraint measure, a presumption arises from
the very text of Article 6.10 that such a measure may be applied
416only prospectively.
The Panel had examined the different language used in the
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA)1 7 and in the ATC to determine
whether the drafters intended that the practice of "backdating" be
allowed under the ATC regime.4"  Article 3(5)(i) of the MFA
provided the following:
If however, after a period of sixty days from the date on which
the request has been received by the participating exporting
country or countries, there has been no agreement either on the
request for export restraint or on any alternative solution, the
requesting participating country may decline to accept imports
for retention from the participating country or countries referred
to in paragraph 3 above of the textiles and textile products
causing market disruption (as defined in Annex A) at a level for
the twelve-month period beginning on the day when the request
416 Id. at 10-11 (some punctuation in original text omitted from quote).
417 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 2 U.S.T.
1001, 930 U.N.T.S. 166 [hereinafter MFA].
418 See Costa Rica Underwear Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 9.
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was received by the participating exporting country or
countries not less than the level provided for in Annex B. Such
level may be adjusted upwards to avoid undue hardship to the
commercial participants in the trade involved to the extent
possible consistent with the purposes of this Article. At the
same time the matter shall be brought for immediate attention to
the Textile Surveillance Body.419
The Appellate Body decided that the absence of the above
language in the ATC was intended to end the practice of
backdating the effective date of a restraint measure.410
The Appellate Body also determined that Article X:2 421 of
GATT 1994 did not speak to the issue of retroactive application of
a safeguard restraint measure.4 2' However, the Appellate Body did
explain that prior publication of a measure of general application,
as required by Article X:2, did not cure the deficiency because
there was no authority provided in Article X:2 to give such a
measure retroactive effect.
423
Although the Appellate Body agreed that the safeguard
restraint was a measure of general application, it concluded that
this did not conflict with the finding that backdating the effective
date of a restraint measure was prohibited by Article 6.10 of the
ATC. The Appellate Body explained:
The conclusion we have arrived at, in respect of permissibility
of backdating, is that the giving of retroactive effect to a
safeguard restraint measure is no longer permissible under the
regime of Article 6 of the ATC and is in fact prohibited under
Article 6.10 of that Agreement. The presumption of prospective
effect only, has not been overturned; it is a proposition not
424
simply presumptively correct but one requiring our assent.
419 Id. at 12 (quoting the MFA) (emphasis added).
420 See id. at 12-13.
421 GATIT 1994, supra note 1, art. X:2.
422 See Costa Rica Underwear Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 16.
423 See id.
424 Id. at 15.
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5. India Wool Shirts and Blouses Case
a. Panel Report
In this dispute, India claimed that the United States violated its
obligations under the ATC.425  The United States imposed a
transitional safeguard measure on wool shirts and blouses from
India on April 18, 1995, and published the request for
consultations in the Federal Register on May 23, 1995.426 Prior to
imposing the measure, the United States and India held
consultations regarding the U.S. claim that imports of wool shirts
and blouses were causing serious damage to the domestic industry,
which did not bring about a successful solution to the dispute
427
The United States took action, as required under Article 6.10 of
the ATC. Accordingly, the TMB examined the U.S. action and
agreed that the United States had demonstrated an actual threat of
serious damage.2 8
India made the following claims: (1) the U.S. action imposing
a transitional safeguard measure effective from April 18, 1995,
was inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 2, 6, and 8 of
the ATC; (2) the onus of demonstrating serious damage or its
actual threat was on the United States as the importing Member,
and it had to choose at the beginning whether it would claim the
existence of "serious damage" or "actual threat"; and (3) the U.S.
action nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to India under
425 See generally India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra note 51.
426 See Request for Consultation, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,274 (1995).
427 See India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra note 51, at 3. Because no
mutual settlement was reached within the sixty-day period, the United States notified
India on July 14, 1995 that a restraint would be applied to imports from India (category
440), effective from April 18, 1995 and extending through April 17, 1996. The restraint
level was 76,698 dozen for the 12-month period. See id.
428 See id. India sent a communication to the TMB on October 16, 1995, informing
the TMB that they would not be able to conform to its recommendations. India
requested that the TMB give a thorough consideration to the reasons it had given and
asked that it recommend that the United States rescind the restraint. The TMB at its
November 13-17, 1995, meeting reviewed India's request and concluded that its review
of the matter was complete. During its review, the TMB found that the actual threat-of
serious damage had been demonstrated, and that, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 6,
this actual threat could be attributed to the sharp and substantial increase in imports from
India. See id.
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the WTO Agreement, GATT 1994, and the ATC.429 With regard to
its claim that the United States had to choose either serious
damage or actual threat as the justification for its actions, India
claimed that these two options were not "interchangeable because
the data requirement would vary with the chosen situation. ' '43 °
The United States countered with the following: (1) the
safeguard measure was consistent with Article 6 of the ATC; (2)
the measure was not inconsistent with Article 2 or any other
provision of the ATC; and (3) the measure did not nullify or
impair benefits accruing to India under the ATC or GATT 1994.431
India asked for the establishment of a Panel to resolve the
issues in dispute. In addressing the underlying substantive issues,
the Panel also addressed certain additional issues important to the
claims made by India: (1) burden of proof; (2) standard of review;
and (3) the role of the TMB.432
i. Burden of Proof
India claimed that the United States bore the burden of proving
that it had met the requirements of Article 6 of the ATC.433 The
United States claimed that, consistent with accepted GATT 1947
dispute settlement, India bore the burden to establish a prima facie
case of a violation and, in particular to this case, that the U.S.
action was inconsistent with the ATC.434 In addition, the United
States argued that it was not required to re-establish that its actions
in imposing the transitional safeguard were justified.435
The Panel concluded:
First, we consider the question of which party bears the burden
of proof before the Panel. Since India is the party that initiated
the dispute settlement proceedings, we consider that it is for
India to put forward factual and legal arguments in order to
establish that the U.S. restriction was inconsistent with Article 2
429 See id. at 4.
430 Id.
431 See id. at 5.
432 See id. at 11.
433 See id.
414 See id.
431 See id.
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of the ATC and that the U.S. determination for a safeguard
action was inconsistent with provisions of Article 6 of the ATC.
Second, we consider the question of what the importing
Member must demonstrate at the time of its determination.
Concerning the substantive obligations under Article 6 of the
ATC, it is clear from the wording of Article 6.2 and 6.3 of the
ATC that, in its determination of the need for the proposed
restraint, the United States had the obligation to demonstrate
that it had complied with the relevant conditions of application
of Article 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC.436
ii. Standard of Review
Next, the Panel discussed the appropriate standard of review.
India argued that the proper standard of review was to determine
whether the United States had observed the requirements of
Article 6 of the ATC, not whether it had acted reasonably.43' The
United States argued that the standard of review should be the
same as the standard used in the Fur Felt Hat, Working Party
Report,438 where the domestic determination was "entitled to the
benefit of reasonable doubt.,
43 9
The Panel reviewed the relative weight to be given GATT
1947 decisions and stated that "the Appellate Body has made clear
in the Japan Liquor report that past GATT Panel reports do not
constitute binding 'subsequent practice' referred to in Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.' 44° Therefore, it
436 Id. at 64.
437 See id. at 12. The Report explained:
India was not requesting the Panel to conduct a de novo review of the matter
and to replace the United States' determination by its own, but was asking the
Panel to objectively assess, in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, whether
the United States had made its determination in accordance with its obligations
under Article 6 of the ATC.
Id. India also argued that the reasonableness standard that the United States supported
would be similar to the standard set out in Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
(reflecting in India's view the Chevron Standard in U.S. law), and should not be
incorporated into the ATC through the acceptance by the Panel of the standard
advocated by the United States. See id.
438 Fur Felt Hat Case, supra note 375.
139 India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra note 51, at 65.
440 Id.
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was "not bound by past GATT reports, although we may follow
their reasoning to the extent relevant."'
44
The Panel rejected both the U.S. and India's positions.
Instead, the Panel decided that with respect to the standard of
review, "the function of this Panel established pursuant to Article
8.10 of the ATC and Article 6 of the DSU, is limited to making an
objective assessment of the facts surrounding the application of the
specific restraint by the United States (and contested by India) and
of conformity of such restraint with the relevant WTO
agreements." 42
iii. Role of the TMB
India also claimed that the United States had submitted
information to the TMB which it had not possessed when it made
its determination of serious damage. 43 At issue was what type of
information the TMB could consider, and, based on its
consideration of information, its ability to uphold a safeguard
action taken by a Member. The Panel reviewed Articles 8.2,444
8.3,"4 and 8.10 446 of the ATC and Articles 4 and 7 of the DSU.
441 Id.
442 id. at 66.
44' See id. at 47.
'4 Article 8.2 of the ATC provides: "The TMB shall develop its own working
procedures. It is understood, however, that consensus within the TMB does not require
the assent or concurrence of members appointed by Members involved in an unresolved
issue under review by the TMB." ATC, supra note 40, art. 8.2.
44 Article 8.3 of the ATC states:
The TMB shall be considered as a standing body and shall meet as necessary to
carry out the functions required of it under this Agreement. It shall rely on
notifications and information supplied by the Members under the relevant
Articles of this Agreement, supplemented by any additional information or
necessary details they may submit or it may decide to seek from them. It may
also rely on notifications to and reports from the WTO bodies and from such
other sources as it may deem appropriate.
ATC, supra note 40, art. 8.3.
46 Article 8.10 provides:
If a Member considers itself unable to conform with the recommendations of
the TMB, it shall provide the TMB with the reasons therefor not later than one
month after receipt of such recommendations. Following thorough
consideration of the reasons given, the TMB shall issue any further
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Upon their review of the articles, the Panel decided that when
differences arise, the ATC requires parties to first seek
consultations before taking action."7 If the consultations do not
result in a mutually agreeable solution, then the matter should be
brought before the TMB, which will embark on a "genuine fact
finding and evidence building exercise. ' 448 In contrast, the terms
of the DSU do not require it to reinvestigate the market situation.
In particular, the Panel noted:
When assessing the WTO compatibility of the decision to
impose national trade remedies, DSU Panels do not
reinvestigate the market situation but rather limit themselves to
the evidence used by the importing Member in making its
determination to impose the measure. In addition, such DSU
Panels, contrary to the TMB, do not consider developments
subsequent to the initial determination. In respect of the U.S.
determination at issue in the present case, we consider,
therefore, that this Panel is requested to make an objective
assessment as to whether the United States respected the
requirements of Article 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC at the time of
the determination. 449
The Panel then turned to the U.S. determination to impose the
safeguard action. The Panel referred to the Reformulated
Gasoline450 and Japan Liquor45' decisions and how the Appellate
Body had stressed that the fundamental rule of treaty interpretation
contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention should be kept
in mind when interpreting provisions of the WTO Agreement.4 2
recommendations it considers appropriate forthwith. If, after such further
recommendations, the matter remains unresolved, either Member may bring the
matter before the Dispute Settlement Body and invoke paragraph 2 of Article
XXIII of GATT 1994 and the relevant provisions of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.
ATC, supra note 40, art. 8.10.
447 See India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra note 51, at 67.
448 Id. at 68.
449 Id. (emphasis added).
450 Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51; Reformulated Gasoline Appellate
Body, supra note 51; see supra notes 155-231 and accompanying text.
151 Japan Liquor Panel, supra note 51; Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51;
see supra notes 232-84 and accompanying text.
452 See India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra note 51, at 68.
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Accordingly, the Panel "endeavor[ed] to give effect to them in
their natural and ordinary meaning and in the context in which
they occur.,
453
The Panel determined that Article 6.2 of the ATC requires
"that serious damage or actual threat thereof to the domestic
industry must not have been caused by such other factors as
technological changes or changes in consumer preferences. 454
Therefore, an importing Member must at least answer the question
of whether the serious damage or actual threat thereof was caused
by changes in consumer preferences or technological changes; the
United States made no mention of these issues in its market
statement.455
The Panel also found that on its face, the U.S. determination
did not respect the parameters laid down in Article 6 of the ATC.456
In particular, the determination did not address certain factors
required by Article 6 in making a determination to impose the
transitional safeguard measure. 457  The Panel concluded that in
making its determination, an importing Member must fully
comply with Article 6's requirements that: (1) all the economic
factors listed in Article 6.3 of.the ATC are "considered", (2) it
demonstrate that the increase in imports is the cause of the serious
damage or actual threat thereof, and (3) the state of that industry is
not caused by such other factors as technological changes or
changes in consumer preferences.
The Panel also examined the need to consult, and the
obligation to obtain, TMB endorsement of any safeguard before
imposing a restraint. Although finding that Members should refer
matters to the TMB for recommendations, the Panel did not find
that there was a requirement to do so before imposing a restraint.
453 Id. (citing, Japan Liquor, supra note 34 and the text of Article 6.2 of GATT
1994).
411 Id. at 70 (emphasis in original).
411 See id.
456 See id. at 76.
411 See id.
458 See id.
159 See id.
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Indeed, it concluded that the language of Article 8.9 of the ATC460
made it clear that the recommendations of the TMB were not
binding upon Members. 46' Finally, the Panel decided that because
it had found the U.S. action inconsistent with the requirements of
both Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC, it was unnecessary to
consider the date of the imposition of the measure.
4 62
b. Report of the Appellate Body
India appealed certain findings and conclusions of the Panel to
the Appellate Body. India appealed essentially three issues: (1)
which party has the burden of demonstrating that there has been an
infringement of the obligations assumed under the ATC, (2) the
limitation on the TMB of using only evidence the importing
Member used in making its determination, and (3) whether under
Article 11 of the DSU the Complaining party is entitled to a
finding on all of the legal claims it makes to a Panel.
i. Burden of Proof
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the burden of
proof was on India to present evidence "sufficient to establish a
presumption that the transitional safeguard determination made by
the United States was inconsistent with Article 6 of the ATC. '463
The Appellate Body stated:
Consequently, a party claiming a violation of a provision of the
WTO Agreement by another Member must assert and prove its
claim. In this case, India claimed a violation by the United
States of Article 6 of the ATC. We agree with the Panel that it,
therefore, was up to India to put forward evidence and legal
argument sufficient to demonstrate that the transitional
safeguard action by the United States was inconsistent with the
obligations assumed by the United States under Articles 2 and 6
of the ATC. India did so in this case. And, with India having
460 ATC Article 8.9 states: "The Members shall endeavor to accept in full the
recommendations of the TMB, which shall exercise proper surveillance of the
implementation of such recommendations." ATC, supra note 40, art. 8.9.
461 India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra note 51, at 78.
462 See supra Costa Rica Underwear Appellate Body, supra note 51; notes 412-424
and accompanying text (discussing similar issue).
463 India Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 13.
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done so, the onus then shifted to the United States to bring
forward evidence and argument to disprove the claim.
ii. Evidence Considered by the TMB
India claimed that the Panel's finding as to what evidence the
TMB could examine to determine whether a transitional safeguard
measure was applied in accordance with Article 6.10 of the ATC
was erroneous. In particular, India disagreed with the Panel's
statement that the TMB "is not limited to the initial information
submitted by the importing Member as parties may submit other
additional information., 461 India was concerned that this finding
would permit the TMB to examine information that was not
available at the time when the safeguard determination was
made.466 The Appellate Body interpreted the Panel's comments on
the TMB to be "purely a descriptive and gratuitous comment
providing background concerning the Panel's understanding of
how the TMB functions., 467 Therefore, this statement was not a
legal finding or conclusion; the Appellate Body had no authority
to uphold, modify or reverse the Panel on this point.468
iii. Right of Parties to Have All Claims
Decided
India claimed that it had a right under the DSU to have all of
its claims considered by the Panel. The Appellate Body examined
Article 11 of the DSU and determined that nothing in it required a
Panel to examine all the legal claims made by the Complaining
469party. Inreviewing past GATT 1947 and WTO Panel decisions,
the Appellate Body observed that "frequently [Panels] addressed
only those issues that such Panels considered necessary for the
resolution of the matter between the parties, and have declined to
decide other issues., 470 Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded
464 Id. at 16.
465 Id. at 4.
466 See id. at 5.
467 Id. at 17.
468 See id.
469 See id. at 18.
470 Id. The Appellate Body cited a number of cases as examples of this statement.
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that Panels must consider only those legal claims necessary to
achieve a mutually satisfactory settlement of the matter; there was
no requirement for Panels to consider all the legal claims put
forward by the parties.47
6. Canada Split-Run Periodicals Case
a. Panel Report
The basic issues in this dispute between the United States and
Canada arose after Canada imposed a prohibition on imports of
"split-run" periodicals."' The import prohibition was effectuated
by Tariff Code 9958,"' which prohibits the importation of
See generally EEC-Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from
Hong Kong, July 12, 1993, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 129 (1993); Canada-
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D.
(30th Supp.) at 140 (1984); United States-Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13,
1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67 (1984); United States-Manufacturing Clause,
May 15-16, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 74 (1984); Japan-Measures on Imports
of Leather, May 15-16, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31 st Supp.) at 94 (1984); Canada-Import,
Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies,
Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 37 (1988); Japan-Trade in
Semiconductors, May 4, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116 (1988); Japan-
Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D.
(35th Supp.) at 163 (1988); EEC-Regulations on Imports of Parts and Components, May
16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (1990); United States-Denial of Most
Favored Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, June 19, 1992,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 128 (1992).
47' See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 18.
472 See id. at 2, 62. Split-run periodicals have the same or similar editorial content
as those published in foreign countries, but contain advertisements directed to the
Canadian market. See id. See infra note 475 for statutory definition of the term under
Canadian law.
411 See id. at 63. Tariff Code 9958 provides:
1. Issues of a periodical, one of the four immediately preceding issues of which
has, under regulations that the Governor in Council may make, been found to
be an issue of special edition, including a split-run or a regional edition, that
contained an advertisement that was primarily directed to a market in Canada,
and that did not appear in identical form in all editions of that issue of that
periodical that were distributed in the country of origin;
2. Issues of a periodical, one of the four immediately preceding issues of which
has, under regulations that the Governor in Council may make, been found to
be an issue of more than five per cent of the advertising space in which
consisted of space used for advertisements that indicated specific sources of
availability in Canada, or specific terms of conditions relating to the sale or
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periodicals where more than five percent of the advertising content
is directed to the Canadian market, regardless of whether an
edition with similar editorial content is sold outside Canada.474 In
addition, Canada imposed an excise tax of eighty percent on the
value of advertisements in "split-run" periodicals distributed in
Canada on a per issue basis through Part V.1 of the Excise Tax
Act.47 Finally, the Canadian Post Corporation applied reduced or
"funded" postal rates, funded by the Department of Canadian
Heritage, to certain periodicals published in Canada; however,
certain Canadian periodicals not eligible for the "funded" rates still
received postal rates lower than those available to imported
periodicals, which had to pay the "international rates. 476
The United States claimed that: (1) the Tariff Code 9958 was
inconsistent with Article XI: 1 of GATT 1994; 411 (2) Part V. 1 of the
provision in Canada, of any goods or services except where the indication of
such sources of availability or such terms or conditions was primarily directed
at persons outside Canada.
Id. (citing Tariff Code 9958, R.S.C., ch. 41 (1985) (Can.), as amended by sched. VII,
§ 114 (1996)).
414 See id. at 2-3, 62-63.
475 See id. at 3. On December 15, 1995, the bill (C-103), 42-43-44 Elizabeth II,
chapter 46, December 15, 1995, adding Part V.I of the Excise Tax became law. Section
36(1) imposes in respect of each split-run edition of a periodical a tax equal to 80% of
the value of all the advertisements in the edition. See Act to Amend the Excise Tax Act
and the Income Tax Act, ch. 46, S.C. (1995) (Can.). Section 35(1) defines a split-run
addition of a periodical as one:
(i) that is distributed in Canada;
(ii) in which more than 20 percent of the editorial material is the same or
substantially the same as editorial material that appears in one or more excluded
editions of one or more issues of one or more periodicals; and
(iii) that contains an advertisement that does not appear in identical form in all
those excluded editions.
Id.
476 See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 5-8.
477 See id. at 8. Article XI:I of GATT 1994 provides:
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 1. No prohibitions or
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export
of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT" 1994, supra note 1, art. XI:1.
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Excise Tax Act was inconsistent with Article 111:2 of GATT
1994,478 or in the alternative, was inconsistent with Article 111:4 of
GATT 1994; 419 (3) the application by Canada Post of lower postal
rates to domestically produced periodicals than to imported
periodicals was inconsistent with Article II1:4 of GATT 1994; and
(4) the funded rate scheme was not a domestic subsidy within the
meaning of Article 111:8.410
Canada denied each claim made by the United States and
insisted its Tariff Code 9958, the Excise Tax, and the postal
scheme did not violate any of its obligations under the WTO
Agreements. Canada claimed that its laws concerning split-run
periodicals were intended to maintain Canadian culture and
preserve its related industries.48  Canada argued that because split-
run magazines had their editorial costs largely paid for in their
original market, they could charge a lower rate for advertising than
Canadian magazines.4  Therefore, the split-run magazines
competed unfairly for advertising revenues in Canada and this
would ultimately lead "to a reduction of material dealing with the
Canadian scene and in turn to a Canadian public that is less well-
478 See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 15. For the text of Article 111:2 of
GATr 1994, see supra note 237.
179 See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 45. Article 111:4 of GATT 1994
provides as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
that that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph
shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of
transport and not on the nationality of the product.
GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:4.
480 See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 54. Article 111:8(b) of GATT
1994 states: "The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies
exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived
from proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of
this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic
products." GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:8(b).
481 See generally Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 9, 43.
482 See id. at 41-43.
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informed on Canadian affairs." '483
i. Tariff Code Claim
The Panel first examined Tariff Code 9958 to see whether it
was consistent with Article XI:I of GATT 1994. The Panel
analyzed the language of Tariff Code 9958 and determined that
"the importation of certain foreign products into Canada is
completely denied under Tariff Code 9958[;] it appears that this
provision by its terms is inconsistent with Article XI: 1. 484 It next
examined the language of Article XI: 1, which provides: "[N]o
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges
: * * shall be instituted or maintained by any [Member] on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other [Member]
,,485
Canada claimed that even if the measure violated Article XI: 1,
it could be justified under the exceptions provided in Article
XX(d) of GATT 1994.486 The Panel cited the relevant portion of
Article XX:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any [Member] of measures:...
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement,
including those relating to customs enforcement, the
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of
Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents,
483 Id. at 43. The Panel observed:
These are not only legitimate legislative concerns; they are far removed from
the idea of protecting domestic production which is referred to in Article III.
Ultimately, of course, the concern behind this legislation is with the
preservation of Canadian culture in the face of an extraordinary challenge from
across the border.
Id.
484 Id. at 63.
485 Id.
486 See id. at 64.
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trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive
417practices ....
The Panel then reviewed the approach taken by the Panel in
488
the Reformulated Gas decision, and stated a party invoking an
exception under Article XX must demonstrate that: (1) the
particular trade measures that are inconsistent with GATT secures
compliance with laws or regulations that by themselves are not
inconsistent with the GATT, (2) the measures for which the
exception was being invoked were necessary to secure compliance
with those specific laws or regulations, and (3) "the measures were
applied in conformity with the requirements of the introductory
clause of Article XX. '489 The Panel decided to follow the same
approach taken by the Panel in Reformulated Gas and require that
"all the above elements had to be satisfied" in order to justify the
claimed exception of Article XI:1 obligations contained in
XX(d)490
In reviewing the functions of Tariff Code 9958, the Panel also
had to determine whether 9958 was a measure designed to secure
compliance with Section 19 of the Income Tax Act.49' The Panel
found that Tariff Code 9958 did not secure compliance with
Section 19 of the Income Tax Act because it "cannot be regarded
as an enforcement measure for Section 19 of the Income Tax
Act. ' 492 The Panel explained this finding as follows:
It is true that if a government bans imports of foreign
periodicals with advertisements directed at the domestic market,
as does Canada in the present case, the possibility of non-
487 Id. (citing GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XX(d)).
411 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51; see also supra notes 155-231
and accompanying text.
489 Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 64 (quoting Reformulated Gasoline
Panel, supra note 51, at 38). The requirements of the introductory paragraph or chapeau
of Article XX are "that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."
Reformulated Gasoline Panel, supra note 51, at 38 (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1,
art. xx).
49 See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 64.
'9' See id. at 64-65.
492 Id. at 65.
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compliance with a tax provision granting tax deductions for
expenses incurred for advertisements in domestic periodicals
will be greatly reduced. It would seem almost impossible for an
enterprise to place an advertisement in a foreign periodical
because there would be virtually no foreign periodical available
in which to place it. Thus, there would be no way for the
enterprise legally to claim a tax deduction therefor. However,
that is an incidental effect of a separate measure distinct (even
though it may share the same policy objective) from the tax
provision which is designed to give an incentive for placing
advertisements in Canadian, as opposed to foreign, periodicals.
We thus find that Tariff Code 9958 does not "secure
compliance" with Section 19 of the Income Tax Act.493
Because the Panel did not agree that Tariff Code 9958 secured
compliance with Section 19 of the Income Tax, the Panel did not
need to review the other criteria for justification under Article
XX(d) of GATT 1994. 94
ii. Excise Tax Claim
The next issue addressed concerned Part V.1 of Canada's
Excise Tax. The Panel framed the issue as whether the eighty
percent excise tax on advertisements in split-run periodicals was
compatible with Canada's obligations under Article III of GATT
1994 .9 Canada first challenged the applicability of GATT 1994
to this part of the Excise Tax on the theory that the measure
pertains to an advertising service that is within the purview of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).496  Canada's
argument, as paraphrased by the Panel, was:
[S]ince Canada has made no specific commitments for
advertising services under GATS, the United States should not
be allowed to "obtain benefits under a covered agreement that
have been expressly precluded under another covered
agreement." Put another way, Canada seems to argue that if a
493 Id.
494 See id.
491 See id.
496 See id.; General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement, supra note
1, Annex 11B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS; 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
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Member has not undertaken market-access commitments in a
specific service sector, that non-commitment should preclude
all the obligations or commitments undertaken in the goods
sector to the extent there is an overlap between the non-
commitment in services and the obligations or commitments in
the goods sector.497
The Panel was not convinced by Canada's characterization of
the Excise Tax as "a measure intended to regulate trade in
advertising services. 495  In considering Canada's argument, the
Panel examined the structure of the WTO Agreement, including its
annexes, and stated:
Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement is the relevant provision,
which reads as follows:
The agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 .. .are integral parts of this Agreement,
binding on all Members-
... as the Appellate Body has repeatedly pointed out, "one of
the corollaries of the 'general rule of interpretation' in the
Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and
effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to
adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility". The ordinary
meaning of the texts of GATT 1994 and GATS as well as
Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement, taken together, indicates
that obligations under GATT 1994 and GATS can co-exist and
that one does not override the other. If the consequences
suggested by Canada were intended, there would have been
provisions similar to Article XVI:3 of the WTO Agreement or
the General Interpretive Note to Annex IA in order to establish
hierarchical order between GATT 1994 and GATS. The
absence of such provisions between the two instruments implies
that GATT 1994 and GATS are standing on the same plain in
the WTO Agreement, without any hierarchical order between
the two.
4 9
Accordingly, the Panel concluded that Article III of GATT 1994
491 Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 5 1, at 66.
498 Id.
499 Id.
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was applicable to Part V. 1 of the Excise Tax.0
iii. Article III Claim
Having determined that Article III was applicable, the Panel
then had to consider whether the Excise Tax was inconsistent with
Article 111:2.50 ' Article 111:2 requires that imports "shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes, or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products."5 °2 The Panel addressed two
questions in ascertaining whether there was a violation of Article
111:2: (1) whether imported split-run periodicals and domestic
non-split-run periodicals are like products, and (2) whether
imported split-run periodicals are subject to an internal tax in
excess of that applied to domestic non-split-run periodicals. °3 An
affirmative answer to both of these questions would mean that it
was a violation of Article 111:2's first sentence.5 4 However, if the
answer to the first question was negative, then further examination
would be required to determine if a violation under Article III:2's
second sentence was present."'
(a) Like Product Analysis
The Panel first had to determine if imported split-run
periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals were "like
products."5 6 The United States argued that the Canadian excise
tax created an artificial distinction between "otherwise entirely like
products-split run and non-split run magazine editions."5 7 The
United States pointed out that a similar edition of a magazine sold
in another country did not alter the fact that magazines have
similar "physical characteristics, end-uses, content, advertising, or
'00 See id. at 67.
'0' See id.
502 Id. (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:2).
503 See id. at 68.
'o' See id.
505 See id.
506 See id. at 69.
507 Id. at 23.
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any other attribute."5"8 These traditional factors for determining
like product, according to the United States, were satisfied with
respect to imported split-run and non-split-run domestic
magazines.,09
Canada argued that imported split-run periodicals basically
reproduced foreign editorial content and combined it with
advertising directed at the Canadian public.51 °  Canadian
periodicals, on the other hand, had editorial content developed for
the Canadian market; therefore, Canada argued, imported split-run
periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals were
"distinguishable on the basis of their content, the essential
characteristic of any magazine" and were not "like products"
within the meaning of Article 111:2.5"
The Panel examined the magazine Harrowsmith Country Life
and compared the Canadian edition with a hypothetical U.S.
edition of the publication.' The Panel concluded that the
magazines would have "common end-uses, very similar physical
properties, nature and qualities." '513 In addition, the magazines
would most likely have "the same readership with the same tastes
and habits. 5 14 However, one magazine, the imported split-run
periodical, would be subject to the excise tax while the domestic
non-split-run magazine would not.515 Therefore, based on the
traditional factors used to determine "like products" the Panel
determined that imported split-run periodicals and domestic non-
split-run periodicals were like products. 6
Next, the Panel had to determine if imports were subject to an
internal tax in excess of that applied to domestic non-split-run
508 Id.
'0' See id.
510 See id.
511 Id. at 23-24.
512 See id. at 69.
513 Id.
514 Id.
515 See id.
516 See id.
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periodicals.517 Canada argued that the excise tax did not apply
"indirectly," under the definition in Article 111:2, to periodicals but
rather was levied on the value of advertisements in the
periodical."8 The Panel did not accept this argument because the
tax was applied to "each split-run edition of a periodical on a per-
issue basis."519 The Panel stated:
We note that the excise tax is not "directly" applied to
periodicals in that it is levied on the value of advertisements,
not on the value of periodicals per se. However, it is clear that
the tax is applied in respect of each split-run edition of a
periodical on a "per issue" basis. Therefore, the tax is applied
"indirectly" to periodicals within the ordinary meaning of the
terms of Article 111:2. Canada's narrow reading of the term
"indirectly" is supported only by Canada's own interpretation of
the drafting history, which is contested by the United States....
Furthermore, the Panel report cited by Canada in support of its
argument referred to taxation on raw materials by way of
example. It did not conclude that the scope of the term
"indirectly" is limited to taxation on inputs. We thus conclude
that imported "split-run" periodicals are subject to an internal
tax in excess of that applied to domestic non "split-run"
periodicals.2
It determined that Part V.1 of the Excise Tax violated Article
111:2's first sentence.52' It did not need to examine whether the tax
was inconsistent with Article 111:2's second sentence or if it
violated Article 111:4.522
iv. Postal Rate Claim
The last issue examined by the Panel was whether the postal
rate scheme employed by Canada violated its obligations under
Article 111.523 The Panel found that there were actually two
517 See id.
518 See id. at 69-70.
519 Id. at 70.
520 Id.
521 See id.
522 See id.
523 See id.
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separate issues involved in the postal rate scheme: (1) whether the
fact that Canada Post applies the "commercial Canadian" rates or
the "funded" rates to Canadian periodicals, which are lower than
the "international" rates applied to imported periodicals,
constitutes a violation of Article 111:4; and (2) whether the funded
rate scheme for certain periodicals is allowed as a subsidy within
the meaning of Article 111:8(b). 2 4
(a) Lower Rate Issue
As to the application of lower rates to Canadian periodicals
than to imported periodicals, the Panel first looked at the text of
Article 111:4, which provides:
The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the
territory of any other [Member] shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations, and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on
the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product."'
Having previously determined that the products involved were
"like" products, the Panel considered whether the postal rates
could be viewed as governmental regulations or requirements for
the purposes of Article 111:4.526 Although Canada argued that
Canada Post had a "legal personality distinct" from the Canadian
government, the Panel found that Canada Post generally operated
under governmental instructions and that the Canadian
government controlled Canada Post's pricing and other policies."7
In support of its conclusion, the Panel cited the GATT 1947
Panel decision in Japan Trade in Semiconductors. 8 In that case,
524 See id.
525 Id. (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:4).
526 See id. at 71.
527 See id. In addition, Canada admitted that it could instruct Canada Post to
change its pricing policy. See id.
528 Panel Report on Japan-Trade in Semiconductors, May 4, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D.
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the GATT Panel found that "the operation of measures . . . was
essentially dependent on Government action or intervention. 529
The Canada Split-Run Panel explained that "in view of the control
exercised by the Canadian Government on 'non-commercial'
activities of Canada Post, we can reasonably assume that sufficient
incentives exist for Canada Post to maintain the existing pricing
policy on periodicals., 530 The Panel also considered that "Canada
Post's operation is generally dependent on Government action,"
which led it to "the conclusion that Canada Post's pricing policy
on periodicals can be regarded as governmental regulations or
requirements within the meaning of Article 111:4 of GATT
1994.", '
The Panel then considered the provisions of Article 111:1,
"which articulates the general principle that internal measures
should not be applied so as to afford protection to domestic
production. 532  The Panel held that the "funded" rate scheme
"strongly suggests that the scheme is operated so as to afford
protection to domestic production" '533 because the commercial
Canadian rates were lower than the international rates applied to
imported products. 34 The Panel concluded that the application of
the "commercial Canadian" and "funded" rates to Canadian
periodicals and the higher "international" rates applied to imports
were inconsistent with Article 111:4 of GATT 1994.535
The second inquiry the Panel undertook was whether the
"funded" rate scheme found to violate Article 111:4 could
nevertheless be justified under Article 111:8(b) of GATT 1994,
which states:
(35th Supp.) at 116 (1988).
529 Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 71.
530 Id. at 72.
531 id.
532 Id. (citing Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 18 for the proposition
that the purpose of Article 111:1 is to establish this general principle as a guide to
understanding and interpreting the specific obligations contained in Article 111:2 and in
the other paragraphs of Article III, while respecting, and not diminishing in any way, the
meaning of words actually used in the texts of those other paragraphs).
533 Id.
534 See id.
135 See id.
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The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of
subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including
payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of
internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the
provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through
governmental purchases of domestic products."'
The Panel determined that Canada Post did not retain any
economic benefits from the "funded" rate scheme it applied to
certain Canadian periodicals. 37 The Panel further noted that the
payment of the subsidy was made "exclusively" to qualifying
Canadian publishers. 3 ' Therefore, the Panel found that Canada's
"funded" rate scheme satisfied the terms of Article 111:8(b) and
that the rate discrimination between domestic and foreign
periodicals did not run afoul of Article III."'
Although the Panel found that some of the Canadian measures
were inconsistent with Canada's obligations under the WTO, it did
not lose sight of the fact that maintaining Canadian culture was an
important public policy goal of the Canadian government.5 40 In
anticipation of possible criticism that the decision might cast doubt
on the ability of countries to take action to protect cultural identity,
the Panel report noted that this decision did not pass judgment
upon the "ability of any Member to take measures to protect its
cultural identity ... [It] was not at issue in the present case." 4'
b. Report of the Appellate Body
Both the United States and Canada appealed certain aspects of
the Panel's decision. Although the United States agreed with the
findings and conclusions of the Panel concerning the Tariff Code
and Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act, it took issue with the Panel's
conclusion that Canada's "funded" postal rate scheme was
justified by Article 111:8(b) of GATT 1994.542
536 GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:8(b).
"I See Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, at 73.
538 See id.
519 See id.
140 See id.
541 Id.
542 See Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 9.
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Canada appealed the Panel's finding that Part V.1 of the
Excise Tax Act was a measure regulating trade in goods subject to
GATT 1994.4' Moreover, Canada submitted that even if GATT
1994 applied, the finding by the Panel that Part V.1 was
inconsistent with Article 111:2 was erroneous." Canada argued
that the Panel erred when it found that imported split-run
periodicals and non-split-run periodicals were like products.545
Canada also disagreed with the 'Panel's finding that it had failed to
apply the principle of non-discrimination embodied in Article
111:2.*4 Canada agreed with the Panel's conclusion that the
"funded" postal rate scheme was a permissible subsidy according
to Article II:8(b) of GATT 1994.-7 The Panel's finding with
regard to the Tariff Code was not appealed.
With respect to the first issue, whether Part V.1 of the Excise
Tax Act applied in the case of split-run periodicals, Canada argued
that it was a measure regulating trade in services and, as such, was
subject to GATS. 4' The issue of whether there can be potential
overlaps between GATT 1994 and GATS was not addressed by
the Appellate Body because the parties agreed it was not relevant
to the appeal.
49
The Appellate Body found that Part V. 1 of the Excise Tax Act
was a measure that "clearly applies to goods-it is an excise tax'
on split-run editions of periodicals."55 After an examination of the
measure, the Appellate Body focused on the purpose of Article HI.
The Appellate Body articulated well established principles that:
(1) "the trade effects of a difference in tax treatment between
imported and domestic products do not have to be demonstrated
for a measure to be found inconsistent with Article 111""' and (2)
the fundamental purpose of Article III of GATT 1994 is to ensure
141 See id. at 3.
544 See id. at 5.
541 See id.
546 See id. at 6.
141 See id. at 7.
148 See id. at 16. See also GATS, supra note 496.
149 See Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 19.
550 Id. at 20.
151 Id. at 18 (citing Japan Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 16).
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equality of competitive conditions between imported and like
domestic products. 52 The Appellate Body revisited its analysis in
the Japan Liquor decision and stated that it was not "necessary to
look to Article II:1 or Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994 to give
meaning to Article 111:2, first sentence, in this respect." '553
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel's determination on
the violation of Article 111:2 regarding the treatment Members are
to accord "like products. 554 The Appellate Body stated that:
the Panel found (and Canada did not contest on appeal)
[Canada's Import Tariff Code 9958] to be inconsistent with the
provisions of Article XI of GATT 1994, hypothetical imports of
split-run periodicals have to be considered. As the Panel
recognized, the proper test is that a determination of "like
products" for the purposes of Article 111:2, first sentence, must
be construed narrowly, on a case-by-case basis, by examining
relevant factors including:
(i) the product's end-uses in a given market;
(ii) consumers' tastes and habits; and
(iii) the product's properties, nature and quality.555
The Appellate Body found that the Panel had not adequately
analyzed the criteria in relation to imported split-run periodicals
and domestic non-split-run periodicals 56 For this reason, it had to
determine whether there had been a violation of Article III:2's
second sentence. 57  The Appellate Body explained that the
problem with the Panel's analysis was that it compared two
editions of the same magazine (both imported) "which could not
552 See id.
I d. The Appellate Body explained that in its Japan-Alcoholic Beverages
decision it had stated that "Article 111:1 articulates a general principle" which "informs
the rest of Article III." Id. However, that decision "also said that it informs the different
sentences in Article 111:2 in different ways .... With respect to Article 111:2, second
sentence, we held that 'Article 111:1 informs Article 111:2, second sentence, through
specific reference."' Id.
554 See id. at 20.
"I Id. at 20-21 (citing Canada Split-Run Panel, supra note 51, para. 5.23, and Japan
Liquor Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 20).
556 See id. at 20.
517 See id.
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have been in the Canadian market at the same time. ' Therefore,
in the opinion of the Appellate Body, the Panel's analysis was
flawed and the lack of proper legal reasoning forced it to overturn
the Panel's conclusion. 9 The Appellate Body found that the
Panel could not have logically concluded that imported split-run
periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals were like
products and reversed the legal findings and conclusions of the
Panel on this issue. 6°
The Appellate Body examined the consistency of the measure
(Part V. 1 of the Excise Tax Act) with the requirement in the
second sentence of Article 111:2, which required that "no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other
internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.,,561 Canada
argued that the Appellate Body did not have jurisdiction to
examine a claim under Article 111:2's second sentence because no
party appealed the findings of the Panel on that i. 5 62 Ipary apeaed fi in  fth atissue. n
response to Canada's argument, the Appellate Body stated:
We believe the Appellate Body can, and should, complete the
analysis of Article 111:2 of the GATT 1994 in this case by
examining the measure with reference to its consistency with
the second sentence of Article 111:2, provided there is sufficient
basis in the Panel Report to allow us to do so .... As the legal
obligations in the first and second sentences are two closely-
linked steps in determining the consistency of an internal tax
measure with the national treatment obligations of Article 111:2,
the Appellate Body would be remiss in not completing the
analysis of Article 111:2. In the case at hand, the Panel made
legal findings and conclusions concerning the first sentence of
Article 111:2, and because we reverse one of those findings, we
need to develop our analysis based on the Panel report in order
to issue legal conclusions with respect to Article 111:2, second
558 Id.
... See id. at 22.
560 See id.
56' GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. 111:2.
562 See Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 23.
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sentence, of the GATI" 1994.563
Based on its analysis, the Appellate Body concluded that
imported split-run periodicals and domestic non-split-run
periodicals were "directly competitive or substitutable.
564
The last question to be answered in the analysis of Article
111:2's second sentence was whether the dissimilar taxation was
applied so as to afford protection to the domestic product. First,
the Appellate Body found that the tax on imported split-run
periodicals was "beyond excessive, indeed it [was] prohibitive. 565
Second, the Appellate Body determined that there was ample
evidence that the very design and structure of the measure was
such as to afford protection to domestic periodicals.66 Third,
Canada admitted that the objective and structure of the tax was to
insulate Canadian magazines from competition in the advertising
sector, thus leaving significant Canadian advertising revenues for
the production of editorial material created for the Canadian
market. Based on its analysis of the structure and purpose of the
tax, the Appellate Body found that Part V. 1 of the Excise Tax Act
was designed to afford protection to the production of Canadian
periodicals. 68
The Appellate Body then turned to the issue of Canada's
"funded" postal rate scheme and the applicability of Article
III:8(b) of GATT 1994. The Appellate Body reviewed the text,
context, and object and purpose of Article III:8(b). 69 An accurate
reading of Article 111:8(b), according to the Appellate Body, leads
to the conclusion that "it was intended to exempt from the
obligations of Article III only the payment of subsidies which
involves the expenditure of revenue by a government."57  The
Appellate Body found there was no reason to distinguish a
563 Id. at 23-24.
164 Id. at 28.
565 Id. at 30.
'66 See id.
567 See id. at 31.
568 See id. at 32.
569 See id. at 32-33.
570 Id. at 34.
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reduction of tax rates on a product from a reduction in
transportation or postal rates."7' In addition, the Appellate Body
agreed with the GATT Panel in United States-Malt Beverages that:
Article 111:8(b) limits, therefore, the permissible producer
subsidies to "payments" after the taxes have been collected or
payments otherwise consistent with Article III. This separation
of tax rules, e.g., on tax exemptions or reductions, and subsidy
rules makes sense economically and politically. Even if the
proceeds from non-discriminatory product taxes may be used
for subsequent subsidies, the domestic producer, like his foreign
competitors, must pay the product taxes due. The separation of
tax and subsidy rules contributes to greater transparency. It also
may render abuses of tax policies for protectionist purposes
more difficult, as in the case where producer aids require
additional legislative or governmental decisions in which the
different interests involved can be balanced. 72
The Appellate Body, based on the text, context, and purpose of
Article 111:8(b), found that the Panel erred in its interpretation of
that provision. Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded that
the "funded" postal rate scheme was not justified under Article
111:8(b) of GATT 1994.
7. EC Regime for the Importation, Distribution
and Sale of Bananas573
In February 1996, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
and the United States requested consultations with the EC over
their regime for the importation, distribution, and sale of bananas.
The resulting Panel decision dealt with a complicated structure
571 See id.
572 Id. (quoting United States-Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 206 (1992)).
511 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123. There were four separate Panel reports
issued in this dispute. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/USA, WT/DS27/MEX,
WT/DS27/ECU, WTIDS27/GUA/HON, (May 22, 1997). These reports are identical
except for some paragraph numbers. In addition, certain claims were not raised by all
the parties. Where a complainant did not raise an issue, it was not addressed in the Panel
report for the particular party. With this in mind, the cites to the Panel report will be to
the U.S. report, WT/DS27/R/USA. Where a particular issue is not addressed in the U.S.
report, the Panel report in which the issue was addressed will be cited.
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first put in place by individual members of the EC and then by the
EC collectively.
a. Background of the Dispute
The facts of this case are complex and require an
understanding of several years of history and diplomacy. In order
to continue some form of support for their former colonies in
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP countries), European
countries put in place several different programs, one of which
concerned the importation of bananas. On July 1, 1993, the EC
introduced a common market organization for bananas that
replaced the individual regimes that were in place among the
Member countries.74 The economic importance of the banana
regime to the ACP countries is substantial because many of the
ACP exporting countries are developing nations with relatively
small gross domestic products (GDP)."' The banana regime
provides many small nations with a protected market and steady
income from exports. For example, for St. Lucia, a long time
beneficiary of the EC banana regime, bananas account for
seventeen percent of its GDP.576 Without assured access to the EC
banana markets, many of these small nations would probably not
be able to compete because their bananas are not price
114 See Council Regulation 404/93 of 25 February 1993, 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1
[hereinafter Regulation 404/93].
The EC common market organization allows for imports of bananas from traditional
ACP countries, non-traditional imports from ACP countries, imports from non-ACP
third countries, and EC bananas. The bananas from traditional ACP countries enter duty
free up to a maximum quantity of 857,700 tons. The amount each ACP country can
supply is fixed. The imports of non-traditional ACP bananas and bananas from third
countries are subject to a bound tariff rate quota of 2.2 million tons. With Austria,
Finland, and Sweden joining as new members, the EC increased the bound tariff rate
quota by 353,000 tons. See European Communities and Their Member States-Schedule
of Specific Commitments (Apr. 15, 1994), at 16,373-16,377.
171 The countries enjoying preferential treatment under the EC banana regime are as
follows: Belize, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Ivory Coast, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent, the
Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Suriname, and Venezuela. This list includes the
traditional ACP countries and the parties to the Banana Framework Arrangement.
576 See Canute James & Francis Williams, Bananas: Growers Fear Bleak Future,
FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 11042787.
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competitive.5" In fact, production costs in the Windward Islands578
are approximately one third higher than those of Latin America 9
Without the EC banana regime, banana growers fear that
production of bananas will have to be halted and replaced with
other crops that would offer less income than bananas have
provided in the past.80
Under the Fourth Lome Convention,58' the EC is obligated to
accord "more favorable treatment than that granted to third
countries benefiting from the most-favored nation clause for the
same products.5 82  With respect to bananas, Protocol 5 of the
Lome Convention states that "[i]n respect of banana exports to the
Community markets, no ACP State shall be placed, as regards
access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those
markets, in a less favorable situation than in the past or at
present. 583
In addition to the Lome Convention, the EC negotiated an
agreement with certain countries having an interest in supplying
the EC with bananas. The agreement negotiated with Colombia,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, called the Banana
Framework Agreement (BFA), allowed imports from those
countries at the MFN tariff rate of seventy-five European Currency
Units (ECU) per ton.58  Imports of bananas in excess of the
amounts allowed under category one and two were subject to a
tariff of 822 ECU per ton."8
5 See id.
578 The Windward Islands consist of: Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent, and St.
Lucia. See id.
179 See id.
580 See id.
581 African, Carribean and Pacific States-European Economic Community: Final
Act, Dec. 15 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) [hereinafter Lome Convention]. The Lome
Conventions were a series of conventions the last of which was signed in 1989 and will
remain in effect until the year 2000. See also EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 300
n.705 (citing the Lome Convention).
582 EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 301 (citing Article 168(2)(a)(ii) of the
Lome Convention, supra note 581).
583 Id.
11 See id. at 24.
585 See id.
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The challenge by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and
the United States to the EC system was the third time a Panel had
reviewed the EC banana regime. The first two Panels were under
the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system and both found that
certain aspects of the EC banana regime were inconsistent with its
186obligations under GATT. However, neither Panel report was
adopted because of a lack of consensus.87 Not coincidentally, the
Complainants in earlier Panel disputes with the EC were the
parties to the BFA negotiated in 1994. Also, in 1994, the EC
requested and received a waiver from GATT known as the Lome
waiver.188 The GATT Contracting Parties adopted the waiver in
December 1994, and the waiver was extended by the WTO
General Council in October 1996. The waiver provided in
pertinent part:
[T]he provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General
Agreement shall be waived, until 29 February 2000, to the
extent necessary to permit the European Communities to
provide preferential treatment for products originating in ACP
States as required by the relevant provisions of the Fourth Lome
Convention, without being required to extend the same
preferential treatment to like products of any other contracting
party.589
b. Major Issues Addressed
In the following discussion, all the major issues raised and
decided by the Panel are addressed. The issues presented in this
dispute are best summarized and organized as addressed by the
Panel and can be divided into three categories: (a) organizational
issues, (b) preliminary issues, and (c) substantive issues. 9°
586 See EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, Report of the Panel, DS38/R (Feb.
11,1994) (not adopted); EEC-Member States Import Regimes for Bananas, Report of the
Panel, DS32/R (June 3, 1993) (not adopted). The EC blocked adoption of each report,
as was common under the GATT 1947 dispute settlement regime.
587 See supra note 586.
588 See Lome Convention, supra note 581, Waiver Decision L/7604 of 9 Dec. 1994;
Extension of the Waiver WT/L/186, Decision of 14 Oct. 1996 (commonly referred to as
the "Lome Waiver").
589 EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 301.
9 See id. at 272-73.
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i. Organizational Issues
Two organizational issues arose in this dispute: first, the
extent to which third-parties would be allowed to participate in the
Panel proceedings; and second, the presence of private lawyers at
Panel proceedings.
The first organizational issue arose because of the number of
third parties that wanted to participate. There were no less than
seventeen third party participants Who requested that they be
allowed to participate more fully in the proceedings than was
normally permitted. 9' The Panel examined Article 10 and
Appendix 3 of the DSU for guidance on the issue. Article 10,
paragraphs 2 and 3, provide that:
2. Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before
a Panel and having notified its interest to the DSB ... shall have
the opportunity to be heard by the Panel and to make written
submissions to the Panel. These submissions shall also be given
to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the Panel
report.
3. The parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the1 92
dispute to the first meeting of the Panel.
The Working Procedures set out in Appendix 3, paragraph 6 of
the DSU provides that "[a]ll third parties ...shall be invited in
writing to present their views during a session of the first
substantive meeting of the Panel set aside for that purpose."'5 93 The
EC requested that third parties be allowed to participate in other
Panel meetings and not just the first one. The Complainants did
not agree with the EC and believed the rights of third parties were
sufficiently safeguarded by the normal procedures in the DSU.594
The Panel determined that third parties would be able to observe
the whole of the proceedings at the first Panel meeting and not just
the session set aside for hearing third-party arguments.9
The Panel reviewed GATT 1947 practice with regard to third
'9' See id. at 274.
592 DSU, supra note 4, arts. 10.2-3.
"I Id. app. 3, para. 6.
51 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 274.
'9' See id.
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party participation in Panel meetings and found that under the
prior practice expansive rights had been granted to third parties,
but only after agreement between the parties involved.5 96 Because
no such agreement between the parties could be reached in this
dispute, the Panel decided that third parties would be allowed to
"have the opportunity also to make a brief statement at a suitable
moment during the second meeting."'5 97 The Panel also stated that
it did "not expect them to submit additional written material
beyond responses to the questions already posed during the first
meeting. 598  The Panel based its decision on the following
considerations:
(i) the economic effect of the disputed EC banana regime on
certain third parties appeared to be very large;
(ii) the economic benefits to certain third parties from the EC
banana regime were claimed to derive from an international
treaty between them and the EC;
(iii) past practice in Panel proceedings involving the banana
regimes of the EC and its member States; and
(iv) the parties to the dispute could not agree on the issue. 99
The third parties requested that they be allowed further
participatory rights, including the right to participate in the interim
review process. In the Panel's view, this was not proper because
of the language in DSU Article 15, which only refers to parties as
participants in the interim review process. 6w Therefore, it decided
to grant no further participatory rights than those outlined above.6 °'
The Panel reasoned that "to give third parties all of the rights of
parties would inappropriately blur the distinction drawn in the
DSU between parties and third parties. 6°2  Thus, the Panel
extended third party rights beyond normal limits despite
opposition because of the importance of the case to many third
596 See id. at 274 n.657.
197 Id. at 275.
598 Id.
599 Id.
6 See id.
60' See id.
602 Id.
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parties. This decision to extend participatory rights suggests that,
had there been agreement between the parties to the dispute, there
could have been broader participation by third parties including,
perhaps, participation in the interim review process.
The second organizational issue addressed was the presence of
private lawyers at the Panel's first substantive meeting on
September 10, 1996. The Complainants objected to the presence
of private lawyers at the Panel proceedings. 6°3 The Panel reviewed
Article 12.1 of the DSU and the Working Procedures at Appendix
3 and concluded that "only members of governments (including
the European Commission and an international civil servant of the
ACP Secretariat) [could] attend the Panel meeting."' 4 In coming
to this conclusion, the Panel listed the factors it weighted:
(a) It has been past practice in GATT and WTO dispute
settlement proceedings not to admit private lawyers to Panel
meetings if any party objected to their presence and in this case
the Complainants did so object.
(b) In the working procedures of the Panel, which were adopted
at the Panel's organizational meeting, we had expressed our
expectation that only members of governments would be
present at Panel meetings.
(c) The presence of private lawyers in delegations of some third
parties would be unfair to those parties and other third parties
who had utilized the services of private lawyers in preparing
their submissions, but who were not accompanied by those
lawyers because they assumed that all participants at the
meeting would comply with our expectations as expressed in
the working procedures adopted by the Panel at its
organizational meeting.
(d) Given that private lawyers may not be subject to disciplinary
rules such as those that applied to members of governments,
their presence in Panel meetings could give rise to concerns
about breaches of confidentiality.
(e) There was a question in our minds whether the admission of
private lawyers to Panel meetings, if it became common
practice, would be in the interest of smaller Members as it could
601 See id.
W4 Id.
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entail disproportionately large financial burdens for them.
(f) Moreover, we had concerns about whether the presence of
private lawyers would change the intergovernmental character
of the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
We noted that our request would not in any respect adversely
affect the right of parties or third parties to meet and consult
with their private lawyers in the course of Panel proceedings,
nor to receive legal or other advice in the preparation of written
submissions from non-governmental experts.
The Panel's decision not to allow private lawyers in Panel
proceedings, despite their having been deputized as part of a
delegation, has drawn interest from the organized bar in the United
States and from bar associations in Europe and elsewhere. For
example, the American Bar Association, Section of International
Law and Practice, International Trade Committee has established a
Subcommittee on Private Counsel on WTO Dispute Settlement
Proceedings; the Subcommittee is examining the issue as this
article goes to print. The justifications listed in the Panel's report
are the ones generally mentioned by Members when asked why
other Members would be denied the right to counsel of their
choosing. In addition, because the WTO is the creature of an
international agreement, Members who believe the right to
deputize non-governmental lawyers for purposes of Panel
proceedings is an important issue can seek to have existing
practice modified through negotiations within the WTO.
In any event, the Appellate Body in the banana dispute
authorized the appearance of private counsel to represent Member
governments in the banana appeal. 6°6 It is not clear whether the
actions of the Appellate Body will result in a revisiting of the
practices of the Panels by Member nations or will be maintained in
future appeals.
ii. Preliminary Issues
The Panel addressed certain "preliminary" issues raised by the
EC. The EC claimed that the Complainants did not fulfill the
minimum consultation requirement of affording a reasonable
605 Id. at 275-76.
606 See id.
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possibility for arriving at a mutually satisfactory solution and that
the Complainants had also failed to set out a clear statement of the
claims of the dispute. 67 The EC also questioned the request for the
establishment of a Panel, arguing that it was unacceptably vague
and failed to comply with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the
DSU.68 Furthermore, the EC claimed that the United States had
no legal interest in the dispute and should not be allowed to raise
any claims.6°9 Finally, the EC claimed it was entitled to separate
Panel reports under Article 9 of the DSU.
610
The Panel took up these "preliminary" issues in turn. The
Panel rejected the EC's claim that the consultations were
inadequate and stated that:
[t]he only prerequisite for requesting a Panel is that the
consultations have "fail[ed] to settle a dispute within 60 days of
receipt of the request for consultations .... Ultimately, the
function of providing notice to a respondent of a complainant's
claims and arguments is served by the request for establishment
of a Panel and by the complainant's submissions to that Panel.6 '
The Panel next considered whether the request for the Panel
provided enough specificity as to the issues raised by the
Complainants.6 2  Ultimately, the question was determined by
" See id. at 276.
608 See id. DSU, supra note 4. Article 6.2 reads:
The request for the establishment of a Panel shall be made in writing. It shall
indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue
and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to
present the problem clearly. In case the applicant requests the establishment of
a Panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall
include the proposed text of the special terms of reference.
DSU, supra note 4, art. 6.2.
6 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 276.
610 See id.
611 Id. at 278 (citing DSU, supra note 4, art. 4.7).
612 See id. at 279. The request for establishment of a Panel stated:
The Governments of Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United
States, acting jointly and severally, each in the exercise of the rights accruing to
it as a member of the WTO, therefore, respectfully request the establishment of
a Panel to examine this matter in light of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures, the Agreement on Agriculture, the GATS, and
the TRIMS Agreement, and find that the EC's measures are inconsistent with
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observing the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. In
particular, the Panel stated:
We therefore find that the Panel request made by Complainants
was sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 of the
DSU to the extent that it alleged inconsistencies with the
requirements of specific provisions of specific WTO
agreements.
In light of the foregoing finding, since the invocation of the
Agreement on Agriculture in the Panel request did not indicate
a specific provision thereof, we will not consider the claim
raised by Ecuador in its first written submission under that
Agreement. We will also not consider the claim raised by
Ecuador, Guatemala and Honduras, and the United States in
their first written submission under Article 5 of the TRIMs
Agreement since the Panel request referred only to Article 2 of
the TRIMs Agreement.613
In arriving at its conclusion the Panel reviewed previous WTO
Panel requests64 and observed that "in most cases there [was] no
specific explanation given as to how the contested measure is
inconsistent with the requirements of the specified provisions of
the specified agreements. '61 5  The Panel found that to date no
WTO Panel had found a request to be either inadequate or
inconsistent with the terms of Article 6.2 of the DSU.616 The
Panel's decision appears to create clear lines for judging the
propriety of claims being pursued before a Panel: was the
Agreement and Article of the Agreement identified in the request
for consultations; if yes, the Panel will have jurisdiction.
The requirement of a "legal interest" when requesting the
establishment of a Panel was raised by the EC with respect to
claims made by the United States. The EC argued that because
the following Agreements and provisions among others: (1) Articles I, II, III,
X, XI and XIII of the GATT 1994, (2) Articles 1 and 3 of the Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures, (3) the Agreement on Agriculture, (4) Articles II,
XVI and XVII of the GATS, and (5) Article 2 of the TRIMS Agreement.
Id.
613 Id. at 285-86.
614 See id. at 284 n.679.
615 EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 284.
616 See id.
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banana production in the United States was minimal and its
exports were nil, it had no legal interest in the claims it was
pursuing.6 7 Article 3.3 of the DSU provides:
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly
under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures
taken by another Member is essential to the effective
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper
611balance between the rights and obligations of Members.6.
The EC argued that this language in Article 3.3 of the DSU
implied a requirement that the United States suffer nullification or
impairment of WTO benefits in respect to trade in bananas. The
United States, in the EC's view, could not raise a "goods" issue
because it had "no legal right or interest" in the trade of bananas as
619
a good.
The Panel examined Article 3.7620 of the DSU to determine
what type of legal interest was required. The Panel stated that
"[t]he likelihood of litigation by all against all seems unlikely, as
Members are admonished by Article 3.7 of the DSU to exercise
restraint in bringing cases ....
The Panel found that neither Article 3 nor any other portion of
the DSU contained an explicit requirement that a Member must
have a "legal interest" as a prerequisite for requesting a Panel.622
617 See id. at 286. The Panel report lists U.S. banana production (including Puerto
Rico) as 54,500 tons and U.S. banana importation as 0.4 million tons in 1994. See EC
Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 15 (citing FAO and Eurstat sources).
618 DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.3.
619 EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 286.
620 Article 3.7 of the DSU provides:
Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether
action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim of dispute settlement
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually
acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered
agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed
solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to
secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be
inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements ....
DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.7.
621 EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 287.
622 See id. at 286.
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The Panel went on to explain:
We fail to see that there is, or should be, a legal interest test
under the DSU. This view is corroborated by past GATT
practice, which suggests that if a complainant claims that a
measure is inconsistent with the requirements of GATT rules,
there is not a requirement to show actual trade effects. GATT
rules have been consistently interpreted to protect "competitive
opportunities" as opposed to actual trade flows.
6 2 3
Therefore, the Panel decided that the United States had a right to
advance the claims it raised in its request.6 4
The last "preliminary" issue the Panel addressed was the
number of Panel reports to be issued in the dispute. The EC had
625argued for four separate reports. In support of its argument, the
EC invoked Article 9 of the DSU, which addresses situations
where more than one Member requests the establishment of a
Panel.626 In particular, the EC argued that the Panel was required
to submit its findings to the DSB in a manner that protected "the
rights the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate
Panels examined the complaint., 627  The Panel agreed and
concluded that Article 9 required separate Panel reports to be
issued in the dispute in order to protect the rights of the EC.628
iii. Substantive Issues
The Panel had to decide the claims of five Complaining
parties.629 The claims involved several aspects of GATT 1994, and
623 Id.
624 See id. at 288.
625 See id.
626 See id.
627 Id. (quoting Article 9.2 of the DSU, supra note 4).
628 See id. The Panel explained its decision as follows:
In our view, one of the objectives of Article 9 is to ensure that a respondent is
not later faced with a demand for compensation or threatened by retaliation
under Article 22 of the DSU in respect of uncured inconsistencies with WTO
rules that were not complained of by one of the complaining parties
participating in the Panel proceeding. Our reports must bear this objective in
mind.
Id.
629 See id. at 26-27. Although there were five complaining parties, Ecuador,
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a tremendous amount of evidence was put forward by the parties
regarding a number of extraordinarily complex issues. As
previously noted, the Panel decided that the EC had a right to four
separate Panel reports for each Complaining party, each of which
was approximately 380 pages in length when the decisions were
issued.6 30  Although the Complainants submitted several of the
same issues to the Panel, some Complainants raised different
issues. The following chart provides an overview of the issues
raised by each of the respective parties.
Complainants and Issues Raised
631
Import
Country GA 1T 1994 Licensing TRIMs GATS
Agreement
United States 1: 1; 111:4; X; 1.3; 3.2; 2 and 5 II and XVII
and XIII and 3.5
Mexico 1:1; 111;4, X; 1.2; 1.3; 3.2; 2 II and XVII
and XIII and 3.5
Ecuador 1:1; 111:4; X; 1.2; 1.3; 3.2; 2 and 5 II and XVII
and XIII and 3.5
Honduras and 1:1; II; 111:4; 1.3; 3.2; 2 and 5 II and XVII
Guatemala X; and XIII and 3.5
(a) Like Product Analysis
The issue of "like product" was dispensed with quickly by the
Panel. The Panel found, according to the factors commonly used
in GATT practice and the fact that all the parties to the dispute had
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States, two of these countries, Guatemala
and Honduras, filed their request for consultations jointly and were considered as
pursuing a joint claim. Therefore, the Panel issued one report to cover the claims put
forward by Guatemala and Honduras.
630 See id.
631 See id. at 26-27. The Panel stated: "Aspects of the EC's measures applying to
bananas were cited as being inconsistent with the following provisions and Agreements
in those submissions .... Id. (citing the first submissions of the Complaining Parties).
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"proceeded in their legal reasoning on the assumption that all
bananas are 'like products,"' that bananas from ACP, non-ACP,
and the EC were like products. 62  The issue was not seriously
pursued in this dispute and the Panel found that the submissions of
the parties resolved the issue.
(b) Article XIII
The report took each issue raised by the Complainants in turn,
starting with whether the EC market regime for bananas was
consistent with Article XIII of GATT 1994. Article XIII:2(d)
addresses country-specific allocations of tariff quota shares and
requires that shares must be given to Members with a "substantial
interest" in supplying the product concerned. 633 The position of
new Members who acceded to the WTO after the implementation
of the EC banana regime was also an important issue in
determining the rights of the parties because the EC allocated tariff
quota shares to some ACP and BFA countries and not others. The
Panel stated:
In this case, the EC allocated tariff quota shares by agreement
and assignment to some Members (e.g., ACP countries (in
respect of traditional and non-traditional exports), Nicaragua
and Venezuela) without allocating such shares to other
Members (e.g., Guatemala). Moreover, under the BFA, the
BFA countries were given special rights in respect of
reallocation of tariff quota shares that were not given to other
Members (e.g., Guatemala). For the reasons noted above ...
such differential treatment of like products from Members is
inconsistent with the requirements of Article XIII: 1.
We now consider the position of a Member who acceded to the
WTO or GATT after the implementation of the EC common
market organization for bananas (a "new" Member) .... There
is no requirement that a Member allocating shares of a tariff
quota negotiate with non-Members, but when such countries
accede to the WTO, they acquire rights, just as any other
Member has under Article XIII whether or not they have a
632 Id. at 289.
633 Id. at 292 (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XIII:2(d)).
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substantial interest in supplying the product in question.
Thus, although the EC reached an agreement with all Members
who had a substantial interest in supplying the product at one
point in time, under the consultation provisions of Article
XIII:4, the EC would have to consider the interests of a new
Member who had a substantial interest in supplying the product
if that new Member requested it to do so. The provisions on
consultations and adjustments in Article XIII:4 mean in any
event that the BFA could not be invoked to justify a permanent
allocation of tariff quota shares. Moreover, while new
Members cannot challenge the EC's agreements with Colombia
and Costa Rica in the BFA on the grounds that the EC failed to
negotiate and reach agreement with them, they otherwise have
the same rights as those Complainants who were GATT
contracting parties at the time the BFA was negotiated to
challenge the consistency with Article XIII. Generally
634
speaking, all Members benefit from all WTO rights.
The Panel set out the requirements of Article XIII to determine
if the EC's allocations were consistent with its obligations under
that Article. In a case in which quotas are allocated among
supplying countries, "the Member applying the restrictions may
seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota
with all other Members having a substantial interest in supplying
the product concerned. 635  In a case where this method is not
reasonably practicable:
the Member concerned shall allot to Members having a
substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon
the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous
representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of
the product, due account being taken of any special factors
which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the
636product.
634 Id. at 298-99 (footnotes in quoted text have been omitted).
635 Id. at 290-91 (quoting GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XIII:2(d)).
636 Id. at 291. Article XIII, sections (4) and (5) provide:
4. With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2(d) of this
Article or under paragraph 2(c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative
period for any product and the appraisal of any special factors affecting the
trade in the product shall be made initially by the Member applying the
1998]
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The Panel determined that Article XIII was clear and required
that when quantitative restrictions were used, that they must be
used in the least trade-distorting manner possible.637 In the words
of the Panel, this case was "the first case in which a broad
challenge to a quota or tariff quota system has been made."63
Therefore, it was necessary for the Panel to determine how the
terms and subdivisions of Article XIII work together.
The Panel found that Article XIII's general non-discrimination
requirement was modified by Article XIII:2(d), which provides
that tariff shares can be allocated to supplying countries because
"the terms of Article XIII:2(d) make clear that the combined use of
agreements and unilateral allocations to Members with substantial
interests is not permitted.""63  Therefore, in the absence of
agreements with "all Members having a substantial interest in
supplying the product, the Member applying the restriction must
allocate shares within the rules of Article XIII:2(d), second
sentence." ' 0
The next question was whether country-specific shares must be
allocated to Members that do not have a "substantial interest" in
supplying the product. The Panel noted that the first sentence of
Article XIII:2(d) refers to allocation of a quota "among supplying
countries. ' 6" It then recognized that "this could be read to imply
that an allocation may also be made to Members that do not have a
restriction: Provided that such Member shall, upon the request of any other
Member having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the
request of the [Contracting Parties], consult promptly with the other Member or
the [Contracting Parties] regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion
determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special
factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, formalities or any other
provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate
quota or its unrestricted utilization.
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or
maintained by any Member, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this
Article shall also extend to export restrictions.
GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XIII:4-5.
637 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 291.
638 Id. at 292.
639 Id.
640 Id.
641 Id.
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substantial interest in supplying the product. 62 However, if this
interpretation was accepted, then "any such allocation must...
meet the requirements of Article XIII: 1 and the general rule in the
chapeau to Article XIII:2(d)." 643 The Panel stated:
Therefore, if a Member wishes to allocate shares of a tariff rate
quota to some suppliers without a substantial interest, then such
shares must be allocated to all such suppliers. Otherwise,
imports from Members would not be similarly restricted as
required by Article XIII: 1. As to the second point, in such a
case it would be required to use the same method as was used to
allocate the country-specific shares to the Members having a
substantial interest in supplying the product, because otherwise
the requirements of Article XIII: 1 would not be met.64
The Panel then examined this practice in light of the object and
purpose of Article XIII and determined:
Members not having a substantial supplying interest will be
able, if sufficiently competitive, to gain market share in the
"others" category and possibly achieve "substantial supplying
interest" status which, in turn, would provide them the
opportunity to receive a country-specific allocation by invoking
the provisions of Article XIII:4. New entrants will be able to
compete in the market, and likewise have an opportunity to gain
"substantial supplying interest" status. For the share of the
market allocated to Members with a substantial interest in
supplying the product, the situation may also evolve in light of
adjustments following consultations under Article XIII:4. In
comparison to a situation where country-specific shares are
allocated to all supplying countries, including Members with
minor market shares, this result is less likely to lead to a long-
term freezing of market shares. This is, in our view, consistent
with the terms, object and purpose, and context of Article
XIII.645
The Panel found that the banana import system, by allocating the
tariff rate quota amounts to ACP countries, was inconsistent with
642 Id. at 292-93.
64' Id. at 293.
644 Id.
645 Id.
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the provisions of Article XII.64' 6
The Panel then looked to the Lome waiver to determine if it
applied to cover the inconsistency with Article XIII. 647 The Lome
waiver, by its own terms only covered the EC's obligations with
respect to Article 1: 1.64' Therefore, the Panel had to determine if a
measure that was inconsistent with Article XIII, could be covered
by a waiver applicable to Article 1.64' The Panel found that the
Lome waiver did cover the inconsistency with Article XIII
because it was the only way to give real effect to the waiver.65°
The Panel explained:
[I]n order to give real effect to the Lome waiver, it needs to
cover Article XIII to the extent necessary to allow the EC to
allocate country-specific tariff quota shares to the ACP
countries in the amount of their pre-1991 best-ever banana
exports to the EC. Otherwise, the EC could not practically
fulfill its basic obligation under the Lome Convention in respect
of bananas, as we have found that it was not unreasonable for
the EC to conclude that the Lome Convention may be
interpreted to require country-specific tariff quota shares at
levels not compatible with Article XIII. Since it was the
objective of the Lome waiver to permit the EC to fulfill that
basic obligation, logically we have no choice therefore but to
interpret the waiver so that it accomplishes that objective."'
In addition to giving effect to the terms of the waiver, the
Panel concluded that the foregoing interpretation was correct
because of the close relationship between Article I and Article
XIII. The Panel reasoned that:
Article I requires MFN treatment in respect of "rules and
formalities in connection with importation", a phrase that has
been interpreted broadly in past GATT practice, such that it can
appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff quota
allocations. Such rules are clearly rules applied in connection
646 See id.
647 See id. at 301.
648 See id. at 303.
649 See id. at 304.
650 See id.
651 id.
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with importation . ... To describe the relationship somewhat
differently, Article I established a general principle requiring
non-discriminatory treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and
formalities in connection with importation. Article XIII: 1 is an
application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the
administration of quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas. In
that sense, the scope of Article XIII: 1 is identical with that of
Article I.652
In effect, any inconsistency between the obligations under Article
XIII and the EC banana regime was covered by application of the
Lome waiver.
The EC also claimed that the BFA quota share allocations
were consistent with GATT rules because they were included in
their Schedules as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations."'
The Complainants argued that a prior adopted GATT Panel
report654 supported the conclusion that tariff bindings in Schedules
cannot justify an inconsistency with the Members obligations
under the WTO Agreement. 5  In the GATT Panel report,
commonly referred to as the "Sugar Headnote case," the United
States was found to be in violation of its obligations under Article
XI: 1, even though it put certain qualifications regarding
quantitative restrictions in its Schedule.656 The Panel agreed with
the GATT Panel in the Sugar Headnote case and determined that
the EC's inclusion of allocations inconsistent with the
requirements of Article XIII did not prevent a Member from
challenging those allocations.657
652 Id.
653 See id. at 305.
654 See id. (citing Panel Report on US-Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, June 22,
1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 341-343 (1989) [hereinafter Sugar Headnote
Case]).
655 See id.
656 See id. In the Sugar Headnote decision, the Panel found that "Article 11:1(b)
does not permit contracting parties to qualify their obligations under other provisions of
the General Agreement and that the provisions in the United States GATT Schedule of
Concessions can consequently not justify the maintenance of quantitative restrictions on
the importation of certain sugars inconsistent with the application of Article XI:1."
Sugar Headnote Case, supra note 654, at 343.
657 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 307.
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(c) Licensing Procedures, GAIT, and GATS
Under the EC regime, there were three categories of import
licenses for bananas: Category (A), consisted of operators who
marketed third-country bananas and non-traditional ACP bananas
during the preceding three-year period; Category (B) operators
were those who marketed bananas from EC and traditional ACP
sources during a preceding three-year period; and Category (C)
operators were new market entrants who started marketing third-
country or non-traditional ACP bananas. Operators who marketed
third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas as well as
traditional ACP and EC bananas qualified for both category (A)
and (B). 658 The EC Regulation allows for 66.5% of the licenses
allowing the lower tariff rate quota for Category A operators; the
next 30% is reserved for Category B operators; and the last 3.5%
is reserved for Category C operators.659
The Complainants claimed that the licensing categories and
restrictions were inconsistent with EC obligations under Article I
and Article III of GATT 1994 and that the effect it had on service
providers was inconsistent with Articles II and XVII of GATS.66°
The Panel found that the licensing procedures and restrictions
were inconsistent with the provisions of Articles I and III of
GATT 1994 and Articles II and XVII of GATS.66' In the Panel's
interpretation, such a regime was inconsistent with the EC's
obligations under Article : 1 because it constituted an advantage of
the type covered by Article I that accorded an advantage to
traditional ACP bananas not accorded to the like products from
662other Members. The Panel noted that Article 1: 1 of GATT 1994
obliges Members to accord any advantage granted to any
product originating in any country to the like product
originating in the territories of all other Members, in respect of
matters referred to in Article 111:4. The matters referred to in
658 See id. at 317.
659 See id.
660 See id. at 318.
661 See id.
662 See id. at 319. The Panel noted that the second Banana Panel had reached the
same result. See id. (citing Panel Report on EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, DS8/R
(Feb. 11, 1994) (not adopted)).
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Article 111:4 are "laws, regulations and requirements affecting
[the] internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution and use [of a product]". In our view, the allocation
to Category B operators of 30 percent of the licenses allowing
for importation within the tariff quota of third-country bananas
means ceteris paribus that operators who in the future wish to
maintain or increase their share of licenses for the importation
of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota
tariff rates would be required to maintain or increase their
current purchases and sales of traditional ACP (or EC) bananas
in order to claim that they market traditional ACP (or EC)
bananas for purposes of the operator category rules. Such a
requirement to purchase and sell a product from one country...
in order to obtain the right to import a product from any other
country ...at a lower rate of duty under a tariff quota is a
requirement affecting the purchase of a product within the
meaning of Article 111:4 and 1: 1.663
The Panel determined, with respect to the licensing procedures
applied to third-country and non-traditional ACP imports, that the
Lome waiver did not waive the EC's obligations under Article
1:1.664 The Panel reasoned that the licensing procedures violated
the preamble of the waiver because they "creat[ed] undue
,,661 ePaedifficulties for the trade of other parties. Second, the Panel
found that the Lome waiver did not apply to the licensing
procedures because those procedures were not one of the
advantages that ACP countries formerly enjoyed.666  The Panel
concluded that this finding was in accordance with past Panel
practice of interpreting waivers narrowly.
67
(d) Hurricane Licenses
The EC granted hurricane licenses only to operators including
663 Id. at 326.
664 See id. at 330.
665 Id.
666 See id. at 329.
667 See id. at 330 (citing Panel Report on US-Restrictions on the Importation of
Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the
Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th
Supp.) at 256-57 (1990)).
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or directly representing EC (or traditional ACP) banana producers
61or producer organizations. In order to be granted a hurricane
license, the operators had to have suffered damage by a tropical
storm.669 Category A operators who have historically marketed
third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas would not be
allocated hurricane licenses under the EC regime. 6' ° The Panel
found that the EC's practice of only issuing hurricane licenses to
ACP and EC producers and producer organizations or operators,
was not applied in a neutral manner nor administered fairly and
equitably, and, therefore, was inconsistent with the requirements
of Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement. 67'
(e) GATS
This dispute was the first to examine a measure affecting trade
in services where a Member had undertaken specific commitments
in the particular service sector.6 ' Although the GATS Agreement
applies to trade in services, its coverage is not universal because it
does not cover those provided for in the exercise of governmental
authority, and it contains national treatment and most-favored-
nation principles.673 In order to determine if a Member has
obligations under GATS, it is necessary to review the Member's
Schedule of Commitments because Members can choose the
particular services in which they make market access and national
674treatment commitments. A Member will only have obligations
668 See id. at 337. Hurricane licenses authorize operators to import third-country
and non-traditional bananas when it is otherwise impossible to supply the EC with
bananas because of tropical storm damage. See id. at 337-38. Article 1.3 of the
Licensing Agreement provides: "The rules for import licensing procedures shall be
neutral in application and administered in a fair and equitable manner." Id. at 339. This
was an issue pursued primarily by Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. See id.
669 See id.
670 See id. at 339.
671 See id.
672 See also Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra notes 548-49 and
accompanying text noting that the issue was not raised on the appeal from the Panel's
decision. See generally Canada Split-Run Panel, supra notes 496-99 and accompanying
text for a discussion on the application of GATS to a measure aimed primarily at goods
but that also had an impact on services.
673 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 342.
674 See The Design and Underlying Principles of the GATS, VTO Secretariat, (Apr.
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concerning a particular service or service provider if the Member
has so provided in its schedules.67
The arguments put forward by the parties concerned the
measures applied to wholesale trade services involving the
distribution of bananas.676 The Panel found that with respect to the
measures within the EC import licensing regime, GATS applied
because: (1) GATS, like GATT, was an umbrella agreement that
applies to all sectors of trade in services and all types of
regulations; 677 (2) the preparatory work of GATS confirmed that
the word "affecting" did not mean "in respect of' and, therefore,
GATS covered not only laws and regulations that directly
governed the conditions of sale or purchase but also those that
might adversely modify conditions of competition between like
23, 1997).
675 See id.
676 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 342.
677 Article I of GATS provides:
1. This Agreement applies to measures by Members affecting trade in services.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply
of a service:
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member;
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other
Member;
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the
territory of any other Member;
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons
of a Member in the territory of any other Member.
3. For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) "measures by Members" means measures taken by:
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central,
regional or local governments or authorities; In fulfilling its obligations and
commitments under the Agreement, each Member shall take such
reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their observance by
regional and local governments and authorities and non-governmental
bodies within its territory;
(b) "services" includes any service in any sector except services supplied in
the exercise of governmental authority;
(c) "a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" means any
service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition
with one or more service suppliers.
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domestic and imported products on the internal market; and (3)
GATS covers the supply rather than the delivery of services."'
The Complainants argued that the EC's import licensing
provisions directly targeted North and South American firms that
distributed bananas. 679 The licensing procedures provided definite
competitive advantages to EC and ACP owned firms that engaged
in wholesale services. 6 0 The Complainants submitted that four
key components of the EC banana regime were inconsistent with
GATS: (1) the operator category licenses, (2) export certificates,
(3) hurricane licenses, and (4) activity function allocations.68' In
the Complainants' view, the EC had drastically altered the
competitive conditions by structuring the regime for the wholesale
distribution of bananas to favor domestic service suppliers.682
The EC argued that the measures the Complaining parties
raised were not "measures affecting trade in services. 683 In the
EC's view, the measures regulated the importation of goods, not
services. The EC argued that, "the objective of the GATS is to
regulate trade in services as such . . . . [I]t covers the supply of
services as products in their own right. ' '684 The EC further argued
that a measure could not be covered by both GATT and GATS
because the coverage of the two agreements was intended to be
mutually exclusive. 685 GATS, under the EC's analysis, governs
"measures affecting trade in services" and not the supply of
goods.686
The Panel did not agree with the EC and undertook its own
analysis of what GATS covered. In particular, the Panel reviewed
the rules of interpretation and how they related to their analysis of
GATS, supra note 496, art. 1.
678 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 343-44.
679 See id. at 195.
680 See id.
681 See id.
682 See id.
683 Id. at 342.
684 Id.
685 See id.
686 Id.
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GATS. The Panel applied the following legal reasoning:
In accordance vith Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, we note that the ordinary meaning of the term
"affecting", in Article 1: 1 of GATS, does not convey any notion
of limiting the scope of the GATS to certain types of measures
or to a certain regulatory domain. On the contrary, Article 1: 1
refers to measures in terms of their effect, which means they
could be of any type or relate to any domain of regulation. Like
GATT, the GATS is an umbrella agreement which applies to all
sectors of trade in services and all types of regulations. We also
note that the definition of "measures by Members affecting
trade in services" in Article XXVII(c) has been drafted in an
illustrative manner by the use of the term "include." Sub-
paragraphs (i)-(iii) do not contain a definition of "measures by
Members affecting trade in services" as such, but rather are an
illustrative list of matters in respect of which such measures
could be taken. In other words, the term "in respect of' does
not describe any measures affecting trade in services, but rather
describes what such measures might regulate.
With respect to the claim by the EC that GATT and the GATS
cannot overlap, we note that such a view is not reflected in any
of the provisions of the two agreements. On the contrary, the
provisions of the GATS referred to above explicitly take the
approach of being inclusive of any measure that affects trade in
services whether directly or indirectly. These provisions do not
make any distinction between measures which directly govern
or regulate services and measures that otherwise affect trade in
687
services.
In determining what the provisions of GATS required of
Members, the Panel examined the language in Article 11:1 of
GATS which provided that "[w]ith respect to any measure covered
by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like
services and service suppliers of any other country. 688
687 Id. at 343-44.
688 Id. at 348-49 (citing GATS, supra note 496, art. II). Article 11:2 provides: "A
Member may maintain a measure inconsistent with paragraph I provided that such a
1998]
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The Panel found that the "obligations contained in Article 11: 1
of the GATS to extend 'treatment no less favorable' should be
interpreted to require providing no less favorable conditions of
competition., 68 9  In addition, the EC had undertaken a full
commitment on national treatment in the sector of wholesale trade
services with respect to supply through commercial presence. 69°
This meant that the EC had committed in its GATS schedules to
accord no less favorable treatment to the wholesale trade service
providers from other Members than it accorded domestic
wholesale trade service providers.691
The Panel then examined Article XVII of GATS. With respect
to the allocation of import licenses on the basis of operator
categories, the Complaining parties claimed this was a violation of
the national treatment obligation in Article XVII of GATS. 692 The
Panel analyzed Article XVII, which provided that in order to
measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the Annex on Article II Exemptions."
GATS, supra note 496, art. 11:2. Article 11:3 provides: "The provisions of this
Agreement shall not be so construed as to prevent any Member from conferring or
according advantages to adjacent countries in order to facilitate exchanges limited to
contiguous frontier zones of services that are both locally produced and consumed." Id.
art. 11:3.
689 EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 351.
690 See id. at 352.
691 See id.
692 Article XVII (National Treatment) of GATS provides:
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service
providers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply
of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers. (Specific commitments assumed under this
Article shall not be construed to require any Member to compensate for any
inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of
the relevant service or service suppliers.)
2. A Member may meet the requirements of paragraph 1 by according to
services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical
treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services
or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service
suppliers of any other Member.
GATS, supra note 496, art. XVII.
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establish a breach of the national treatment obligation, three
elements must be demonstrated: (1) the EC had undertaken a
commitment in a relevant sector and mode of supply, (2) the EC
had adopted or applied a measure affecting the supply of services
in that sector and/or mode of supply, and (3) the measure accords
to service suppliers of any other Member treatment less favourable
than it accords to the EC's own like service suppliers.693
The Panel reviewed the categorization of A and B operators
and stated:
We note that the categorization of A and B operators is based
on whether they have during a previous three-year period
marketed EC and traditional ACP bananas or third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas. The operator category rules
apply to service suppliers regardless of their nationality,
ownership or control . . . .Thus, the EC rules establishing
operator categories do not formally discriminate against
Complainant's wholesale service suppliers on the basis of their
694
origin.
The Panel then turned to the question of whether the
"application of formally identical operator category rules,
nevertheless, modifies conditions of competition in favour of
service or service suppliers of EC origin, or at the expense of
services or service suppliers of third-country origin.,, 695 The Panel
determined that, according to Article XVII, identical treatment
could be considered less favorable treatment if it adversely
modifies conditions of competition for foreign services or service
providers. 96
The Panel examined how the rules for establishing operator
categories had impacted the conditions of competition for foreign-
owned or controlled service suppliers.6 97 The EC's allocation to
693 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 353.
694 Id. at 355.
695 Id. at 356; see GATS, supra note 496, art. XVII:2-3.
696 See EC Bananas Panel, supra note 123, at 357.
697 See id. at 358. The Panel examined the complainants' arguments and the
impacts that would result and explained that:
[T]he Complainants submit that before the introduction of the EC banana
regime, companies controlled or owned by natural or juridical persons of their
1998]
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Category B operators of thirty percent of the licenses for
importation of bananas from third-country and non-traditional
ACP countries at in-quota tariff rates had created less favorable
conditions of competition for the like service suppliers of
Complainant's origin and was inconsistent with Article XVII of
GATS.6 9' Accordingly, the Panel stated:
[W]hen licences authorizing in-quota imports of third-country
and non-traditional ACP bananas are traded, sellers of licenses
will usually be Category B operators and purchasers of licenses
will usually be Category A operators . . . . Thus in general,
Category A operators are able to purchase the licences they
need in addition to their annual licence entitlement if they wish
to maintain their previous market share. However, initial
licence holders who carry out the physical importation of
bananas or sell the licences in any case reap tariff quota rents,
whereas licence transferees have to purchase these licences for a
price up to the amount of the tariff quota rent from initial
licence holders .... Given that licence transferees are usually
Category A operators who are most often service suppliers of
foreign origin and since licence sellers are usually Category B
nationalities held a market share of over 95 per cent of the imports of Latin
American bananas to the EC.
[T]he Complaints submit that prior to the introduction of the EC common
market organization, the share of the three large banana companies (i.e.,
Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte) in the EC/ACP market segment was only 6 per
cent and that the share for all non-ACP foreign-owned companies was less than
10 per cent. While the EC states that in 1994, 28 per cent of the EC/ACP
production was controlled by three large banana companies, for our purposes
what is important is the relative share of service suppliers of the Complainants'
origin of the EC market for EC/ACP bananas. On either view, we conclude that
most of the suppliers of Complainants' origin are classified in Category A for
the vast majority of their past marketing of bananas, and that most of the
suppliers of EC (or ACP) origin are classified as Category B for the vast
majority of their past marketing of bananas.
Id. Operators classified in Category A cited for most of their past trade volume were:
Chiquita Brands (U.S.), Dole Foods (U.S.), Noboa (Ecuador), Del Monte (Mexico),
Uniban (Colombia), Banacol (Colombia) (information submitted by Complainants). See
id. at 358 n.812. Operators in Category B cited for most of their past trade volume were
Geest (UK), Fyffes (Ireland), Pomona (France), Compagnie Fruitiere (France),
CDB/Durand (France), Gipam (France), Coplaca (Spain), Bargoso SA (Spain). See id.
at 358 n.813.
698 See id. at 357.
[Vol. 23
WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
operators who are most often service suppliers of EC (or ACP)
origin, we conclude that service suppliers of Complainants'
origin are subject to less favourable conditions of competition
in their ability to compete in the wholesale services market than
service suppliers of EC (or ACP) origin. 699
Because the categorization of operator licenses created less
favorable conditions of competition for foreign-owned service
suppliers, the Panel found that the EC's commitments under
GATS were not fulfilled under Article XVII of GATS.700
For essentially the same reasons, the Panel found the
categorization of service suppliers also violated Article II of
GATS. T'M In order to establish a claim under Article II of GATS
two elements must be satisfied: (1) the EC has adopted or applied
a measure covered by GATS; and (2) the EC's measure accords to
services or service suppliers of Complainants' origin treatment
less favorable than it accords to the like services or service
providers of any other country. 7°2 The Panel established that the
measures implementing the operator category rules constituted
measures affecting trade in services, satisfying the first
requirement of a GATS Article II violation. °3  The Panel
determined that the allocation to Category B operators of thirty
percent of the licenses allowing importation of third-country and
non-traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates creates less
favorable conditions of competition for like service suppliers of
Complainants' origin. TM Therefore, the measure was inconsistent
with the requirements of Article II.
The Panel rejected both the narrow interpretation of GATS
offered by the EC and the argument that the agreements are
mutually exclusive. This means that if a measure relates to goods
but affects trade in services, it could be found to violate GATT,
with respect to goods, GATS, with respect to services, or both.
Although the Panel found that most of the EC banana regime
699 Id. at 359-60.
700 See id. at 361.
701 See generally id. at 361-63.
702 See id. at 361.
703 See id. at 362.
71 See id. at 363.
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was inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO Agreements,
it nevertheless recognized that there were great economic and
social effects from the measures at issue in the dispute.05
However, the Panel also noted that the fundamental principles of
the WTO and the WTO rules were designed to foster, not impede,
the development of countries.
The Panel's decision has been appealed by the EC and the
Complaining Parties to the Appellate Body.7 °7 Therefore, the final
chapter in the EC Banana dispute has not at this point been
written.
The EC appealed the Panel's decision to the Appellate Body
on June 11, 1997. The principle issues the EC appealed were the
Panel's interpretations and legal conclusions regarding: (1) its
interpretation of Article XIII of GATT 1994; (2) its finding that
GATT and GATS are two mutually overlapping agreements and
that the measures complained fell simultaneously under GATT
and GATS; (3) its interpretations of Article II of GATS; and (4) its
finding that the United States had a legal right or interest in
advancing claims under GATT.7 °8
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States
filed a joint cross-appeal under Rule 23(1) of the Working
705 See id. at 376.
706 See id.
707 On June 11, 1997, the EC notified its intention to appeal certain issues of law
and legal interpretations developed by the Panel, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Notification of an Appeal by the
European Communities under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), WT/DS27/9 (June 13,
1997). See WTO Dispute Overview, supra note 106, at 2. The Complainants, the United
States, Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala and Honduras submitted their joint appeal to the
Appellate Body on June 26, 1997.
708 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, Notification of Appeal by the European Communities under paragraph 4 of
Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, (DSU) WT/DS27/9 (June 13, 1997). In addition, the EC made claims
regarding, the scope of the Lome Convention, the characterization of the TRQs (tariff
rate quotas) and the preferential regime as a single import regime for bananas, the
finding of nullification of impairment with respect to the United States, and the burden
of proof under GATS. The EC also claimed that the Panel failed in its obligation to
interpret the WTO and its annexed agreements in conformity with the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law under Article 3.2 of the DSU.
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Procedures for Appellate Review.7°9  The Appellate Body
communicated to the DSB that its decision would be released by
September 9, 1997.710
VII. Treaty Interpretation and the WTO
An important issue in WTO dispute settlement is how the
agreements are to be interpreted. The rights and obligations of
Members must be carefully considered by the Panels and the
Appellate Body. In each previously reviewed decision, the Panel
and Appellate Body analyzed the interpretation issue. The Panel
and Appellate Body both relied on the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and the interpretation rules adopted by the DSB to
date.
The DSU provides that agreements should be interpreted "in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. 71' Panels and the Appellate Bodies have
construed this language to reference the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 712 The principles of treaty interpretation set out in
709 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas (AB-1997-3), Appeal of Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the
United States, Under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (26
June 1997), appealing 3 issues: (1) the Panel's extension of the waiver to GATT Article
XIII breaches with respect to the EC's assignment of country-specific allocations to
"traditional" ACP suppliers; (2) the Panel's extension of the EC's WTO waiver for
measures "required" by the Lome Convention to cover certain tariff preferences
provided to "non-traditional" ACP bananas; and (3) the Panel's decision to exclude from
its considerations GATS claims made by Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico that were
within its terms of reference, solely on the basis that those claims were not made in their
first written submissions.
710 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/10 (Aug. 11, 1997) (Communication from the Appellate Body).
I" DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.2. The Appellate Body circulated its decision on
September 9, 1997. See Dispute Settlement Overview, supra note 106. It "mostly
upheld the Panel's findings, but reversed the Panel's findings that the inconsistency with
GATT Article XIII is waived by the Lome waiver, and that certain aspects of the
licensing regime violated Article X of GATT and the Import Licensing Agreement." Id.
The complainants applied for binding arbitration to determine "'reasonable period of
time' for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB." Id. The
reasonable period of time was determined to be between September 25, 1997 and
January 1, 1999. See id.
712 See supra notes 126, 170, 440, 452, 499, 687 and accompanying text. There are
73 parties to the Vienna Convention including most of the major trading partners of the
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the Vienna Convention are viewed by many as customary
international law-that is, as a rule or set of norms so universally
accepted by nations that they obey the rule or norms out of a sense
of obligation.
Certain articles of the Vienna Convention are particularly
important and are frequently cited by Panels and the Appellate
Body. The most often cited article is 31, found in section 3 of the
Vienna Convention. Article 31 establishes that treaties are to be
"interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. '71 3 The Convention also allows for
the consideration of related agreements and subsequent practice in
order to interpret treaties.74  Article 32 provides that "[r]ecourse
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion" where the provisions are ambiguous or would lead to
an absurd result.7' 5
United States. Major trading partners who are parties to the Vienna Convention include,
to name just a few: Canada, Mexico, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, Italy, Russian
Federation, Korea, Chile, and Colombia.
713 Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 3 1(l).
714 See id. art. 31(2)-(4). The Convention reads as follows:
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Id.
"I Id. art. 32.
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Article 28 provides for the non-retroactive application of
treaties.716 The principle of non-retroactive interpretation of
treaties is important for parties because it provides them with the
assurance as to their obligations under a treaty. Parties would
likely be discouraged from signing treaties if retroactive
application were allowed because they could be found in
immediate violation of the treaty for past acts. This result is
avoided under the principle contained in Article 28.
Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, it nevertheless recognizes that
the Treaty represents generally accepted principles of customary
international law.717 Section 325 of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopts the same
provisions as Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.18
VIII. Observations on Early Panel and Appellate Body
Decisions Under the WTO
In general, the Panel and Appellate Body process has worked
relatively well in the first two and a half years of the WTO. A
716 See id. art. 28. The article reads:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established,
its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place
or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of
the treaty with respect to that party.
Id. See also supra notes 300, 348 and accompanying text.
717 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES § 325
cmt. a (1987). Therefore, unless the Vienna Convention comes into force for the United
States, this section does not strictly govern interpretation by the United States or by its
courts in the United States. But it represents generally accepted principles and the
United States has appeared willing to accept them despite differences of nuance and
emphasis.
718 The Restatement reads:
§ 325. Interpretation of International Agreement
(1) An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.
(2) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the agreement, and subsequent practice between the parties in the application
of the agreement, are to be taken into account in its interpretation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES § 325 (1987).
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variety of procedural issues have arisen in the cases and in the
mechanics of requesting Panels. Some have been resolved
through Panel reports and Appellate Body reports. Issues resolved
include (1) whether parties can raise issues on appeal that were not
separately noticed, (2) the amount of content that is needed for an
issue to properly be before a Panel, (3) whether Members can be
represented by private counsel and under what conditions. While
some of these issues could be revisited during the 1998 review of
the dispute settlement system by the WTO or may evolve over
time (e.g., private counsel), issues addressed by the Panels on
procedural issues are likely to be accepted as correct and will
promote more uniform practice going forward.
Some procedural issues, however, will almost certainly be
addressed during the 1998 review. For example, Article 6.1 of the
DSU states that "a panel shall be established at the latest at the
DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as
an item on the DSB's agenda."7 9 The Article does not cover all
possible situations. For example, consider what happens if, at a
DSB meeting, the party whose action is the subject of the request
for a Panel objects, and the party seeking a Panel does not request
a Panel at the next meeting because of ongoing consultations. If
the Complaining party asks for a Panel a second time at the third
meeting, is the establishment of a Panel a matter of right or a
matter of whether the other party chooses not to object? This issue
has arisen in disputes and the disagreement has led to delays in
Panel formation. Ideally, this issue will be addressed in 1998.
A. Standard of Review
On factual issues, Panels are guided by Article 11 of the DSU
where they are instructed to "make an objective assessment of the
matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of
the case."72 This approach has led to little or no deference to
Member governments charged with gathering the factual
information and to date has resulted in no sympathy being shown
for administrative burdens or difficulties in compiling information.
719 DSU, supra note 4, art. 6.1.
720 DSU, supra note 4, art. 11.
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An arguably different standard of review for factual
determinations is called for under Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, which provides:
[I]n its assessment of the facts of the matter, the Panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was
proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the Panel might have reached a different conclusion, the
evaluation shall not be overturned .
This standard of review was added at the insistence of the
United States at the end of the Uruguay Round to deal with the
problem of perceived substitution of judgment by a Panel in
matters where the Panel generally had little of the massive
administrative record that was before the agency. The United
States expects that this standard will apply to both anti-dumping
and countervailing duty determinations that are challenged at the
WTO. 722
In mid-1997, several requests for consultations on U.S. anti-
dumping determinations were made by the Republic of Korea.
Those cases and other disputes involving anti-dumping and
countervailing duty measures should provide some insight into
whether the language included in Article 17.6(i) will be a more
deferential standard than that applied in other disputes or whether
Panels choose to construe the language as permitting the continued
substitution of judgment. 23
The standard of review for interpretations of agreements has
resulted in Panels and the Appellate Bodies construing the
Agreement terms with no deference to Member states. The United
721 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and trade 1994, Art. 17.6, in Annex IA to WTO Agreement, supra note 1
[hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement].
722 See supra notes 308-11 and accompanying text; Declaration on Dispute
Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM).
723 Some have argued that such a construction would be permissible. See Steven P.
Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996).
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States pushed for adoption of a standard that would give the
benefit of the doubt to the contracting party, but that suggestion
• . 724
was rejected. To date no legal issue has been viewed as properly
left to the construction of the Member countries because the issue
was not addressed or was vague, although such results may simply
reflect the sampling of cases that have made it through the dispute
settlement process. As reviewed in some of the individual
disputes, reference to the negotiating history occurs only where
there is ambiguity. Thus, intentions of parties may seldom be
reflected in constructions by particular Panels or by the Appellate
Body. Similarly, construction of similar or identical language
under prior agreements, if not trade liberalizing (e.g., practice and
construction under the MFA for textiles and apparel), appear to be
given little, if any, consideration in constructing WTO terms.
The United States also insisted on an arguably different
standard of review of legal interpretations in the anti-dumping and
countervailing duty area. Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement states:
[T]he Panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
or public international law. Where the Panel finds that relevant
provisions of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the Panel shall find the authorities'
measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon
725
one of those permissible interpretations.
Unlike the standard of review on facts, anti-dumping and
countervailing duty challenges use the same operative language in
the first sentence: "in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. 726 However, the second
sentence requires that Member governments be given the option of
selecting any of the constructions that are permissible. Time will
tell whether Panels will ever perceive that multiple constructions
of agreement terms are permissible.
Finally, Panels and the Appellate Body appear to be doing
little more than paying lip service to the requirement that
724 See supra notes 433-36 and accompanying text.
725 Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 721, art. 17.6(ii).
726 Implementation of Article VI, supra note 46, at ii.
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"[lrecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements., 7 ' Take, for example, the Banana Panel's views on
the effects of scheduled commitments that may be viewed as
contrary to other GATT 1994 Articles. Throughout the course of
the Uruguay Round negotiations, agriculture liberalization was
one of the most difficult issues. Many countries who promoted
significant trade liberalization in agriculture (e.g., the Caimes
group of countries) signed onto the Uruguay Round package only
because of specific entries made in various countries' schedules.
If such obligations in the schedules can be voided by other parties
on the theory that the obligations contravene other GATT 1994
articles, how do the Panel reports not change the rights and
obligations of the Members? This is particularly true where all
parties to the Uruguay Round had an opportunity to review the
schedules of commitments and raise objections prior to the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round process.
B. Role of the TMB in Textile Disputes
Unlike other agreements, the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC) requires that emergency actions (imposition of
quotas under Article 6) be reviewed by a special body before a
challenge can be brought to the DSB." 8 Such a review ideally
permits quick decisions and, if there are errors, quick correction.
As can be seen from the review of the two Panel decisions
involving textiles, 9 the special Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB),
conducts something akin to a de novo factual review of the
decision of the Member state applying restrictions.
Information that becomes available to a Member country after
the date of the action challenged is routinely gathered and
considered by the TMB in determining whether the action of the
Member country is warranted. The TMB then makes appropriate
recommendations or findings to the Members where a consensus is
727 DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.2.
72 See ATC, supra note 40, art. 8.10.
729 See supra notes 360-424 and accompanying text (discussing the Costa Rica
Underwear decision); supra notes 425-71 and accompanying text (discussing the India
Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel and Appellate Body decisions).
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reached. Any party who is dissatisfied with the action of another
party after the recommendations are made may seek consultations
and dispute settlement under the DSU.
7 30
The early Panel decisions under the WTO make clear that: (1)
the issue before the Panel is not whether the recommendation of
the TMB was correct or incorrect but rather whether the
underlying decision of the administrator comports with ATC
Article 6, and (2) the Panel will not consider later facts to support
action by a Member but may consider later facts to discredit a
finding of serious damage."'
Thus, the TMB process serves little function if a matter is not
resolved at the TMB stage and is essentially ignored by Panels and
the Appellate Body. To the extent that Panels and the Appellate
Body are correct in ignoring developments at the TMB, it raises
questions as to why Member nations wanted the TMB to publish
reasons for its decisions. It is possible that fuller decisions will
make consensus easier in cases over time or will satisfy the
concerns of Members about recommendations contrary to their
positions. However, the added work does not presumably simplify
the task for Panels as the factual record will always be "polluted"
with information not before the decision maker at the time of the
initial decision.
C. Transitional Safeguards as an Integral Part of the ATC
In both of the textile cases, the Panels found that a transitional
safeguard measure under the ATC was to be viewed as an
exception rather than a integrated part of the Agreement rights.733
As Panel reports dealing with the "exception" make clear, GATT
precedent construes "exceptions" narrowly.
However, in the India Wool Shirts and Blouses dispute, the
Appellate Body characterized the "transitional safeguard
730 See supra note 446.
731 See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra notes 373-99 and accompanying text;
India Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel, supra notes 443-55 and accompanying text.
732 The WTO Members decided to require the publication of full reasons as part of
the Ministerial Declaration in December 1996.
"I See Costa Rica Underwear Panel, supra note 42; India Wool Shirts and Blouses
Panel, supra note 51.
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mechanism provided in Article 6 of the ATC as a fundamental part
of the rights and obligations of WTO Members. 734 The Appellate
Body's construction is preferred because Article 6 is an integrated
part of the ATC package. It is part of the rights and obligations
and countries understood and expected action would be taken.
There is no basis for treating these rights as exceptions.
D. Number of Disputes Taken to the Appellate Body
Not surprisingly, in the early stages of the WTO, every Panel
report has been appealed. Perhaps more surprising has been the
large number of instances where legal constructions by Panels
have been reversed. The relatively high rate of reversal on appeal
is likely to ensure that dockets stay jammed for some time to
come.
The practical effect of a heavy Appellate Body workload is the
probable desirability of having Appellate Body Members be
present full time in Geneva. With the "collegiality" objective and
the large number of disputes, participating on the Appellate Body
has already approached a full time task. Such a change may have
implications for the type of individuals who will be able to serve
on the Appellate Body. At the same time, the heavy workload
raises practical issues in terms of adequacy of staff and other
resources for the Appellate Body (and, of course, for Panels) at the
WTO.
Opinion appears divided in Geneva as to whether the dispute
settlement process will slow down in terms of numbers of cases
within the next few years. The workload will likely remain heavy
and become increasingly complex, particularly as cases
challenging anti-dumping, countervailing duty, SPS, TBT and
other actions that may involve massive administrative records start
to work their way through the system.
Also, the Canada Split-Run decision by the Appellate Body
raises the interesting question of whether there should be the
capability of remanding a matter to a Panel where the Appellate
Body reverses and the remaining record does not contain adequate
73 India Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body, supra note 51, at 16. The
Appellate Body did not address this issue in the Costa Rica case because it was not one
of the issues appealed.
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information to permit the Appellate Body to complete its work
without some evaluation of factual information.735 Obviously, the
trade-off is increased time before a final decision is rendered.
With judicial experience in the United States as an example,
Member nations would do well to resist the urge to add a remand
process to the DSU during the 1998 review.
For Panels, the complexity of cases, such as those involving
photographic film and paper, and beef hormones, raises concerns
about the adequacy of resources within the WTO to staff,736 and of
the Missions within Geneva to provide, acceptable Panelists.
While there are many non-governmental Panelists available, WTO
staff limitations and budget limitations for use of non-
governmental Panelists raise significant questions about the
volume of disputes that can practically be handled at any given
time.
IX. Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body
Recommendations
As was discussed above, the WTO dispute settlement system is
fundamentally different from the system under GATT 1947. It is
more legalistic and automatic. Decisions cannot be blocked as
they were in the past.73 7 Members must comply with adopted
Panel or Appellate Body decisions, pay compensation, or face
retaliation."' The degree to which Members are implementing
adverse decisions indicates that Members are taking the dispute
settlement process seriously.
In the Japan Liquor dispute, the United States alleged that
Japan was taking too long to implement the Appellate Body's
ruling. The United States applied for binding arbitration under
Article 21(3)(c) of the DSU on December 24, 1996, almost two
months after the Appellate Body's decision was adopted by the
711 See Canada Split-Run Appellate Body, supra notes 556-64 and accompanying
text.
736 Reportedly, in 1997, every lawyer within the WTO, regardless of division,
worked on staffing Panels because of the existing workload.
737 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
738 See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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DSB. 39 The United States wanted the arbitrator to determine the
reasonable period of time for implementation of the
" 7 4 0
recommendation of the Appellate Body. In that case, the
arbitrator found that a reasonable time to implement the
recommendations would be fifteen months.7 '
This decision is not binding on other parties in other cases, but
it does provide an example of a timetable deemed reasonable for
implementation of recommendations. From the Japan Liquor case
it appears that the WTO will monitor implementation of
recommendations but the Complainants must be vigilant in their
efforts to ensure compliance and implementation in a reasonable
period of time.
No other Members to date have invoked the arbitration article
under the DSU to speed along a Member's implementation of a
Panel or Appellate Body recommendation. It is unclear if this
means that Members are faithfully and fully implementing the
recommendations within a reasonable period of time. For
example, the Panel and Appellate Body recommendations were
adopted by the DSB in the Reformulated Gas dispute on May 20,
1996.742 The U.S. EPA issued its final rule, to bring the U.S.
measure in conformity with the adopted recommendations, on
August 28, 1997.743
The ruling by the arbitrator in the Japan Liquor case and the
EPA's action indicate that Members are taking adopted Panel and
Appellate Body recommendations seriously. Implementation of
adopted Panel and Appellate Body recommendations will be
monitored by the DSU and the Complaining parties.
719 See Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/15, WT/DS10/15,
WT/DS I1/13 (Feb. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Report of the Arbitrator].
740 See WTO Dispute Overview, supra note 106, at 1.
741 See Report of the Arbitrator, supra note 739, at 9.
742 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996).
743 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements for Gasoline
Produced by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 80).
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X. What the Developments at the WTO During the First
Two and a Half Years Mean for the Private Bar
For private practitioners and their clients in the United States,
the first two and a half years of the WTO have brought about some
important developments in Geneva as well as in Washington.
First, substantially increased transparency has been obtained in
dispute Panel proceedings in which the United States is a party.7M
This means that lawyers and their clients have a better opportunity
to track issues of potential relevance and to provide comments to
USTR. USTR's actual track record in complying with new
statutory requirements on information available to the public is
reasonably good although some problems remain.7 45 There are also
policy questions about why written comments from the public
should not be included in the public record at some point in a
dispute.
Second, a framework to deal with conflicts of interest has been
adopted, which should give the appearance, and hopefully the
reality of more impartiality among the Panelists serving on
individual disputes.
Third, the early actions of the Appellate Body suggest that
parties losing Panel decisions will be able to obtain meaningful
review by the Appellate Body. Lawyers will want to improve
their knowledge of public international law and encourage their
clients to pursue their interests through parties to the dispute.
Fourth, the role for U.S. lawyers within the WTO dispute
hearing process is evolving. Counsel representing foreign
governments can actively support those governments in factual
research, brief writing, and, at least at the Appellate Body, in
arguing if the government so wishes. At Panels, to date,
appearance is permitted on consent. Counsel for U.S. interests
will be able to provide input to USTR for consideration.
Fifth, just as bi-national Panels use U.S. lawyers under
NAFTA, the United States has submitted a list of U.S. lawyers for
inclusion on the WTO's list of non-governmental Panelists.
Unlike NAFTA, inclusion on the WTO's roster will likely provide
'44 See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
741 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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less direct involvement simply because of the observed preference
for using members of the Geneva missions as Panelists and
because of WTO budget considerations.
Sixth, the potentially historic decision to derestrict most WTO
documents in a timely fashion should permit lawyers and their
clients to better understand the development of WTO agreements
and decisions, permit the formulation of strategies that are more
consistent with WTO objectives, and identify issues needing to be
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addressed within the WTO or in new negotiations. The
importance of the decision will depend in significant part on the
willingness of the WTO and its Members to derestrict quickly and
for the WTO and/or USTR to assure ready access once documents
are derestricted. The online access from the WTO to large
volumes of documents is very encouraging. 141
Seventh, NGOs have made modest progress in their access to
the WTO. Lawyers representing NGOs should benefit from the
increased access.
XI. Conclusion
Despite some unsightly squabbling during 1995 over the
composition of the Appellate Body and the Director General
position of the WTO, the WTO has moved forward with
reasonable dispatch in assessing compliance with WTO rights and
obligations. While noncompliance and non-notification, which
characterized GATT, remain a problem for many developing and
least developed countries, the WTO and major developed
countries and some leading developing countries are providing
increased technical assistance to improve both notification and
compliance.
The dispute settlement process has started quickly and the high
success rate of those challenging conduct of others continues
under the WTO. To date, the United States has lost three
challenges brought against it.748 Efforts to trim U.S. unilateralism
746 See discussion supra at Part III.B.
747 The WTO documents are available on line at http://www.wto.org.
748 See generally Reformulated Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body, supra notes
155-231 and accompanying text; Costa Rica Underwear Panel and Appellate Body,
supra notes 360-424 and accompanying text; Iddia Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel and
1998]
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have had some success, although the dispute with Japan on
automobiles and automobile parts shows that there will be some
cases in which the United States remains willing to invoke
unilateral action.749 More important, the United States, as the
leading user of the dispute settlement system, has enjoyed
significant success in consultations and through Panel and
Appellate Body decisions.
The issue of the propriety of private counsel representing
Members will remain topical for the near term. The Appellate
Body, by allowing private counsel to participate in its proceeding
in the EC Banana case, may create a testing ground for expanded
participation, assuming it maintains this course in other disputes.750
Member nations could address the issue directly through
negotiations in the DSB. Such negotiations could clarify rights
before Panels and the Appellate Body. Therefore, expect any
formal recognition of the right to outside counsel to be
accomplished by conflict and confidentiality 'equirements.
The 1998 review of the DSU by Members should leave the
dispute settlement system substantially unaltered. All in all, the
new system has enjoyed reasonable success to date, even though
significant challenges loom immediately on the horizon.
Appellate Body supra notes 425-71 and accompanying text.
749 See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
750 See supra notes 603-06 and accompanying text.
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